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INDEX.
ABANDONMENT. See EASEMENT, 1.
ABATEMENT.
A proceeding in the county court to compel a guardian to account, abates
on the death of the guardian. Harvey v. Harvey, 262.
ACCOMPLICE. See CRIMINAL LAW, 27, 28.
ACCOUNT. See EQUITY, 7, 39 ; LiMITATIOWS, STATUTE Or, 2, 15, 16, 17;
PARTNERSHIP, 6, 22, 23, 24.
1. Decree denied where complainants' laches has rendered it impossible to
do justice to both parties. S.&out v. Ex'rs of Seabrook, 198.
2. If the court is satisfied that nothing is due complainant a dismissal must
be directed. Id.
3. Where defendant admits his indebtedness, but sets up that a judgment-
creditor of the plaintiff has a suit, in which such indebtedness is sought to be
subjected to the payment of his judgment : Hield. that it is error to render
judgment until such judgment-creditor is made a party. Benson's Adm. v.
Stein, 451.
4. But where the judgment is rendered, the error is cured whenever it is
made to appear of record that the action of the judgment-creditor has been
dismissed. Id.
5. Where the defendant answers that the amount due plaintiff has been
fixed by an award, and the plaintiff replies, admitting the award, and asks
judgment thereon, there is no such departure in pleading as will vitiate a
judgment for the amount admitted to be due. Id.
ACCRETION. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See DEED, 3
ACTION. See ADMIRALTY, 4; AsSUMPSIT, I ; ATTORNEY, 3; INSURANCE, I;
M1ORTGArE, 19; NUISANCE, 4, 8; PARTNERSHIP, 9; STATUTE, 6.
1. Where the charter of a bank rendered the persons and property of the
stockholders liable for the redemption of the bank bills in proportion to their
stock, such liability can he enforced by a separate action against a stock-
holder by a billholder. M ills v. Scott, 518.
2. Debt will lie where the bank's indebtedness and the number of shares
held by the stockholder can he stated. Id.
3. Debt will always lie where the amount sought to be recovered is certain
or can be ascertained from fixed data by computation. Id.
4. If a man knowingly plant, and suffer to grow over the laud of his
neighbor a noxious tree, by which his neighbor's cattle are injured, an action
will lie against him by such neighbor. Crowhurst v. Burial Board, 348.
5. Limits of the doctrine sic utere tuo ut alienurn non ledas, discussed. Id.
Note.
6. A man promised certain stockholders to pay the debts of the corporation,
in consideration of a transfer of stock to him. Failing to pay a certain debt
he was sued in assumpsit by the creditor upon an assignment of this agree-
ment. feld, that the action did not lie since plaintiff's interest could not be
ascertained at law. Pratt v. Bates, 586.
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7. No action lies for the breach of a promise to marry made by a person
incurably impotent. Gdick- v. Guliclk, 583.
8. Suit may be brought to recover money unlawfully exacted under stress
of legal process. .People v. East Saginaw, 451.
9. A railroad, by whose direction a contractor enters upon land which it
has acquired, subject to an existing lease, is liable as a joint-tortfeasor with
the contractor for damages to the crops of the lessee. Ullman v. Hannibal 4'
St. Joseph Railroad Co., 63.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1853, Feb. 26. See BANKRUPTCY, 7.
1863, See EVIDENCE, 12.
1866, July 18. See STATUTE, 6.
1866, July 26. See MINES AND MINING, 1.
1872, May 10. See MINES AND MININo, 6.
1874, Revised Statutes.
Sect. 3082. See STATUTE, 7.
-Sect. 4233. See ADMIRALTY, 1.
Sect. 5117. See BANKRUPTCY, 8.
Sect. 5278. See EXTRADITION, 1.
1875, March 3. See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 1.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. See SHIPPING; NEGLIGENCE, 8, 9, 11, 12.
I. Collision.
1. Rule 22 of 4233 of the U. S. Revised Statutes, directing that a vessel
overtaking another vessel shall keep out of the way, applies until the ovtr-
taking vessel has completely passed the other. Kennedy v. American Steam-
boat Co., 656.
2. A packet conveying mails and carrying on commerce, although belong-
ing to the sovereign of a foreign state, is not exempt from process of law, nor
can the crown clothe such vessel with the immunity of a foreign ship of war.
The Parlement Belge, 726.
II. Liability of Shipowners. See infra, 4.
III. Maritime Lien.
3. Proceedings in rem are exclusively cognizable in admiralty, and the
question whether a case is made for the recall of property released under
bond, must be determined by the courts empowered to hear the pending suit.
United States v. Ames, 517.
4. An action in rein may be sustained to recover damages for the death of
a person caused by negligence. Rusk v. Steamboat, 624 and Note.
IV. Salvage.
5. A tug is not entitled to salvage for rescuing a ship from danger brought
about by the tug's negligent performance of a contract to tow the ship. Thi
Aobert Dixon, 726.
ADMISSION. See EVIDENCE, 11 ; TRIAL, 1.
AGENT. See BANK AND BANxnR, 1; BILLS AND NOTES, 1 ; BROKER, 1, 2
CONTRACT, 9, 11 ; CORPORATION, 10 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 41 ; INSUR-
ANCE, 7, 13, 14; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3; RAILROAD, 1; 'UNITED
STATES, 3.
1. Where either a public or private agent is clothed with general powers,
the means and measures necessary to carry them into effect are also granted.
State ex. rel., 6'c. v. Gates, 62.
2. Where a son is suffered to act as a general agent for his father, the pub-
lic will be justified in assuming that he possesses all the powers of a general
agent. Thurber v. Anderson, 583.
3. An agent to pay mdney, cannot retain it on the ground that his princi-
pal's contract to pay was illegal. Kiewert v. Rindskopf, 656.
4. Payments to an agent bind the principal, where the agent is authorized
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AGENT.
to receive the money, either b express authority, by the usage of trade, or by
the dealings of the parties. Voble v. iVugent, 727.
ALIEN. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1, 2; LAND, 1.
ALIMONY. See CONTEMPT, 1; IIUSBAND AND WIFE, 33, 34, 35.
AMENDMENT. See CRIMINAL LAWV, 1.
ANI MALS. See NEGLIGENCE, 23, 27.
APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS. See GUARANTY, 4; NATIONAL BANK, 5.
ARBITRATION.
The power of a court with the consent of the parties to refer a case to
arbitrators, is incident to all judicial administration where the right exists to
ascertain the facts as well as the law. Newcomb v. Wood, 199.
ARREST.
Manual touching of the body not necessary to constitute an arrest in a
civil action. Richardson, Ez'r v. Rittenhouse, 130.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY. See TREsPAsS, 1 ; VERDICT, 1, 2.
ASSIGNMENT. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 9, 10, 11; PARTNERSHIP, 10;
?LEADING, 3.
1. A claim against the United States, before it is allowed, cannot be
assigned. Spofford v. Kirk, 124.
2. Any writing, clearly appropriating a fund or property to a person, is
esteemed in equity an assignment. Bower v. Stone Co., 198.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION, 6; MORTGAGE, 19.
I. A verbal agreement madeat the time of the execution of a deed forland
that if a survey should show more acres than mentioned in the deed, the ven-
dee should pay for the excess, may be shown by parol and enforced. Ladeke
v. Sutherland, 125.
2. When the assignee of a purchaser sells the land and then is compelled
to pay the original vendor more than is due him, in order to get a deed to
satisfy his vendee, and the payment is made under protest, it is a question for
the jury whether the payment is not involuntary, and if so, the excess may
be recovered back in assumpsit under the common counts. Pemberton v. irl-
liams, 262.
ATTACHMENT. See ACCOUNT, 3; BILLS AND NOTES, 13; EXECUTOR, 4.
RECEIVER, 2, 6; REPLEVIN, 1.
1. Cannot be made to operate on a merely legal title where plaintiffs have
or are bound to take notice of the equitable title. Tucker v. Vandermark,
335.
2. Money paid into court is not liable to attachment. Mattingly v. Grimes,
388.
3. A stockholder who owes a corporation for unpaid stock upon which a
call has been made, may be garnished on a judgment against the corporation.
ffeints v. Mill Co., 789.
ATTORNEY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 10; EVIDENCE, 29.
1. The privilege of admission as an attorney in the courts of Maryland is
limited to white male citizens above the age of twenty-one years. In re Charles
Taylor, 388.
2. The privilege of admission as an attorney is not a right within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States,
but is governed and regulated by the legislature. Id.
3. Counsel fees cannot be recovered by action, unless a contract fixing the
amount can be shown. Hopper v. Ludlam, 727.
4. The mere possession of a mortgage-deed does not authorize a solicitor to
receive the mortgage-money for his client. Ex parte Swinbanks, 787.
5. In such case, if the client does not receive the money, the mortgagee
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cannot recover without showing that the solicitor was expressly authorized.
Ex parte Swinbanks, 787.
6. Viney v. Chaplin, 2 DeG. & J. 468, followed. Barker v. Greenwood, 2
Y. & C., Ex. 414, distinguished. Id.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL. See CONSTITUTIONAL Liw, 32; Cono ATIoN, 5;
EQUITY, 25.
AUCTIONEER. See CONSTITUTIONAL Liw, 2.
BAILMENT. See EQUITY, 15; NEGLIGENCE, 28; REPLEVIN, 1.
1. A. endorsed a note for W.'s accommodation. V. pledged it to P. for a
debt, and subsequently paid the debt, but wrote to P. asking him to give time
on another debt due from W., and to hold this note as collateral.. A. was
secured for his endorsement. In an action by P. against A.: Held, that W.'8
letter was an actual pledge and not a mere offer : Held further, that '. could
recover. Providence Thread Co. v. Aldrich, 727.
2. Delivery of railroad receipts by a purchaser of grain to the seller as se-
curity for the price is a symbolical delivery of the grain. Tulor v. Turner,
125.
BANK AND BANKER. See ACTION, 1, 2 ; CORPORATION, 4 ; PAnTNEInSHIP, 9.
1. A bank collected money as an agent, placed it with their own moneys,
and wrote to their employers that they had remitted it. Before it was actu-
ally remitted the bank failed: Hed, that the money was part of their general
assets. In re West of England, 4-c., Bank, 788.
2. Pennell v. Deffel, 4 D., M. & G. 372, considered. Id.
BANKRUPTCY. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 2; SET-OPF, 3.
I. Effect of Proceedings.
1. District Courts have no power, under section 25 of the Bankrupt Act, to
order, in a summary way, a sale of an estate claimed by the assignee, but in
the possession of a third person claiming adversely. qifford v. Helmes, 125.
2. Courts of Bankruptcy may exercise, in a summary way, and with notice
to the parties, many of the powers conferred by section 1 of that act. Id.
3. The power given to the Circuit Court by section 2 of the act, to revise
such cases arising in the District Court, does not extend to any case where
special provision for revision is otherwise made. Id.
4. Creditors cannot reach property fraudulently conveyed, except through
the assignee. Glenny v. Langdon, 126.
5. In such case if the assignee will not sue, the court may direct him to
proceed, or may authorize the creditors or the bankrupt to sue in his name
upon indemnifying him against costs. Id.
6. A claim against the government for cotton captured by the United States
forces, and sold, passes to an assignee in bankruptcy, though from the bar
of the statute the claim be not enforceable by legal proceedings. Erwin v.
The United States, 262.
7. The Act of Congress of February 26th 1853, to prevent frauds upon the
treasury, does not embrace the passing of claims to heirs, devisees or as-
signees in bankruptcy. Id.
II. Fraud.
8. Fraud, as used in section 5117 of the Revised Statutes, means positive
and not implied fraud. Wolf v. Stix, 518.
9. It does not include such fraud as the law implies from the purchase of
property from a debtor with the intent to hinder and delay his creditors. Id.
10. The purchaser in such case is not liable to pay to creditors the value of
what he buys. All the risk he runs is that the sale may be avoided and the
property reclaimed for the benefit of creditors. Id.
11. To come within this exception in the Bankrupt Act, the debt must be
created by fraud. Id.
III. Assignee. See supra, 4, 5, 6.
12. A debtor made an assignment for the benefit of creditors and afterwards
paid mqney to a creditor. Subsequently, under proceedings in bankruptc's
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a trustee was appointed who filed a bill and set aside the assignment, and who,
more than two years after his appointment, sued the creditor for the money,
on the ground that it belonged to the assignee. field, that the cause of action
had not accrued to the plaintiff until the assignee's title had vested in him
under his hill in equity. Tappan v. Whitemore, 191.
13. Aliter, if the suit had been brought merely on plaintiff's title as trustee
in bankruptcy for money paid in fraud of the Bankrupt Law. Id.
14. A complete transcript of the record and files need not be given in evi-
dence to support the deed of an assignee. A certified copy of the order
decreeing bankruptcy and appointing the assignee, is sufficient. Heath v.
Hyde, 263.
IV. Discharge.
15. A discharge in bankruptcy of liquidating partner a bar to suit on bond
of indemnity to retiring partner who is subsequently obliged to pay firm debts.
Fisher v. Tifft, 9.
16. Who are sureties and what are contingent liabilities, within the mean-
ing of the Bankrupt Law, discussed. Id. Note.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS, 9.
1. Cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review when a case
has been tried by the court. Bits v. Mogridge, 388.
2. A bill of exceptions, filed after the term, will not be considered, unless
it appears by an entry of record that the opposing party consented. An entry
showing merely that he was present is not sufficient ; nor will the defect be
cured by an entry subsequently made reciting his consent. State v. Duck-
worth, 583.
BILL OF LADING. See COMMON CARRIER, 5.
BILL OF PEACE. See EqUITY, 16.
BILLS AND NOTES. See BAILMENT, 1; COLLATERAL SEctmrrY, I; Evi-
DENcE, 7, 31, 32; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 49, 50, 51 ; INTEREST, I ; LIMIT-
ATIONS, STATUTE OF, 9, 10; NATIONAL BANKx, 3; PARTNERSHIP, 3, 8, 12,
14, 16, 25 ; USURY, 1.
I. Form, Consideration, etc.
1. A promissory note, commencing, "We promise to pay," and signed
"George Moore, Treasurer of Mechanic Falls Dairying Association," is the
note of Moore, and not of the association. Mullen v. Moore, 56.
2. A promissory note payable to A. B., trustee, is not commercial paper.
Third National Bank v. Lange, 382.
II. Rights of Parties. See infra, III.
3. Demand and notice are not necessary as against an endorser, who, at
the maturity of the note, has sufficient property of the maker in his possession
held as security against his liability. Beard v. Westerman, 56.
4. A holder of a note payable in a distant city uses due diligence if he sends
it for collection to a bank in that city, in time to be presented at maturity.
He is not bound to provide against an unanticipated suspension of the bank,
or an unauthorized interference with the letter by the postmaster. Pier v.
Heinrichshoffen, 126.
5. A notary's certificate of protest, stating that notice was put in the post
office, is sufficient, without stating that the postage was prepaid. Id.
6. Delivery of a note by the holder to the maker, with intent to discharge
the debt. does discharge it. Panderbeck v. Tanderbecc, 263.
7. While a negotiable note, payable on demand, is by statute dishonored
at the end of four months, yet where such note is on annual interest, it will
be presumed that the endorser made his endorsement with a waiver of such
demand. Hayes v. Werner, 330.
8. The taking of security by the endorser, is not a waiver of demand and
notice, but is evidence of it. Id.
9. Notice of the non-payment of a negotiable promissory note must be given
to an accommodation endorser. Braley v. Buchanan, 388.
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10. Joint-maker, signing for accommodation, is released by an extension
granted without his knowledge. Barron v. Cady, 518.
11. Parol declarations of payee at the time of signing, that maker would
not be called upon, are not admissible as evidence, and are therefore no
defence to the note. Wright v. Remington, 743.
II Endorsement, Acceptance, etc.
12. Evidence of verbal agreement of payee at the time of endorsing a note,
that he would assume unconditional liability, not admissible. Rodney v.
Wilson, 56.
13. After a transfer of a note by endorsement, the amount due cannot be
garnished in the maker's hands as a debt due the original holder. K, isely v.
Evans, 126.
14. The holder of a note endorsed in blank delivered it with his own
endorsement, preceded by the words, in his own handwriting, "Received one
year's interest on the within, May 10th 1871." Held, that the endorsement
imported merely an acknowledgment of the payment of interest, and any
other intent must be shown by evidence aliunde. Clark v. Whiting, 126.
15. A telegram agreeing to accept a draft for a certain sum, "for stock,"
is not a conditional contract, but an absolute undertaking to accept and pay
the same. Coffman v. Campbell, 198.
116. A subsequent endorser guarantees preceding endorsements, but where
the alleged second endorsement was made before delivery, and the payee sub-
sequently wrote his name above it, the rule cannot apply even in favor of a
bona fide holder without notice. Third National Bank v. Lange, 382.
17. Parol evidence is admissible to show the character in which the alleged
second endorsers stood towards the note. Id.
18. One who endorses a past-due note at the request of the maker, pursu-
ant to a contract with the payee for further indulgence, is liable as guarantor.
Rives v. Thomas, 511.
19. The endorsement by the payee that he holds himself "responsible for
the within note, without notice or protest," is of no other effect than to waive
protest and notice as a necessary step to fix his liability. Halley v. Jackson,
584.
20. The liability of the maker and endorser is several, and it is error to
proceed against them as if they were jointly bound. Id.
BOND. See CONT3rICT, 1.
BOUNDARY.
Where parties claiming under the same grantor recognise a boundary
between them, and one of them afterwards conveys with reference to that
boundary, he and those who claim under him are bound by the description as
against his grantee. Fahey v. Marsh, 518.
BROKER. See CONTRACT, 11.
1. It is contrary to public policy to allow a broker to recover commissions
from both sides, although he acted in good faith. Scribner v. Collar, 389.
2. A broker was employed to find a purchaser for property, the price to be
fixed by the vendor. Having found a purchaser, with whom the vendor
agreed as to the price: Hdd, that no further duty was imposed upon him.
Hughes v. Young, 788.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOr, 7; LIBEL, 1; LIMITA-
TIONS, STATUTE OF, 22; NEGLIGENCE, 20.
CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, &a
Barker v. Greenwood, 2 Y. & C. Ex. 414, distinguished. Ex parte moin-
banks, 788.
Brine v. Insurance Co., 6 Otto, re-affirmed. Orvis T. Powell, 60.
British & Am. Tel. Co. v. Colson, Law Rep., 6 Ex. 18, overruled. House-
hold Fire Ins. C"o. v. Grant, 728.
Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & W. 248, and Reade v. Lamb, 6 Exch. 130,
commented on. Britain v. Rossiter, 716.
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CASES AFFIRMED, COMMENTED ON, OVERRULED, &c.
Claflin v. Rosenburg, 42 Mo. 439, followed. Wrightv. McCormi,.k, 267.
England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856, commented upon. Bent v. The
Baank, 291.
Frost v. Knight, Law Rep. 7 Exch. I11, reviewed. Day v. The Insurance
Co., 47.
Grizewood v. Blaine, I1 C. B. 538, discussed. Thacker v. Hardy, 254.
Hamilton t,. The 1). V. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa 31, and Muldowney v. The
Illinois, &c., Railroad Co., Id. 462, distinguished. Baldwin v. Railroad, 761.
Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, reviewed. Day v. The Insurance
47.
Huntley v. Griffith, F. Moore 452, Goldsbornugh 15.9, followed. In re
Barber, 790.
Inman v. Tripp, 11 R. 1. 520, explained and affirmed, Makefield v.
14 w l, 658.
Ioulton v. Sandford, 51 Me. 127, re-affirmed. Perkins v. Inhabitants of
Fayette, 59.
Pennell v. Deffel, 4 D., M. & G. 372, considered. In re West of England,
-c., Bank, 788.
Penna. Railroad Co. v. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 373, distinguished. Hoag v.
Railroad, 214.
Penna. Railroad Co. v. Herr, 62 Penn. St. 353, followed. Hoag v. Rail-
road, 214.
Preston v. Walker, 26 Iowa 205, followed, Burrows v. Stryker, 268.
Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield, I C., M. & R. 20, followed. Britain v.
Rossiter, 716.
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and The Davis, 10 Id. 15, approved. Carr v. U.
S. 528.
Viney v. Chaplin, 2 DeG. & J. 468, followed. Er parte Swinbanks, 788.
United States v. Clarke County Court, 96 U. S. 211, disapproved. State
v. Macon County Court, 459.
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See SALE, 7.
CERTIORARI.
Is not a writ of right when used to correct proceedings of inferior trib-
unals, and should be denied when it would work public inconvenience.
Trustees v. School Directors, 519.
CHARTER-PARTY. See SHIPPING, 3.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 22, 23; MORTGAGE, I.
CHECK. See PARTNERSHIP, 9 ; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1.
1. The state treasurer may pay a demand upon the treasury by a check
upon a bank where he has money on deposit. State v. Gates, 62.
2. When a county treasurer receives from the state treasurer a bank check
for money due to the county, it is his duty to present it within a reasonable
time, and if he neglects to do this, and the bank fails, the loss will fall upon
himself. Id.
CHOSE IN ACTION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 29.
CITIZENSHIP. See NATURALIZATION, 1 ; U. S. COURTS, 2, 4.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See BAILMENT, 1, 2; BILLS AND NOTES, 3;
SET-OFF, 4.
The holder of a note secured by a chattel-mortgage, who obtains posses-
sion of the property mortgaged, is a trustee of such property and must account
for its fair value if he purchase it at a sale made by himself. Beard v. West-
erinan, 57.
COLLISION. See ADMIRALTY, I.; NEGLIGENOE, 7-12.
COMMITTEE. See INJUNCTION, 7.
C.03MON CARRIER. See FRAUDS STATUTE OF, 2; RAILROAD, 3-11, 25;
SALi, 3.
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1. If a common c~rrier knowing that an article is intended for market,
delays its delivery, the measure of damages is the depreciation in the market
value of the article at the place of consignment, between the time it ought to
have been delivered and the time it was delivered. Devereux v. Buckley,
127.
2. A party cannot maintain an action against the captain of a boat for pre-
venting her from selling her goods on his boat on an excursion ; nor can she
recover when the captain put her goods into the baggage-room, and could not
deliver them to her, owing to the crowd, until it was too late for her to get
them conveyed to the grounds of a picnic where she expected to make sales.
Smailman v. Whilter, 263.
3. The presumption that when goods are accepted, marked toa place, there
is a contract to carry to that place, may be overcome by proof of an express
contract to carry only to an intermediate point. Merchants', 4-c., Trans.
Co. v. Moore, 519.
4. The conditions on the back of a railroad receipt provided that goods for
points beyond the company's line, would be forwarded as opportunity might
offer without liability for delay, or would be placed in the company's ware-
house at the risk of the owner pending communication with the consignee.
In an action against the company for goods destroyed by fire at the company's
warehouse at the terminus of their line: Held, 1. That the company held the
goods as warehousemen. 2. That the evidence in the case was not sufficient
to show negligent delay. 3. That there was a presumption that plaintiff's
agent read the conditions of the receipt. 4. That a conditional promise by
defendant's freight agent to pay for the goods if they were not insured by
plaintiffs, would not be binding without proof of non-insurance. Armstrong
v. Railway Co., 438.
5. The mere fact that a bill of lading contains a clause limiting the com-
mon-law liability of the carrier is not conclusive evidence of such a contract
with the shipper. Merchants', 4-c., Co. v. Leysor, 788.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
1. One who, under the orders of the military authorities of the Confederate
states, destroyed cotton to prevent it falling into the hands of the United States
forces, is relieved from civil responsibility to the owner of the cotton who at
the time voluntarily resided within the lines of the insurrection. Ford v. Surget,
127.
2. All people residing within the insurrectionary districts daring the civil
war were liable to b-. treated as enemies, without reference to their personal
sentiments. Id.
3. The Confederate government was merely the head of an insurrection,
and the courts cannot recognise the validity of its legislative acts. 'd.
4. To the Confederate army, however, in order to prevent retaliation, was
conceded belligerent rights, and its soldiers are exempt from liability for acts
of legitimate warfare. Id.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See ADMIRALTY, 2; FOREIGN JUDGMENT, I; HUS-
BAND AND WIFE, 2, 3, 4, 50; INTEREST, 2 ; RECEIVER, 1, 7 ; SLANDER, 5;
TAX AND TAXATION, 16.
1. In Iowa a contract made in another state authorizing a confession of
judgment by an attorney will not he enforced. Hamilton v. Shoenberger, 263.
2. Goods were attached in Massachusetts and delivered by the officer to a
receiptor, who left them with the debtor, by whom they were brought to Con-
necticut and sold. Held, That the right of the receiptor to maintain replevin
was to be determined by the law of Connecticut. Peters v. Stewart, 331.
CONFUSION OF GOODS.
1. A party mixing the property of others with his own, must be able to dis-
tinguish his own property or lose it Jewett v. Dringer, 263.
2. A junk dealer fraudulently obtained from a railroad, old iron at less
than its value, and mixed it with other old iron belonging to himself, so as
to be undistinguishe0ble. Held. that he must forfeit the whole to the rail-
road. Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See ATTOnNEY, 2; CRIMINAL LAW, 17; LixrTA-
TION.1, STATUTE OF, 19; MULNICI'AL CORPORATION, 21, 22, 31, 32; OF1r-
CEl, I; TAX, 2, 8; WATEItS, 4, 5.
I. Pow, rs of Co.qress.
1. Congress may legislate respecting the people and property in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, as the legislature of any state over its municipalities.
Afattingly v. District of Columbia, 199.
II. Powers of the State Legislature.
2. A state tax on the amount of an auctioneer's sales, so far as it applies
to sales of imported goods in the original package for the importer, is void
as a duty on imports and as a regulation of commerce. Cook v. Pennsylvania,
57.
3. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is determined solely by
its repugnancy to constitutional restraints, and not by its violation of natural
justice. Bertholfv. O'Riellg, 1 1 1.
4. That a statute impairs the value of property or imposes a liability not
known to the common law, does not render it unconstitutional. Id.
5. A statute making the owner of premises on which liquor is sold liable
for damages resulting from the intoxication of the purchaser, held to be valid.
Id.
6. Courts not justified in giving strained construction to a constitutional
provision or a statute, in order to relieve against individual or local hard-
ships. Law v. The People, 128.
7. A statute authorizing the prosecution of the offence of keeping a disor-
derly house, without an indictment, is unconstitutional. State v. Anderson,
129.
8. Not so a statute authorizing a prosecution for the sale of ardent spirits
without a license. Id.
9. The power of police regulation throughout the state is vested in the
legislature, who may require railroad companies to light their railroads within
a city or village. Cin., Ham. J- Day. Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 199.
10. The 32d chapter of the Ohio Municipal Code of 1869, authorizing city
and village councils to require such lighting, is not in conflict with the state
constitution. Id.
It. When, on default of the railway company, such lighting is procured to
be done by the council, the expense may be declared a lien upon the real
estate of the company. Id.
12. The liability of the railway company to pay such expense can only be
enforced by suit, and cannot be collected as a tax or assessment. Id.
13. The attempt of the state of Tennessee to separate itself from the Union
did not destroy its identity, as a state, and its acts during the rebellion are
valid, except where done in aid of the rebellion, or where in conflict with the.
constitution and laws of the United States. Keith v. Clark, 331.
14. By the charter of the Bank of Tennessee in 1838, the state agreed to
receive the bank's notes in payment of taxes. By a constitutional amend-
ment in 1865, it forbade the receipt for taxes of notes issued by the bank
during the rebellion. Reld, that this was impairing the obligation of a con-
tract. Id.
15. The constitutional provision prohibiting laws impairing the obligation
of contracts, does not restrict the right to legislate upon the subject of divorces.
Hunt v. Hunt, 389.
16. An ex post facto law is one which imposes a punishment for an act
which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or which imposes
additional punishment to that then prescribed. Burgess v. Salmon et al., 390.
17. The ex post.facto effect of a law cannot be evaded by giving a civil form
to that which is essentially criminal. .d.
18. The legislative authority of a state is the right to exercise supreme and
sovereign power, subject to no restrictions except those of the state and federal
constitutions, and laws and treaties thereunder. F'y v. The State, 424.
19. A statute cannot be unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of any
contract made after its passage. Id.
20. A statute prohibiting the sale of railroad tickets by any person, except
VOL. XXVIL.-101
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the agents of the railroads, or by a bonafide purchaser of an unused ticket,
is not unconstitutional as granting an exclusive privilege. ry v. The State,
424.
21. Nor is such statute a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the
federal constitution. Id.
22. A state constitution reseryed to the legislature the power to change or
modify subsequent charters. Afterwards by an Act of the Legislature, two
corporations created prior to the constitution, were consolidated with the same
privileges secured by their original charters. Held, that this created a new
corporation which the state might tax notwithstanding an exemption in the
charters of the original corporations. Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 452.
23. An act creating a liability on the part of the seller for an injury from
intoxication, to which the liquor contributes only in part, is not unconstitu-
tional. Sibila v. Bahney, 457.
24. The police power of the states was not surrendered when the people
conferred upon Congress the general power to regulate commerce. Patterson
v. Kentucky, 519.
25. The police power extends to the protection of the lives, the health and
the property of the community. Id.
26. State legislation, strictly and legitimately for police purposes, does
not necessarily intrench upon any authority confided to the national govern-
ment. Id.
27. A Kentucky statute provided for the inspection of certain oils before
sale, and that such as ignited at less than a certain degree of heat should be
condemned as unfit for sale: Held, a police regulation, and not in conflict
with the Federal constitution. Id.
28. States may regulate remedies subject to the restriction that as to past
contracts the remedy be not so materially lessened as to impair the obligation
of the contracts. Taylor v. Stockwell, 569.
29. A state law exempting property from execution is valid as to prior
contracts, provided that the creditor's remedy is not so materially lessened as
to impair the obligation of the contract. Id.
30. A statute may be void as to certain classes of persons, and valid as to
others. State v. Amery, 656.
31. A law, constitutional within certain limitations, may, if it exceeds
those limitations, be void only for the excess. Id.
32. Statutes directing suits for specific objects to be brought by an attor-
ney-general, and regulating the proceedings in them, are very common, and
their validity has uniformly been recognised: United States v. Railroad Co.,
335.
33. An ordinance of San Francisco that every male person imprisoned in
the county jail under judgment of a criminal court should have the hair of
his head "cut or clipped to the uniform length of one inch from the scalp,"
is invalid as being in excess of the municipal authority, and in violation of
the 14th amendment of the U. S. constitution. Ho Al Kow v. Nunan, 676.
34. Evasion of constitutional limitations by state legislatures and the ex-
tent of the prohibition of class legislation, discussed. Id., Note.
35. The legislative right to order low lands to be drained, at the expense
of the owners, rests entirely on ancient custom, and cannot be deduced from
the power to legislate, unless the reclamation of the lands is a matter of direct
public concern. Hoagland v. Wurts, 727.
36. When such legislation is founded on usage it must conform to the
usage. Id.
37. The rules of descent and the power of disposition by will may be regu-
lated from time to time by the legislature. Emmert v. Hays, 792.
III. Toking Private Property. Eminent Domain. See MuNciIPAL Conro.A-
TION, 10, 13, 31, 32; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 4.
38. Where an easement has been appropriated, but the landowner retains
substantial rights in the property, he is not entitled to the value of the land
in fee. Dodson v. Cincinnati, 391.
39. Public authorities have a reasonable time after the ascertainment of the
INDEX. 803
."WNSTITUTIONAL LAW
expense of taking lands for public use to decide whether to accept or refuse
the laud. O eill v. Freeholders, 4-c., 729.
40. Commissioners appointed under a special statute reported a valuation
of lands intended to be taken, but a motion to accept the lands at such valua-
tion was rejected at a meeting of the board of frecholders : Held, that such
rejection was a finality, and that the power given by the act was exhausted:
Id.
41. Respective rights of state and United States, and obligation to make
compensation for land taken, discussed. Note to Greve v. St. Paul, 4-c.,
Railroad Co., 705.
CONTEMPT.
A committal foie contempt in refusing to pay alimony, if regular on its
face, will not lie reviewed on an application for the writ of habeas corpus.
In re Bissell, 452.
CONTRACT. See AGENT, 3; CORPORATION, 8; CUSTOM, 1 ; EQUITY, I;
FRAUD, 4, 8; GUARANTY, 1, 2 ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20, 21, 27, 28; IN-
sURANCE, 4-11; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 10, 11 NAME, 1 ; REIWARD, 1;
SALE, 3, 6; SPECIFIC 1"EnFOIvtANCE, 1, 4, 10, 16.
1. A bond for duties was conditioned that the importer should pay $425,
or the amount ascertained to be due, or should withdraw and export the
goods: Held, the word 41 or" could not be construed " and." Dumont v.
United States, 64.
2. Executory contract for the sale of chattels, to be delivered in the future,
valid, although at the date of contract the seller does not have them, nor any
means of getting them. Sawyer v. Taggart, 222.
3. An understanding when the contract is made that at its maturity it shall
be settled by payment of differences in price renders the contract illegal. Id.
4. Aliter, if either party contracts in good faith and the agreement to
settle by differences is made subsequently. fd.
5. A party ordering a re-sale of property before the contract time for
delivery will be liable for all losses thereby. Id.
6. Validity of, for future delivery of property not owned by vendor.
awyer v. Taggart, 222, Note; Thacker v. Hardy, 254, Note.
7. Where the consideration of a contract declared void by statute is
morally good, a repeal of the statute will validate the contract. City v.
Bank, 390.
8. A park association offered a purse to be divided among the winning
horses in a race according to their speed, and required all persons entering
horses to pay an entrance fee of ten per cent. on the whole sum. Held, not
a gaming transaction within the Illinois Act of 1845, and that a note given
for the entrance fee was valid. Wilson v. Conlin, 490, and Note.
9. When parties contract to act as agents to sell sewing-machines in a
particular locality, and the company withdraws them from such place, they
will have the right to rescind the contract ; but if the company has reserved
the right to change the character of their employment, they will not have the
right to rescind, although directed to sell in a different locality. Howe Sew-
ing-Mfachine Co. v. Layman, 520.
10. Rescission does not always require the express agreement of both
parties ; but where the contract is executory upon non-performance by one
party, the other may declare it rescinded. School District v. Hayne, 656.
11. A stockbroker may recover from his principal commissions and ad-
vances, although he knew that his principal did not intend to actually receive
or deliver the stock bought or sold, but to settle by differences. Thacker v.
Hardy, 254.
12. Grizewood v. Blaine, 11 C. B. 538, discussed. Id.
13. A contract to cut and deliver one million feet of logs at $4.25 per
thousand feet, to be scaled and received as each one hundred thousand feet are
put in floating water, held to be a severable and not an entire contract. Tenny
v. Mulvaney, 728.
14. Defendant applied for shares in a company. The company allotted
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the shares to him and posted a letter addressed to him containing the notice
of allotment, but the letter never was received. Held, that the defendant was
a shareholder. British and American Telegraph Co. v. Colson, Law Rep. 6
Ex. 18, overruled. Household Fire Ins. Co. v. Grant, 728.
CONTRACTOR. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1.
CONVEYANCE. See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 1.
COPYRIGHT. See EXECUTION, 4.
A simple copyright of a map does not give a publisher an exclusive
right to the particular signs and key which he adopted. Perris v. Hexamer,
452.
CORPORATION. See ACTION, 1, 6; ATTACHMENT, 3; BANKS; BILLS AND
NOTES, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 22; CRIMINAL LAW, 45; EQUITY, 22;
EVIDENCE. 21 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RAILROAI?; RECEIVER, 4; TAx-
ATION, 7, 8.
1. Corporations possess only the powers conferred upon them by the law
of their creation, and when created by public acts of the legislature, parties
dealing with them are chargeable with notice of their powers and the limi-
tations thereof'. Franklin Co. v. Lewistown Institution, d-c., 57.
2. A savings institution having no funds for investment borrowed money
to purchase stock in a corporation, giving the lender its notes for the purchase-
money and allowing him to take the stock in his own name as collateral
security. Hdd, that its purchase of the stock was ultra vires, and that it was
not estopped from setting up that defence. Id.
3. Senble, that in the United States corporations cannot purchase, hold or
deal in stocks of other corporations unless expressly authorized by law. Id.
4. A charter of a bank provided that " each stockholder shall be liable to
double the amount of stock held by him, and for three months after giving
notice of transfer, &c." Held, that a stockholder's liability to a creditorwas
primary, and not secondary, and having incurred the liability, he was not
released by not being sued within three months after transfer of his stock.
Fuller v. Ledden, 263.
5. Interference by the attorney-general with corporations on the ground of
a trust in the government, is limited to two classes of cases: 1. Religious,
charitable, municipal or other corporations whose functions are solely public,
and whose managers are abusing their functions. 2. Other corporations
which are exercising powers beyond those to which they are limited. United
States v. Railroad Co., 331.
6. Validity of articles of incorporation cannot be inquired into incidentally
and collaterally. Keene V. Van Reuth, 453.
7. Subscribers to the stock of an insurance company gave promissory notes,
payable on demand, for their subscriptions. Held, that construed in connec-
tion with the nature of the business of the corporation, the notes were intended
to be payable on the call of the directors ; and the Statute of Limitations was
not a defence. tiilbreath v. Gaylord, 457.
8. The contract of a corporation is presumed to be infra vires until the con-
trary appears. Southern Express Co. v. Railroad Co., 520.
9. Stockholders who organize a corporation and thereby induce persons to
credit it, will be estopped from alleging that the charter is unconstitutional in
order to avoid personal liability. McCarthy v. Lavasche, 728.
10. Trustees selected both by the corporation and its bondholders, and
operating the road to earn money to pay the debts of the corporation, are
agents of the corporation as to third persons, and such persons may sue the
corporation for the acts of such trustees. Grand Tower Man. Co. v. Ullman,
789.
COSTS. See DAMAGES, 1.
COUNTY. See INJUNCTION, I; MUNICIPAL BONDS, 2 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TION, 1, 2.
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COURTS. See ARBITRATION, I; CONTEMPT, I; CRIMINAL LAW, 1-28; JUDG-
MENT, 3; JURISDICTION; PROBATE COURTS; REMOVAL OF CAUSES; UNITED
STATES COURTS.
Courts have jurisdiction to make their records conform to what was actually
done. City of Elizabeth et al. v. The American Nicholson Pavement Co., 199.
COVENANT. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 6, 7.
CRIMINAL LAW. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAV, 7; ERRORS AND APPEALrS, 9;
INTOXICATION, I; JURISDICTION, 3 ; JUROR AND JURY, I; LIMITATIONS,
STATUTE OF, 8; REWARD, I ; STATUTE, 11; VERDICT, 3.
I. Genrally.
1. A court passing sentence for a misdemeanor under a misapprehension
of the facts, may at the same term, and before the sentence has gone into
effect, alter the sentence. Lee v. 2'he State, 57.
2. In the absence of anything on the record showing what the facts were,
the reviewing court will presume that the court below acted upon sufficient in-
formation. Id.
3. Upon a trial for intoxication, evidence of defendant's conduct when pre-
viouslv intoxicated, is admissible to show the character of the acts relied on
as evidence in the case. The State v. Ilux./brd, 58.
4. A witness may state his opinion as to the intoxication of a person, and is
not confined to a statement of the conduct of such person. Id.
5. Where a prisoner is convicted under two distinct indictments, and is
separately sentenced under each to a term of imprisonment, the terms are not
concurrent. 1illiamison's Case, 128.
6. Upon the trial of a person jointly indicted with another, the prosecution
will not be permitted to show that the latter is in the penitentiary of another
state. State v. English, 128.
7. When the prosecution has given evidence tending to prove that the de-
fendant went to the place where the crime was committed for the purpose
of committing it, the defendant will be allowed to show that he went thither
on legitimate business. Id.
8. Evidence that the defendant stole property of Peter Sinish, will not sus-
tain an indictment for stealing property of John Peter Sinish. Ad.
9. Mere concealment of a murder does not make a man an accessory, but
is a misprision of felony. State v. Ilann, 128.
10. A criminal does not, by becoming a witness in his own behalf, waive
the privilege of having his confidential communications to his attorney pro-
tected from disclosure. Dattenhqfer v. The State, 136.
11. When a defendant testifies in his own behalf, the state may impeach
his character before he offers any evidence that it is good. State v. Cox, 264.
12. Before permitting witnesses to testify as to the reputation of a witness,
they must show that they are acquainted with it. Id.
13. If a defendant testifies in his own behalf, he subjects himself to the
same rules as to cross-examination and impeachment as other witnesses. State
v. Clinton, 264.
14. An indictment under sect. 163 of art. 30 of the Maryland Code, charg-
ing a party with receiving stolen United States bonds, must charge distinctly
that they were bonds "granted by or under the authority of the United
States." Kearney v. The State, 390.
15. An indictment should allege all matters material to the particular crime
charged, with such positiveness and distinctness as not to need the aid of
intendment. id.
16. In an indictment for an offence created by statute, it is sufficient to
describe the offence in the words of the statute, and the indictment should
follow the language of the statute. Id.
17. A party not having been tried on a valid indictment, has not been put
in jeopardy, and may be tried again. Id.
18. Where a convict is taken from the penitentiary to testify as a witness,
it is competent to prove that his reputation for truth and veracity was bad at
the time of and previous to his conviction. Hamilton v. Yhe Sate, 391.
19. It is error to permit the state to prove by cross-examination of defend-
INDEX.
CRIMINAL LAW.
ant's witness, that the accused stands indicted for other offences. Hamilton v.
The State, 391.
20. The presumption that a married woman who commits a criminal act in
the presence of her husband acts under his coercion, is only priniafacie. Ta-
bler v. The State, 391.
21. It is no ground for the reversal of a judgment that a motion for a new
trial was made, argued and overruled in the absence of the prisoner, where no
objection was made till after sentence. Griffiz v. The State, 454.
22. The fact that the prosecuting attorney began his closing argument
while the defendant was temporarily absent, will not warrant the reversal of a
judgment of conviction. State v. Grate, 454.
23. Where one does an act apparently in violation of a criminal statute,
circumstances that tend to show a want of guilty intention may be given in
evidence on the trial. Farrell v. The State, 520.
24. One indicted for selling intoxicating liquor, maj show that he bought
and sold the liquor believing it not to be intoxicating. Id.
25. Wife not a competent witness for her husband in a criminal prosecu-
tion. Schultz v. State, 528.
26. A defect in the verification of an information is waived by pleading to
the merits and going to trial. State v. Ruth, 578.
27. Where an accomplice is convicted after having been made a witness by
the state, he has tin equitable claim to a judicial recommendation to the mercy
of the pardoning power. State v. Graham, 584.
28. It is competent for the court to order the accomplice to be acquitted,
for the purpose of qualifying him as a witness, or to accept from him a plea
admitting guilt in a minor degree, or to assent to the entering of a nolle pro-
sequi. Td.
II. Bigav.
29. It is no defence that the accused was a Mormon, and that he married
the second time because he believed it to be his religious duty. Reynolds v.
United States, 454.
MI. Briey.
30. What acts amount to. Note to State v. Collier, 773.
IV. False Pretence.
31. An indictment for obtaining goods in exchange for land under false
pretences, charged that defendant daiignedly, feloniously and falsely pretended
that he was the owner of the land, and averred that he was not the owner,
but did not charge that he knew he was not the owner: Held, that this was a
fatal defect. State v. Bradley, 584.
32. The indictment also charged that defendant pretended that he had an
abstract which showed a perfect title ; but there was no averment that he did
not have such an abstract: Held, that this defect was fatal, and was not sup-
plied by an averment that defendant well knew the abstract to be imperfect
and untrue. If such was the fact, the abstract should have been set out as a
false writing, and the defendant charged with pretending that it was a true
abstract. Id.
V. Forgery.
33. It is not essential to the crime of forgery that the person or corporation
in whose name the instrument purports to be made, shall have legal capacity
to make it. Skite v. Eades, 584.
VI. Libel.
34. Whether matter published is obscene or not, is a question of law and
not of fact, and the supposed obscene matter must be set out in the indict-
ment. McNair v. People, 728.
VII. Murder. See supra, 9.
35. The application of the common-law rule, that a criminal offence is
neither excused nor mitigated by the voluntary intoxication of the accused,
in trials for murder, is not affected by No. 44, Acts of 1869, of Vermont,
making degrees of murder. State v. Tatro, 153.
INDEX.
CRIMINAL LAW.
36. nhle, a party under reasonable apprehension of danger of life or
great bodily harm, has a right in self-defence to take the life of the aggres-
sor, but lie must have had no agency in bringing about the danger. Baker
v. Kansa., City Times Co., 101, and Note.
37. Prisoner's counsel offered to prove by the widow of the murdered man
that her husband was jealous of her, and had accused her of being too intimate
with other men than the prisoner, and proposed to follow up this proof by evi-
dence that the killing for which the prisoner was indicted, grew out of a quar-
rel with the deceased, occasioned by the deceased having charged the prisoner
with being too intimate with the wife of the deceased: feld, that the proof
offered was inadmissible. Costley v. State, 454.
38. The general reputation in the neighborhood that the deceased was jeal-
ous of hiq wife, not admissible in evidence, Id.
39. Where a statute provides that murder committed in the perpetration of
arson, rape, &c., or other felony, shall be murder in the first degree, the
words other .felony refer to a felony collateral to the homicide, and not to acts
which are constituent elements of the homicide itself. State v. Shock, 728.
VIII. Nuisance.
40. A house in which unlawful sales of liquor are habitually made, is an
indictable nuisance, although there is a city ordinance prescribing the penal-
ties for such sales. .feger v. State, 584.
IX. Rape.
41. Upon a petition for anew trial: Held, 1. That the existence of newly-
discovered evidence could not be proved by ex parte affidavits. 2. That evi-
dence of previous statement of witness inconsistent with statement on trial
was not sufficient. 3. Nor a change in the opinion of the victim as to the
identity of the criminal, where such change was the result of a suggestion,
and was arrived at by a process of reasoning. Shields v. The State, 461.
42. A new trial will not be granted upon the mere after-recollection of a
former witness. Id.
43. When an indictment, in distinct counts, charges a rape and an attempt
to commit a rape, referring to the same act, a verdict of guilty as to either
count amounts to an acquittal as to the other without an express finding. State
v. Cofer, 455.
44. Physical resistance of the female is not essential if in consequence of
threats she submits through fear of death or great personal injury. State v.
Ruth, 578.
X. Sabbath breaking.
45. A corporation may be indicted for "1 Sabbath breaking," under the 16th
and 17th sections of chapter 149 of the code of West Virginia. State v.
B. 4 0. Railroad Co., 728.
CURTESY. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
CUSTOM. See EVIDENCE, 33; MASTER AND SERVANT, 6; MxINES AND MIN-
ING, 2.
One dealing in a particular market is presumed to deal according to the
custom of the market, and the same rule applies where the dealing is done
through an agent, and the principal is ignorant of the custom. Bailey v.
Bensley, 264.
DAMAGES. See Coe.ssON CARRIER, 1 ; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 5; INTOXXCAT-
ING LIQUORS, I ; JUDGMENT, I ; LIBEL, 6, 12 ; MASTER AND SERVANT, 4 ;
NEW TRIAL, 7 ; OFFICER, 10; RAILROAD, 23 ; SLANDER, 6, 8 ; TROVER, 4.
1. In an action for breach of covenant of warranty, the grantee may recover
taxable costs, but lie cannot recover attorney's fees without proof that he has
incurred liability to the extent of the fees claimed. Swartz v. Ballou, 264.
2. A jury in assessing damages caused by the establishment of a public
road, can consider in reduction of damages, only such special benefits as are
the direct and proximate result of the road, and not such as are common to
the whole community. Roberts v. Board of Conmaissioners, 394.
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3. Increased value founded merely upon increased facilities for public travel
and transportation, cannot be considered. Roberts v. Board of Commissioners,
394.
4. The measure of damages for putting up a defective steam-boiler, is the
difference between its value in its defective condition and its value if completed
in compliance with the contract. Vhite v. Brockway, 520.
5. The measure of damages for failure to pay the joint obligations of others,
is the whole amount of the debts. Pratt v. Bates, 586.
6. Where a tunnel is authorized by an act of the legislature, and directed
by an ordinance of a city, the city is not liable for consequential damages.
Northern Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 589.
7. Persons appointed by law to make or improve a highway, are not answer-
able for consequential damages, if they act within their jurisdiction and with
care and skill. Id.
8. A contract to cut wood, stipulated that in case the wood was not all cut
by the time named in the contract, the laborer should forfeit five cents per
cord on the wood cut. Held, that such stipulation fixed the measure of dam-
ages. Lung Louis v. Brown, 729.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1, 4; FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE, I ; GUARANTY, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 16, 17, 37 ; JorNT-
DEBTORS; MORTGAGE, 4; PARTNERSHIP, 3.
1. The mere fact that a mortgagee of chattels leaves them in the mortga-
gor's hands to sell and remit the proceeds is not itself fraud, but proper
evidence in connection with other facts to show fraud. Fisk v. Harshaw, 129.
2. Where a voluntary conveyance is made, the law raises a conclusive pre-
sumption of fraud as to existing debts, but a subsequent creditor must show
either actual fraud or that debts which existed at the time of the conveyance
are still outstanding. Claflin v. Mess, 199.
3. Payment of all debts existing at the time of a voluntary conveyance,
repels the idea of fraud. td.
4. An administrator cannot sell an interest in lands conveyed by his intes-
tate in fraud of creditors, and his grantee cannot maintain a bill to avoid the
fraudulent conveyance. Beebe v. Saulter, 264.
5. The change of possession, contemplated by the statute of fraudulent
conveyances (I W. S. p. 281, 10), must be open, notorious and unequivocal.
(Following Claflin v. .Rosenburg, 42 Mo. 439, and other cases.) Wright v.
fcCormick, 267.
6. If the purchaser of a stock of goods permits them to remain at the
vendor's place of business, without removing his sign, the change of posses-
sion is not unequivocal. Id.
7. Goods attached were delivered by the officer to a receiptor, who left them
with the debtor. The latter sold them. Held, that the purchaser could hold
the goods if he purchased in good faith, but the burden was on him to show
that fact. Peters v. Stewart, 331.
8. Creditors cannot complain of the disposal of property that they cannot
reach. Dart v. Woodhouse. 393.
9. The right of a debtor to assign his whole estate for his creditors results
from that absolute ownership which every man claims over his own. Reed v.
McIntyre, 455.
10. Such assignments not made to delay or defraud creditors, were upheld
at common law even where certain creditors were preferred. Id.
11. An assignment which had the effect to delay a creditor in the enforce-
ment of his demand by law, was not, for that reason alone, fraudulent and
void. Id.
12. A purchaser's good faith is not conclusively established by his nncon-
tradicted testimony. The question is for the jury. Molitor v. Robinson, 455.
13. A sale not accompanied by immediate delivery, is only prima facie
fraudulent as against creditors. Id.
14. A vendor to a firm claimed to have relied on the assurance of a partner
that their assets exceeded their liabilities. It was shown that when the ven-
dor's agent had asked one of the firm how he reconciled this assurance with a
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subequent failure, the latter said something about having lost a good deal of
money in a series of years in failures. h1eld, that even though this answer
nay not have been material, its admission was harmless. Sldpman v. Seymour,
521.
15. An agent was instructed to inquire into a customer's credit and to sell
to him if satisfied with his answers, lie sent an order to his principal without
communicating the answers. ileld, that the principal had a right to assume
that the inquiries were made, and that the answers were satisfactory. Id.
16. In an action involving the good faith of a firm in buying goods just
he"ore they failed, a written answer to an inquiry by the vendor as to their
credit, which, though true in fact, tended to mislead, was admissible in evi-
dence. Id.
17. Any purchase obtained by false representations as to solvency made
by a firm within a period before its failure equal to the period of credit usu-
ally allowed to it upon its purchases, may be shown as bearing on the ques-
tion whether another purchase made within that period was fraudulent or not,
in contemplation of insolvency. Id.
18. No inference of fraud can be drawn from the fact that money not yet
due remains unpaid, but there is no error in admitting testimony that the
purchase price of goods purchased by means of a falsehood, is still unpaid.
id1.
19. It is an act of bad faith for a mortgagee to withhold from record a
mortgage given him by a debtor in order to shield the latter from demands
that have been contracted in ignorance of its existence. Id.
20. When the good fiith of a mortgage is in question, the time when it
was filed and the use afterwards made of it, may be shown. Id.
21. A purchase made by one who is insolvent and with the purpose not to
pay, is void, even though the buyer has not made false representations. Id.
22. Whether a mortgage, which allows the mortgagor to retain possession
of the personalty or to sell and replace the same, is fraudulent as against his
creditors, should be determined by a jury from the circumstances. lVilliams
r. WInsor, 661.
23. Where mortgaged chattels are left in the hands of the mortgagor with
an unlimited power of disposal for his benefit, the mortgage is void as to pur-
chasers and creditors. Orion v. Orion, 729.
DEOEI)ENT'S ESTATE. See ExEcuToRs AND ADmINISTRATORS; IPEOBATB
CounTs ; WILL.
DF.CEIT. See FRAuD
DEED. See EQUITY, 12, 19 ; MISTAKE, 3;
1. Not set aside on the ground of weakness of grantor's intellect unless
undue advantage taken of such weakness. Mirmon v. Mfarmon, 58.
2. A void deed of a homestead, in all cases where a similar deed of other
property could be ratified, may be ratified by the assent or contract of the
parties, expressed or presumed from their acts. Spaford v. IVarren, 59.
3. Very clear proof is required to impeach a certificate of the acknowledg-
ment of a deed or mortgage. The uncorroborated testimony of the party ex-
ecuting the same, is not sufficient. McPherson v. Sanborn, 521.
4. Where the terms of a deed as agreed upon are given by the parties to
the conveyancer, and the grantor, without the knowledge ofthegrantee, after-
wards causes other terms to be inserted, and the grantee signs, supposing it
to he drawn as agreed upon, a court of equity will reform the deed. Berger
v. Ebey, 585.
DEMURRAGE. See SHIPPING, 4.
DIVORCE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15; HUSBAN.D .A-D WIFE, I.
DOMICILE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 4.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, II.
DRAINAGE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA , 35.
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DRUNKENNESS. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 35; INTOXICATION.
DURESS. See ASSUMPSIT, 2; EQUITY, 13; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 51.
What constitutes duress. Note to Wright v. Remington, 748.
EASEMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 38; EJECTMENT, 2 ; MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION, 10, 31, 32; SUPPORT.
1. Non-user for twenty years evidence of intention to abandon but con-
trolled by proof that owner had no such intention. Pratt v. Sweetser, 58.
2. Title by adverse user rests upon the presumption of a lost grant. Lehigh
Valley Railroad v. McFarlan, 200.
3. To raise the presumption of such grant continuous and peaceable use for
over twenty years must be shown. Id.
4. Proof of acquiescence by the owner of the servient lands is indispensa-
ble in proving title by adverse user. rd.
5. Where the user has been exercised by force, or by permission, or in the
face of protests and in defiance of resistance, a grant cannot be presumed.
Id.
6. Resistance by words is stfficient to prevent the presumption of a grant.
Id.
7. No implied reservation of an easement, though it be continuous and ap-
parent, unless it be an easement of necessity. Wl/eeldon v. Burrows, 646.
8. A vendor conveyed part of his property to A., without reservation, and
subsequently another part to B. Upon B. claiming a right of light over A.'s
plot, which, in the opinion of- the court, was not an easement of necessity:
Beld, that B. was not entitled to recover. Id.
9. Implied easements of light and air discussed. Id. Note
10. The access of air to the chimneys of a building cannot he claimed
either as a natural right of property or as an easement by prescription. Bry-
ant v. Lefevre, 780.
EJECTMENT. Sea POSSESSION; UNITED STATES, 3; VENDOR AND PUIRCH&-
SEE, 8.
1. Where both parties are mortgagees, the party having the oldest mort-
gage, from the common mortgagor, who first forecloses and acquires a deed,
must prevail. If the junior mortgagee has equitable rights by not being
made a party to the foreclosure, he must resort to a court of chancery
Aholtz v. Zellar, 521.
2. Ejeetment does not lie for an incorporeal easement. Taylor v. Gladwin,
455.
3. The recital of an incorporeal right in a judgment of ejectment is nuga-
tory. Id.
ELECTION. See OFFICER, 5, 11.
1. Boards of canvassers sitting to correct voting lists, exercise judicial
function. Keenan v. Cook, 657.
2. Query, whether they are liable in a civil action, for striking off or omit-
ting a name from the voting list. Id.
3. Even if so liable they are the judges of the proof of disqualification,
and in an action against them it must be shown that they acted without proof
satisfactory to them. Id.
4. If their act, although precipitate and erroneous, was not dishonest or
wilful they are not liable. Id.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, III; MUNICIPAL C0oR0R-
TION, 10, 13, 31.; WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 4.
ENCUMBRANCE. See INSURANCE, 20; LIEN; MiSTAKE, 3; MORTGAGE;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 15.
EQUITY. See ASSIGNMENT, 2; DEED, 4; DURtESS, I ; EJEOTMENT, 1 ; EXE-
CUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR, 3; FORMER ADJUDICATION, 2, 6; FRAUD, 3;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 20, 47; INJUNCTION; JUDGMENT, 1, 2; JURIS-
-DICTION, 5; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 5, 6; MISTAKE; MORTGAGE,
16, 17, 18, 21 ; NUISANCE, 3, 7 ; PARTNERSHIP, 23; RAILROAD, 17, 18;
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RECEIVER; SET-OFF, 1 ; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; SUBROGATION; TAX-
.ATION, 15; USURY, 2; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 1, 3.
1. Equity will relieve against mutual mistakes of the parties in the execu-
tion of written contracts. Snll v. Insurance Co., 79.
2. Such mistakes may be shown by parol evidence, but such evidence is to
be received with great caution. Id.
3. A mere mistake of law, stripped of all other circumstances, not a
ground for reforming a written contract. Id.
4. When, however, such mistake is unaccompanied by any negligence, and
the denial of relief would enable tile other party to obtain an unconscionable
advantage, a court of equity will reform the instrument. Id.
5. A partner insured firm property in his own name being assured by the
agents of the company that this would cover the interest of the firm. After-
wards the agents refused to correct the policy. Held, that a court of equity
had jurisdiction to reform the policy. Id.
6. Reformation of contract for mistakes of law discussed. Id. Note.
7. Except in the almost obsolete action of account, partners, whether gen-
eral or for a particular transaction, cannot obtain an account at law, but must
apply to equity. Ivinson v. Hutton, 129.
8. Courts of equity can correct mistakes in written instruments, even as to
the most material stipulations; but the power should always be exercised
with great caution. Id.
9. Where an instrument is intended to carry a prior agreement into execu-
tion, and by mistake fails to fulfil this intention, equity will correct the mis-
take. Id.
10. In equitable actions, even where questions of fact are submitted to a
jury, the court must find that all the facts necessary to sustain the judgment
have been established. Stahl v. Gotzenberger, 129.
11. Issues of fact submitted to a jury in an equitable action should be par-
ticular issues, and the court, if not satisfied, may submit the same issues to
another jury, or may itself determine them. Id.
12. Equity will not relieve against the mutilation of a conveyance, nor
enforce an agreement, where the conveyance and agreement have been pro-
cured by fraud. Fargo v. Goodspeed, 131.
13. On a bill to set aside a transfer of property, obtained by duress, persons
in whose favor certain charges on the lands thereby conveyed were made, are
necessary parties. Probasco v. Probasco, 200.
14. A bill which alleges that a feeble old man has, without consideration,
transferred to his children all of his property, amounting to $45,000, reserv-
ing to himself only an annuity of $1200, inadequately secured, and without
any provision whatever for his wife, in case she survive him ; and that such
transfer was obtained from him by want of comprehension on his part, and
duress and false representations as to its effect on the part of his children,
shows sufficient equity, and will be sustained on demurrer. . Id.
15. In case of the bailment of property to a factor in trust to sell, a court
of chancery has no jurisdiction to enforce the trust. Taylor v. Turner, 200.
16. A bill of peace can only be maintained after the complainant has satis-
factorily established his right at law, or where the defendants are so numerous
as to render the bill necessary to save multiplicity of suits. Lehigh Falleg
Railroad Co. v. McFarlan, 200.
17. Where several plaintiffs bring different suits at law against one defend-
ant, some for diminishing their supply of water, and another for backing
water on his mill-wheel, no ground for interference to prevent multiplicity
of suits is shown. Id.
18. The maxim, that he who asks equity must do equity, may be applied
whenever it is necessary to the promotion of justice. Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 201.
19. At common law, signing is not necessary to the due execution of a
deed, but it is made so by the Statute of Frauds. .d.
20. But if the grantor's name is written in his presence and by his direc-
tion, it is his act, and he will not be permitted, in a court of equity, to repu-
diate the deed. Id.
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21. It is the province of equity to prevent those holding positions of trust
from using them for their own aggrandizement. IBerkiney"r v. Kellrm,,n, 202.
22. Equity has jurisdiction and may enjoin suits at law in a case involving
the relative rights of two corporations to the use of the same stream. Rail-
road Co. v. Society, 208.
23 Where an oral contract is afterwards reduced to writing, and through
the draughtsman's mistake, it fails to express the real intention of the parties,
equity will correct the mistake. Nowlin v. Pne, 265.
24. When there is a demurrer to the whole bill, and also to part, and the
latter only is sustained, the decree is to dismiss so much of the hill as seeks
relief in reference to the matters adjudged bad, and to overrule the demurrer
to the residue. Giant Powder Co. v. California Powder Wiorks, 266.
25. It is essential to a bill by the government to set aside a patent or con-
firmation of title under a Mexican grant, that it shall appear in some way,
that the attorney-general has brought it himself, or given such authority for
it as will make him officially responsible. The United States v. Thrsclonorton
et al., 266.
26. The frauds for which a bill will be sustained to set aside a judgment,
are frauds extrinsic to the matter tried by the first court, and not a fraud
which was in issue in that suit. Id.
27. The cases in which such relief has been granted, are those in which by
fraud practised on the unsuccessful party, he has been prevented from exhibit-
ing fully his case. Id.
28. A deed to purchasers under a judgment and sale made by an auditor,
cannot be avoided on the ground of fraud in the sale, without making the
creditors and auditor parties. Wilson v. Bellows, 265.
29. This defect, in not joining proper parties, is good ground for demurrer,
where it appears on the face of the bill. Id.
30. When the purchasers are not charged with fraud, relief against them
will only be granted on equitable terms. fd.
31. An owner sold land to a railroad at an exorbitant' price, and allowed
the land to be built upon and included in a mortgage of the road before payment
of the price. The road became insolvent, and a receiver was appointed. held,
That the court would not order payment of the agreed price, but would direct
just compensation to be paid to the owner. Coe v. Railway, 332.
32. A suit in equity will not lie to enjoin the execution of process issued in
another such suit. Endter v. Lennon, 391.
33. May grant relief against ignorance of the law, but not against ignor-
ance of facts. Andreas v. Redfield, 455.
34. Where a decree has been passed by default, equity has power to vacate
the enrolment in order to let in a meritorious defence, and this may be done
upon petition, without a bill of review or an original bill for fraud. First
National Bank v. Eccleston, 455.
35. This discretion extends as well to the time when the petition is to be
filed as to the other circumstances. Id.
36. Upon a petition to correct a mistake in a mortgage, the court will not
grant relief upon grounds not stated in the petition. Cox v. Esteb, 456.
37. A court of equity will not divide gains resulting from acts involving
moral turpitude. And profit by an agent to buy, who is also secretly the sel-
ler, is within this rule. Todd v. Rafferty's Adm'r, 476.
38. How far courts will assist in enforcing illegal contracts, discussed. Id.
Note.
39. In matters of account, more especially, courts of equity refuse to inter-
fere after a considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy.
Hall's Adm'r v. Clagett, 585.
40. A transaction that is in fraud of one's rights may be construed in
equity so as to be a means of protecting them. Huxley v. Rice, 592.
41. On a testamentary trustee's bill for instructions, the court will only
instruct as to circumstances existing or certain to arise. Goddard v. Brown,
657.
42. Nor will the court decide whether an interest is vested or contingent
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where the question can only become important by the death of a living cesuz.
Godard v. Brown, 657.
43. Generally a cross-bill implies a bill brought by a defendant against the
plaintiff*, or against other defendants, or against both. When filed against
co-delbndants, it is proper to make the plaintiff in the original suit a defendant
in the cross-bill. TV. Virginia, 0. 4- 0. L. Co. v. Vinal. 657.
44. Being a mere auxiliary suit, a cross-bill need not show any ground in
equity to support the jurisdiction of the court. If, however, it seeks relief, such
relief must be equitable. Id.
45. Where it prays for affirmative relief, the court, after the dismissal of
the original bill, may proceed with the cross-bill as an original. Id.
46. In a suit between partners for a dissolution and an account, a cross-bill is
not necessary to enable the defendant to obtain *an account or to obtain relief
against the fraud of complainant. Such bill will not be sustained on demurrer.
Johnson v. Buttier, 789.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See BANKRUPTCY, 3; BILLOP EXCEPTIONS; CER-
TIORARI ; CRIMINAL LAW, 2 ; MAND.tsus, 5 ; MORTGAGE, 21.
1. Second appeals or writs of error will lie in certain cases where it is
alleged that the mandate of the Appellate Court had not been properly exe-
cuted ; but in such a case will bring up nothing for re-examination except the
proceedings subsequent to the mandate. Stewart v. Salomon, 201.
2. An appeal will not lie from the judgment of a Circuit Court in a proceed-
ing by a creditor to prove his demand against the estate of a bankrupt.
Ingersoll v. Bourne, 201.
3. A cause was tried upon its merits and submitted to the jury upon evidence,
not objected to, tending to show a cause of action in plaintiff, and under in-
structions not excepted to. Held (two judges dissenting), that the judgment
would not be reversed, because the complaint omitted some averment essential
to the cause of action. Vassau v. Thompson, 392.
4. An offer to confess judgment duly made in the court below, need not be
renewed in the Appellate Court. Keffell v. Bullock, 447.
5. Decision of the court upon a motion for a new trial not reviewable on
appeal. Zitzer v. Jones, 461.
6. Where a jury's finding is wholly unsupported by evidence, it is errone-
ous as matter of law, but where it is supported by any evidence, however
slight, it is a finding of fact, and cannot be reviewed on writ of error. Conely
v. McDonald, 592.
7. In examining the charge of a court for the purpose of ascertaining its
correctness in point of law, the whole scope and bearing of it must be taken
together. Congress Spring Co. v. Edgar, 613.
8. Appellate courts are not inclined to grant a new trial on account of an
ambiguity in the charge where it appears that the complaining party made no
effort at the trial to have the matter explained. Id.
9. The minutes of the evidence in criminal actions, required by the statute
to be kept by the judge and filed with the clerk, are no part of the record and
can be brought up only by bill of exceptions. The failure of the judge to keep
such minutes is no ground for reversal unless excepted to. Allen v. The State,
656.
ESCAPE.
1. It is an escape if the sheriff permit the defendant to remain at home on
the promise to go the same day to the sheriff's office to give bail. Richard-
son v. Rittenhouse, 130.
2. If the defendant after escape surrenders himself, the plaintiff may elect
to sue the sheriff for the escape, or affirm the defendant's custody. Id.
3. Such election is made, where, after an escape, the defendant applies
for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and the creditor opposes his discharge,
whereupon the court remand him into custody. 1d.
ESTOPPEL. See AGENT, 2; BOUNDARY, 1; CORPORATION, 2, 9; DEBTOR
AND CREDITOR, 4; HUSBrD AND WIFE, 48; INSURANCE, 16; MUNICIPAL
BONDS, 1; POSSESSION, 3; UNITED STATES, 3.
INDEX.
ESTOPPEL.
1. A trespasser sold certain improvements he had placed on land and
delivered possession of the land and the improvements to his vendee. Subse-
quently he bought the title to the land. Held, that he was not estopped from
recovering possession of the land from a vendee of his vendee. Sheffleld v.
Griffln, 336.
2. A creditor who levies on an equity of redemption, and has the amount
of the encumbrance allowed in his favor in the appraisal of the interest set
off to him, cannot set up the invalidity of the encumbrance. Del. 4I Hud.
Can. Co. v. Bonnell, 419.
3. A party to proceedings in equity under which title has been acquired, is
estopped from disputing such title. Keene v. Van Reuth. 453.
4. A widow entitled to both homestead and dower, accepted an assignment
of dower, but, being ignorant of her right to a homestead, did not then claim
it. As administratrix, she also procured an order for the sale of the estate,
but no sale was made. In a proceeding to have her homestead set out : Held,
that her acts did not constitute either a waiver or an estoplel. Seek v.
Haynes, 457.
EVIDENCE. See AssusPSxT, 1; BAwKnrUTCY, 14; BILLS AND NOTES, 5, 11,
12, 17; CommoN CARRIER, 3-5; CRImINAL LAW, 3, 4, 6-8, 10-13, 18-20,
23-25, 37-39; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 12, 16, 17, 20; DEED, 3; EASE-
MENT, 1, 4; EQUITY, 2, 10; EXPERT; EXTRADITION, 1, 3; F OmER ADJU-
DICATION, 7; HIGHWAY, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 5; INSANITY, 1; INSUR-
ancE, 12; LIBEL, 1, 3, 7, 10; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 11, 22 ; 31ALIC101S
PROSECUTION, 2, 3; MINES, 5, 6; MORTGAGE, 18 ; NEGLIGENCE, 5, 6, 28;
PARTNERSHIP, 15; PossEssION, 8; PREsUmpTION; RAILROAD, 1, 9; TELE
GRAPH, 1, 2; TRIAL, 1, 2, 4, 5; TRUST, 7; UNITED STATES CouRTS, .13;
VERDICT, 2; WAIvER, 1; WILL, 1, 5.
1. An order was drawn by A. upon B. in favor of C., in order to carry out
a settlement by which B. agreed to pay C. a debt he owed A. Held, that the
order was admissible in evidence to show the amount B. had assumed to pay.
Wright v. McCully, 59.
2. Judicial notice will be taken of the powers and authority of public offi-
cers, prescribed by law. State ex rel. Clark v. Gates, 62.
3. In an action for damages resulting from the sales of intoxicating liquor,
under the Ohio statute, it is not necessary to prove the illegal sales beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lyon v. fleahmann, 130.
4. In a suit upon a debt, where a release under seal of all demands is set
up, parol evidence is inadmissible to show that at the time the release was
executed, the releasee told the releasor that the claim in suit should not be
included in the release, nor that after the release the releasee admitted the
debt to be due. ;Drake v. Stark's Ex'r, 201.
5. An officer's return on an execution is a part of the record of the case.
Esten v. Cooke, 658.
6. In investigating the genuineness of a written instrument, it is not com-
petent to prove the execution of other papers having no connection with the
case, and then, by the testimony of experts, who have compared them with
the instrument in question, show that the latter is a forgery. State v. Clinton,
267.
7. A note was given for real estate conveyid by absolute deed by the payee
to the maker. In a suit on the note, Held, that parol evidence was admissible
to show that the conveyance was not intended as a sale, but that there was an
agreement that the land should be reconveyed, and that the note was not to
be paid. Schindler v. Muhlheiser, 332.
8. In an action against a railroad, the complaint alleged that when the
injury was committed the defendants were running a train at a reckless and
grossly negligent and dangerous speed, in violation of a city ordinance. Held,
that evidence that defendants had wilfully committed the injury was inadmis-
sible. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Sinclair, 378.
9. Where, after the trial of a case, a witness dies, and his deposition, taken
at the first trial, is accidentally destroyed, testimony of other witnesses as to
the substance of his deposition is admissible at the new trial. Ruch v. City,
392.
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10. The living witness may use his contemporaneous notes of such testi-
mony to refresh his recollection, or if he can testify positively to the accuracy
of his notes, they may be put in evidence. Ruch v. City, 392.
11. Where an offer is expressly stated to be without prejudice, or where,
from the circumstances, it may be inferred that it was, by way of compromise,
to prevent litigation, such offer is not evidence as an admission ; but if the
admission of afact be made, unless expressly without prejudice, or to induce
a compromise, there is no rule of law which would exclude such admission.
Calvert v. Frebus, 392.
12. Statutes making a tax sale deed prima facie evidence of the regularity
of the sale do not make such deed evidence of the regularity of the proceed-
ings anterior and necessary to the sale. But under the Act of Congress of
1863, the commissioner's certificate is evidence also of the validity of the sale
and title of the purchaser, and can only be affected by proof that the pro-
perty was not subject to taxes, or that the taxes had been paid, or that the
property had been redeemed. DeTreville v. Smalls, 392.
13. Under this Act of Congress a certificate of sale is necessary where the
United States becomes the purchaser. Id.
14. A wife claiming a horse to be a gift from her husband, testified, that
after the gift she went to the stable, gave directions for the keep of the horse,
and afterwards controlled it. Held, admissible as part of the res gesta, and
as tending to show delivery. Davis v. Zimmerman, 394.
15. A witness who is well acquainted with a person whose character is in
question, will be allowed to testify to his general reputation, although he may
never have heard it discussed. State v. Grate, 454.
16. If a witness is kept away by the adverse party, his testimony taken on
a former trial may be given in evidence. Reynolds v. United States, 454.
17. A party who has taken the testimony of a witness under a commission,
cannot at the trial offer a letter of the witness for the purpose of impeaching
his credit. Sewell v. Gardner, 456.
18. Where a party has been misled by previous statements of a witness, he
may contradict the witness as to any material fact. .d.
19. Mistake may be shown by parol as a defence to the specific perform-
ance of a written instrument. Berry v. Whitney, 463.
20. Interrogatories relating to family relationship, dates of decease and
marriages, may well be answered on the basis of family tradition instead of
direct personal knowledge. Van Sickle v. Gibson, 521.
21. The entry on the books of a corporation of a resolution of appointment
of a superintendent is admissible to help establish a claim for salary. Kala-
mazoo Works v. Macalister, 522.
22. Where the issue is whether there was a contract in writing, oral testi-
mony cannot be excluded on the assumption that such writing exists. rd.
23. A resolution of appointment is prima facie not a contract, and can be
withdrawn or altered before acceptance. Id.
24. The rule excluding oral evidence to affect a written contract does not
apply to a corporate resolution appointing an officer, so as to exclude evidence
to show the actual establishment of contract relations under it. Id.
25. Even for the purpose of corroborating the testimony of witnesses, an
inquiry into facts entirely collateral, cannot be permitted. Henke v. McClure,
522.
26. In case of the loss of a steamboat from some unknown cause, a person
conversant with steamboat navigation and familiar with its perils may give
his opinion, whether a steamboat, while being navigated with ordinary care,
might suddenly spring a leak and sink from some unknown peril. Insurance
Co. v. Tobin, 523.
27. When the actual effect of a known agency is unknown, and the opinion
of one familiar, by actual observation with the matter, is the best testimony
the subject affords, such opinion may be received as testimony. id.
28. The statements of a steamboat captain, made in the discharge of his
duty while she is in a sinking condition, and he is seeking aid, are res gesta-,
and competent testimony. Id.
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* 29. A note written by plaintiffs attorney before suit, expressing the
opinion that defendant is not liable is not admissible in evidence for the defence.
Farmers' Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bowen, 524.
30. A certificate of an officer charged with the custody of public records
that his records show a certain fact, is not competent evidence. State v. Ruth,
578.
31. Upon a question as to the proper presentment of a promissory note the
court will take judicial notice, not only of the law merchant, but also of the
almanac, from which it appears that the last day of grace fell on a Sunday.
Reed v. Wilson, 585.
32. It must be presumed that the three days of grace allowed by the gen-
eral, law-merchant are also allowed by the law of Pennsylvania, where the
note was payable. Id.
33. The common usage of any country in reference to its measures should
be followed in estimating such measures when referred to in grants. United
States v. Askew, 586.
34. It seems that the opinion of one qualified to speak as to the hahits of
animalsferce naturm, is admissible as expert testimony; and if not admissible
as such it is admissible as matter of common knowledge. Congress Spring Co.
v. Edqar, 613.
35. Record evidence of satisfaction cannot be contradicted by parol, and is
conclusive until modified by some proceeding operating directly on the record.
Id.
36. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. The unwritten law
of a foreign country must be shown by oral testimony, and the published re-
ports of decisions. State v. Lung Louis, 730.
37. The construction of a written agreement a question of law for the court.
rd.
38. In an action against a gas company for allowing gas to escape into a
sewer, from whence it entered plaintiff's green-house: Held, that evidence of
the presence of gas in other green-houses connected with, the same sewer was
properly admitted. Butcher v. Providence Gas Company, 732.
39. LAws or EVIDENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION OF HIAND-
WRITING, 273.
EXECUTION. See ATTACHMENT; EVIDENCE, 5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
26; SHERIFF, 1.
1. A verbal promise by an execution-creditor to indemnify an officer for
selling goods claimed as exempt is not within the Statute of Frauds, nor void
cs against public policy. Mays v. Joseph, 130.
2. Unpublished manuscripts are not leviable property. Dart v. Woodhouse,
393.
3. The right of an owner of manuscript to publish it or not belongs to him
pqrsonally, independent of locality. Id.
4. The copyright of a published work cannot be reached by the owner's
creditors, unless by statutory authority. Id.
5. An officer has no authority for threshing wheat he has levied upon be-
fore selling it. Stilson v. Gibbs, 589.
6. If an officer with an execution misuses the property levied upon, he is
liable to the execution-debtor, and possibly to the creditor also, if the execu-
tion fails to satisfy the judgment. Id.
7. Where property is exempt from execution, the debtor may sell, mort-
gage or pledge it, as he pleases, without making it liable to execution.
Washburn v. Good, eart, 591.
8. Money collected by the sheriff on execution is not subject to levy upon
a subsequent execution against the plaintiff. Kansas, 4-c., Bank v. Boothe,
730.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 4;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 29; PROBATE COURTS, 1; SALE, 7; USURY, 3.
1. A specific legacy may remain invested in the stocks set apart by the
testator for that purpose. Ward v. Kitchen, 332.
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2. An executor, apprehending a depreciation in the stocks in which a spe
cific legacy is invested, should protect the estate by converting them. WVara
v. Kitchn, 332.
3. An administrator cannot maintain a bill to remove a cloud from his tes-
tator's lands. Ryan v. Duncan, 583.
4. An administrator holding proceeds of a settled estate is chargeable as
trustee of one entitled thereto on trustee process summoning him in his per-
sonal and not in his representative capacity. Hoyt v. Christie, 789.
EXEMPTION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 29; EXECUTION, 1, 7; STATUTE,
12; TAXATION, 6-8.
EXPERT. See EVIDENCE, 6, 26, 34.
1. An expert cannot be asked for a conclusion upon facts not stated. Van
Dusen v. Newcomer, 395.
2. The construction of railroad cars, the mode of working them, and the
effect of a particular thing on their safety, are questions upon which the opin-
ion of e~cperts is admissible. Baldwin v. Railroad, 761.
3. The opinion of experts in handwriting is evidence of low degree. Mu-
tual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 201.
EXTRADITION.
1. The certificate of authentication provided for in sect. 5278, U. S. Revised
Statutes, not required to be in any particular form. Ex parte Sheldon, 393.
2. It is no ground for discharging a fugitive from justice that the indict-
ment, after charging embezzlement, also avers that "so" the defendant com-
mitted larceny. Id.
3. Where it appears that the fugitive stands charged with embezzlement,
the printed statutes of the demanding state may be received to show that em-
bezzlement is a crime. Id.
4. After a fugitive has been arrested on an extradition warrant, he will
not be discharged on the ground that there was no evidence before the exe-
cutive issuing the warrant, that the fugitive had fled to avoid prosecution. Id.
FACTOR. See EQUITY, 15.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT. See INSANITY, 1.
FALSE PRETENCE. See CRIMINAL LAw, IV.
FEES. See ATTORNEY, 3; OFFICEP., 11.
FIXTURES. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 6.
Manure on land owned by a wife is part of the land as against her husband,
although produced in part by stock belonging to the husband. Norton v.
Craig, 58.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER.
A writ of restitution, in an action of forcible entry and detainer, will not
necessarily be unavailing because the persons living upon the land at the insti-
tution of the suit were not made defendants. De Graw v. Prior, 586.
FOREIGN CORPORATION. See TAXATION, 16.
FOREIGN JUDGMENT.
A foreign judgment is a nullity, if rendered upon a service on defendant
made beyond the jurisdiction of the foreign sovereignty. McEwen v. Zimuer,
92, and Note.
FOREIGN LAW. See EVIDENCE, 36.
FORFEITURE. See INsuRANCE, 4, 17-19.
FORMER ADJUDICATION. See TRoVER, 2, 4.
1. Where a judgment creditor obtains an order for the examination of the
defendant, on supplementary proceedings, and the proceeding is heard upon
its merits and dismissed, the case is resjudicata, as to all matters embraced in
VOL. XXVII.-103
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the judgment of the court, and a new examination can only be asked for as to
subsequently-acquired property. Clarke v. Londrigan, 130.
2. A decree not appealed from, rendered by the Master of Rolls in Eng-
land, dismissing a bill, is a bar to a bill filed in the United States against the
agent of the English defendant for the same cause and asking the same relief.
Lea v. Deakin, 322.
3. A judgment is no bar to a subsequent action not between the same par-
ties or their representatives or privies. Tierney v. Abbott, 393.
4. A party was made defendant to a foreclosure suit, on the ground that he
had a lien subsequent to plaintiff's mortgage, and a decree was rendered
against him. Held, that he and his assignee pendente life were barred from
suing on a mortgage prior to that of the plaintiff. Case v. Bartholow, 393.
5. B. had a contract with M., but sued him on the common counts to reco-
ver an overpayment. He did not put the contract in issue, though he gai e
M. credits under it. M. filed no set-off, but immediately sued B. for the
whole amount of his bill. Held, that the judgment in the first suit did not
bar the second. IfcEwen v. Bigelow, 526.
6. A decree in chancery is no bar to a suit not involving the same ques-
tions, even though they might have been brought into the first case by a cross-
bill. Mins v. Vaugh, 591.
7. Judgment in a former suit between the same parties is conclusive of
every issue decided therein, and it can be shown by parol evidence what were
the issues so tried. Campbell v. Rankin, 658.
8. A judgment of a justice, in an action for a wrongful use of a stream, is
not conclusive in the trial of an appeal from the justice in a prior action for a
prior wrongful use of the stream. Hazeltine, Adm'r, v. Case, 663.
FRAUD. See BAxRnUi-TCY, II. ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 2, 4, 11, 18, 22,
23; DEED, 1 ; EQUITY, 12, 26; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 1 ; FRAUDS,
STATUTE OF, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 36, 38; INSURANCE, 14, 23; LIMIT-
ATIONS, STATUTE OF, 7, 18 ; MORTGAGE, 4 ; SURETY, 3, 5, 7 ; TRUST, 8.
1. A purchaser who co-operates with the vendor in the misappropriation
of purchase-money, renders himself liable to the person defrauded. Bower v.
Haddon Blue Stone Co., 202.
2. If one fraudulently procures a sham bid on his property, and thereby
succeeds in having the land of another sold to pay off a portion of the debt he
is equitably bound to pay, such injured party may recover back the sum so
lost. Durst v. Thomas, 267.
3. Where representations were made by the holder of a mortgage for $7000,
that he had'sold the premises to the mortgagor for about $50,000 ; that the
land was valuable; that the mortgage was good, and the interest paid regu-
larly-all of which were false and fraudulent : Held, that they could not be
regarded as simplex commendatio, and a conveyance of lands obtained thereby
was set aside. Perkins v. Partridge, 332.
4. The mere delay of a defrauded party in rescinding a contract does not
destroy his right, if no innocent third party has acquired any interest, and the
wrongdoer is not affected injuriously. Wicks v. Smith, 333.
5. Fraudulent representations as to the legal effect of an instrument will
avoid it, even if made to one who has actually read it, if unable to judge of
its true construction. But the fraud must be contemporaneous, and must
consist in obtaining the assent of the party defrauded, by inducing a false
impression as to'its legal or literal nature and operation. Berr9 v. Whitney,
463.
6. Contracting parties must not act in bad faith to third persons who may
be affected by their agreement. Huxley v. Rice, 592.
7. One who has sold- mortgaged land with warranty, and has covenanted to
pay off the mortgage, cannot, as against his grantee, make title in himself
under a foreclosure. Id.
8. A contract will not be rescinded for fraudulent representations where
defendant believed them, and plaintiff had equal opportunity of ascertaining
their falsity, and was not prevented by any artifice of defendant. Mamlock v.
Fairbanks, 658.
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1. A. being a creditor of B. and also debtor to 0. in an equal amount, it was
verbally agreed in settlement that B. should pay C. what he owed A. H-'eld,
not within the Statute of Frauds. W1'right v. Mfc"ully, 59.
2. A delivery of goods to a common carrier not designated by the pur-
chaser, is not such a delivery as will take the sale out of the Statute of
Frauds. Htr maan v. ATje, 194.
3. An original undertaking to retain attorneys to attend to a suit for a
third person, may he implied from circumstances. Whether the undertaking
is original or collateral, is a question of fact for the jury. Mashier v. Kit-
chell, 267.
4. A parol lease for more than three years, being within the Statute of
Frauds, it is not a fraud to refuse to execute it. &ausser v. Steinmetz, 355.
5. An action lies for the breach of such agreement, but the damages re-
ecoverable are such only as result directly from the breach, Id.
6. In the absence of evidence that the lessor was prevented from leasing to
another person, and no claim being made for money expended in improve-
ments or repairs, his damages must be merely nominal. Id.
7. Application of Statute of Frauds to contracts for sale or lease of lands.
Id. Note.
8. A contract by the owner of a house, to pay a sub-contractor out of funds
coming to the contractor for building the house, need not be in writing, under
the Statute of Frauds. Estabrook v. Gebhart, 522.
9. An agreement not to set up a certain business during the joint lives of
the parties, is "not to be performed within the space of one year," within the
meaning of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. Daveyj v. Shannon, 554.
10. Meaning of the words " not to be performed" discussed. Id. Note.
11. Where defendant after a physician had made three visits to his son-in-
law, undertook to pay the physician, the promise is an origtinal undertaking
as to subsequent but not as to previous services. King v. Edmiston, 586.
12. A verbal promise to pay the debt of another, is void, if made to the
creditor ; but not if made to the debtor. Pratt v. Bates, 586.
13. Plaintiff entered defendant's service under a verbal contract for a year,
to commence two days after the date of the contract. Before the expiration
of the year, defendant dismissed him. Held, that the verbal contract was not
absolutely void by the Statute of Frauds, that no new contract could be im-
plied from any acts done under such verbal contract; and that the principles
of equity, as to part performance, in contracts relating to land, were not to be
extended to such contracts as the above. Brittain v. Rossiter, 716, and Note.
14. Carrington v. Roots, 2 Al. & W. 248, and Reade v. Lamb, 6 Exch.
130, commented on; Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield, 1 C., M. & R. 20, fol-
lowed. Id.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 2,4, 8, 13;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 37 ; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 10.
SALES AND CONVEYANCES WITHOUT DELIVERY OP POSSESSION, 137.
GARNISHMENT. See ATTACHMENT.
GOVERNMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; INSOLVENCY, 1; UNITED STATES.
GUARANTY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 18; SURETY.
1. B. guaranteed the payment of M.'s rent "so long as said M. shall
occupy said premises." Held, that the word "occupy" denoted the whole
period of tenancy. Morrow v. Brady, 730.
2. A letter as follows : "Please send my son the lumber he asks for, and
it will be all right," is a guaranty that the lumber furnished at the time it is
presented will be paid for. Birdsall v. Heacock, 751.
3. Such guaranty is not continuing. Id.
4. Subsequent payments will be applied to purchases covered by the
guaranty. Id.
5. B. sold property to W., taking notes therefor, signed by W. and by IL
as surety, agreeing that if W. should sell the property, the indebtedness
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might be transferred to his purchasers. W. sold the property. B. suggested
that as it would take some time to compute the notes, it would be as well for
the purchasers to assume the debt by writing on the notes themselves, where-
upon they wrote on the back of each note, "We hereby assume and agree
to pay this note," and signed the same. Held, that H. and W. were relieved
from liability. Nelson v. Wdls, 790.
6. Distinguished from suretyship. Note to Birdsall v. Heacock, 757.
7. What constitutes a continuing guaranty. .1d.
8. When notice to guarantor is required. Id.
9. When acceptance of guaranty is necessary. Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD. See ABATEMENT, 1.
1. One standing in the relation of a parent and guardian in fact of a minor,
having the control of such minor and of his property, is bound to the most
scrupulous good faith ; and where, on such minor's coming of age, he attempts
to make a settlement with him, a court of equity will examine the transac-
tion with extreme jealousy. Berkmey/er v. Kellerman, 203.
2. Where a party occupying such a relation claims any advantage from such
settlement, the burden of proof is on him to show that it was fair and equi-
table. .d.
3. A conveyance by such minor, on the day he comes of age, of his real
estate to the persons occupying such relations, can only be upheld in a court
of equity by clear proof that it is just and equitable. Id.
HABEAS CORPUS. See CONTEMPT, 1.
HANDWRITING. See EvIDENCE, 6, 39; ExPERT, 3.
HARBOR LINE. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 5.
HEIR. See INsuRAwcE, 8.
HIGHWAY. See DAMAGES, 2, 7; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3; NuiBAlCZ, 7;
STREET.
1. A town is not required to render its roads passable for their entire width
if sufficient width is passable to render them safe and convenient. Perkins v.
Inhabitants of Fayette, 59.
2. A town may put or leave obstructions on the side of a way provided
they are so far from the travelled track that teams may pass without danger.
Id.
3. A town is not liable for an accident which is the combined effect of the
fright of a horse at meeting cows with boards on their horns and a defect in
the highway. Moulton v. Sandford, 51 Me. 127, re-affirmed. Id.
4. To show title to a public road by dedication there should be satisfactory •
proof either of an intention to dedicate, or of such acts and declarations as
should stop the owner from denying such intention. Kyle v. Town of Logan,
267.
5. No action lies against a municipal corporation for allowing the ordinary
flow of surface-water to escape from a highway on to adjacent land. Nor for
the results of such usual changes of grade as must have been contemplated
and paid for at the layout of the highway. Wakefield v. Newell, 658.
6. A municipal corporation has the same powers over its highways in respect
to surface-water as an individual has over his land. Inman v. Tripp, 11 R.
I. 520, explained and affirmed. .d.
HOMESTEAD. See DEED, 2; ESTOPPEL, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 36.
Where a mortgagor abandons his homestead the mortgage becomes opera-
tive thereon, and it is immaterial whether he knew that the mortgage con-
tained a clause releasing the homestead, or whether his wife signed the same.
Cobb v. Smith, 586.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See ACTION, 7; CRIMINAL LAW, 20, 25, 29, 37;
ESTOPPEL, 4; EVIDENCE, 14; FIXTURES, 1; SPECIIO PERORMANOZ, 4;
TRUST, 4. 8; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 12.
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L Marriage, Divorce and Alimony. See infra, 35 ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15;
CONTEMPT, I.
1. If a wife, without justification, refuses for two years to follow her hus-
band to a new domicile, he is entitled to a divorce. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 267.
2. The English Divorce Court has jurisdiction to grant a divorce against a
foreigner. Niboyet v. Niboyet, 539.
3. A marriage was solemnized at Gibraltar between a Frenchman and
an Englishwoman. The husband resided for several years in England, but
being a consul for France he retained his domicile of origin. The wife pre-
sented a petition for a divorce, alleging adultery committed in England and
desertion. The husband appeared under protest, and prayed to be dismissed.
Held, that the court had jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Id.
4. Whether domicile is necessary to create jurisdiction to dissolve a foreign
marriage, discussed. Id. Note.
5. When at the commencement of the cohabitation and conduct, from
which it is sought to prove a marriage in fact, there was in fact no such mar-
riage, the mere continuance of such cohabitation and conduct is not sufficient
to prove a subsequent marriage. Williams v. Wldliams, 629.
6. Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be
such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation
continued. Id.
7. Presumption arising from cohabitation where the original relation was
unlawful. Id. Note.
I. Curtesy and Dower. See infra, 17.
8. Whether a widow can take under provisions in her husband's will, and
also under an ante-nuptial contract, whereby her dower is barred, depends on
the intention of the testator. Bowen v. Bowen, 131.
9. Where a husband owns an undivided moiety of land and resides upon it
with his family, the wife is a necessary party to an action of partition. Wheat
v. Burgess, 333.
10. A judgment in such action decreeing that the land be set-off to the
husband subject to liens, and that if the liens were not paid in a short time,
the land should be sold to pay them, is void as against the wife in the absence
of jurisdiction of her person by the court. Id.
1I. Where, in a suit upon a vendor's lien for purchase-money, to which the
vendee and his wife, and also the holder of a subsequent mortgage by the
vendee alone, are defendants, and the proceeds of sale are more than the
vefidor's claim, the wife is entitled, as against such mortgagees, to assert her
contingent right of dower. Unger v. Leiter, 523.
12. But such right must be protected in a mode which will not interfere
with the right of the mortgagee to subject the whole estate of the husband to
the satisfaction of the mortgage. Id.
13. Therefore, when the surplus is insufficient to discharge fully the mort-
gage-debt, the court should not direct one-third of the surplus to be put on
interest to secure the dower. Id.
14. The proper course is to award to the wife the value of her dower, to be
ascertained by reference to the tables of recognised authority in connection
with the state of health, and constitutional vigor of the wife and her hus-
band. Id.
15. Where a husband has conveyed land, and his grantee has conveyed it
in parcels to several persons, the wife is entitled to dower out of any parcel
according to its present value, excluding all improvements made on that par-
cel, but including its increased value on account of improvements made on
the other parcels. Boyd v. Carlton, 774.
16. As regards a right to dower, there is no difference between a convey-
ance to a stranger for a valuable consideration, and one to a child for a good
consideration. And in estimating the value of the land, only the improve-
ments at the time of the conveyance are to be regarded. Stookey v. Stookey,
789.
IT. Separate Estate. See infra, 39.
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17. A release of the wife's inchoate right of dower a valid consideration for
a conveyance of property to her. Singree v. Welch, 202.
18. Such conveyance not fraudulent as to the husband's creditors, unless
the consideration is so disproportioned to the value of the dower as to be In-
reasonable. fd.
19. This value being difficult to estimate, the courts will not pronounce the
transaction fraudulent because the wife received a sum greater than he
dower, if the facts do not show malafides. Id.
20. A post-nuptial contract, made upon sufficient consideration, and wholly
or partially executed, will be sustained in equity. Kesner v. Trigg, 202.
21. The separate equitable estate of a wife is subject to an equitable charge
for her debts, and if she declares in writing her intention to charge it or does
so verbally, and her contract is for the benefit of herself or her estate, the
charge is valid. Eliott v. Gower, 658.
22. A married woman, as to property settled to her separate use, is to be
regarded as afeme gole, and may dispose of her personal property or the profits
of her real estate, unless restrained by the instrument creating the estate.
Radford v. Carwile, 659.
23. Such restraint must be expressed or so clearly indicated as to be equiv-
alent to an express restraint. Id.
24. The liability of such estate to the payment of the wife's debts incurred
during coverture, is also an incident which can only be taken away by ex-
press words or clear intent. Id.
25. These incidents do not extend to the corpus of her real estate. Id.
26. The corpus can only be affected by a vendor's lien when such lien has
been reserved, or by a conveyance in which the wife has joined with her hus-
band after a separate examination. Id.
27. The consideration of a contract for which her separate estate is liable
need not enure to her own benefit, but may be any consideration which would
support the contract if she were afeme sole. .d.
28. But her estate cannot be made liable for the debt of her husband or of
any other person, unless by contract in writing, signed by her or by some
one authorized by her. Id.
29. The receipt by an agent, appointed by husband and wife, of money
forming part of an estate, of which the wife is administratrix, amounts to a
reduction into possession by the husband of the wife's distributive share of the
money. Huntley v. Griffith, F. Moore 452; Goldsborough 159, followed.
In re Barber, 790.
IV. Contracts, Conveyances and Liabilities. See supra, 8, 20.
30. By the laws of Iowa the wife has similar property rights and is charge-
able with similar obligations with the husband under like circumstances, and
coverture is no defence against the enforcement of the rights of others grow-
ing out of her contracts. Spafford v. Warren, 59.
31. The wife may ratify a defective and void conveyance of her homestead,
in all cases where her husband could ratify such an act. Id.
32. Where a conveyance of the homestead by the wife was void, but she
surrendered possession of the property voluntarily, made no objection to the
grantee's title when in her presence he offered to sell it, and permitted him to
remain in quiet possession for more than three years and make improvements
without protest: Hld, that her conduct amounted to a ratification of the deed.
Id.
33. A husband is not liable for necessaries furnished to his wife, pending a
suit in divorce, in which alimony had been decreed and regularly paid by
him. Hare v. Gibson, 59.
34. The persons dealing with the wife held chargeable with notice of the
allotment and payment of the alimony. Id.
35. The adequacy of the alimony cannot be collaterally drawn in question,
especially by strangers to the divorce suit. Id.
36. Where a husband and wife are induced by fraud to convey a homestead,
the subsequent affirmance by the husband of the conveyance will not affect
the right of the wife to rescind. Wicks v. Smith, 333.
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37. Open and visible change of poscssion can hardly be required to estab-
lish tile fact of a gift from a husband to his wife when they are living to-
gether. D.avis v. Zhuin,rman, 394.
38. The only question is whether she establishes her right by a fair prepon-
derance of evidence. But it is proper to consider the relation and the facility
with which fraud may be perpetrated. I.
39. Where property is granted to a husband and wife, they are not tcnants
in common, nor joint tenantq. If the hushand die, the property goes to the
wife by survivor~.hip. Ins Co. v. R,.h, 396.
40. The authority of a wife to pledge the credit of her husband is not an
inherent, but a delegated authority. Estlaand v. Ijurchltl, 412.
41. Where a wife leaves her husband without cause she carries no implied
authority to bind him, even for necessaries ; but when she is driven away by
his fault, she becomes of necessity hi- agent to supply her wants. Id.
42. Where the separation is by consent, and by its terms the wife receives
a fixed income, she cannot pledge her husband's credit for necessaries. Id.
43. Liability of husband for wife's contracts. Id. Note.
44. An indebtedness incurred by a married woman, for the benefit of her-
self or her property, and upon its credit, and the giving of a note therefor,
are facts from which a court of equity may enforce a charge against such pro-
perty. Rice v. Railroad Co., 522.
45. But an intention to charge such property will not be implied, merely
from the giving of a note. Id.
46. Neither will her property be made liable in the absence of a contract
valid in law to bind the same, or of such circumstances as make it equitable.
Id.
47. When a married woman subscribes to stock of a corporation, but makes
default in payment, equity will not charge her property in the absence of
proof that either party dealt on the credit of such property. Id.
48. A wile is not estopped from asserting her title to her personal property
against an innocent purchaser from her husband when she was not present at.
the sale, and had no opportunity of giving notice of her rights. Klein v.
•eibold, 730.
49. The Illinois statute as to contracts of a wife empowers her to sign a note
as surety for her husband. Wriqld v. Remington, 743.
50. Such contract may be enforced in New Jersey. Id.
51. Where the payee induced the wife to sign by procuring the husband to
threaten suicide if she did not, this does not amount to duress. Id.
INCUMBRANCE. See ENCUMBRANCE.
INDICTMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7 ; CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 8, 14-16,,
31, 34, 43; EXTRADITIOx, 2.
INFANT. See GUARDIAN AND VARD; PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Action must be brought by his guardian or next friend, who alone is
liable for the costs. Keffell v. Bullock, 447.
2. Not liable for costs after arriving at full age, in an action brought with-
out a guardian or next friend, if, on reaching his majority, he disclaim all,
benefit from the proceeding, and refuse to proceed. Id.
3. By the legislation in Nebraska all the disabilities of infancy, as they
exist by the common law, are fully recognised. Id.
4. If an infant buys a chattel, and after he comes of age converts it to his.
own use, that is a ratification which makes him liable. Robinson v. .Hoskins,
510.
5. A sale of the chattel after becoming of age is a ratification, and such
ratification does away with the necessity of a written promise to pay the debt.
.d.
6. Where an infant purchases a chattel and'the vendor who has retained a.
lien on it for an unpaid balance of the price, retakes it, the infant may re-
cover back the money paid, although the use which he has had of the chattel
was of greater value than such money, and although at the time of purchase
he represented himself to be of full age. Whitecomb v. Joslyn, 790.
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INJUNCTION. See EQUITY, 22, 32; MANDAMUS, 6; MORTGAGE, 10, 16;
NUISANCE, 3; TAXATION, 15.
1. County commissioners executed a contract for the erection of county
buildings, which was ultra vires. Held, that they might be enjoined from
erecting said buildings, and from drawing warrants on the county treasurer
therefor. State v. Board of County Com., 390.
2. The sufficiency of an injunction bill cannot be reviewed in collateral pro-
ceedings. People v. Circuit Judge, 459.
3. Whether injunction to restrain threatened injury is matter of right
gucere. Hall v. Rood, 524.
4. Not granted where such relief is disproportionate to the injury. rd.
5. A wooden building encroached six inches on a private alley for more
than twenty years. The owner attempted to veneer it with brick, whereby it
would encroach three inches more. It did not appear that the encroachment
would materially injure the right of way. Held, that an injunction would not
be granted. Ad.
6. Where the defendant is present when an order for an injunction is granted,
and has notice, he is bound to observe it as if the writ were issued ; and on
dismissal of the bill damages may be properly assessed. Danville Banking
and Trust Co. v. Parks, 587.
7. A committee of a club, in proceeding against a member for alleged mis-
conduct, are bound to act according to the ordinary rules of justice, and if they
act otherwise, they may be restrained by injunction. Fisher v. Keane, 788.
INNKEEPER.
1. Where a safe for the keeping of articles is provided, and notices given,
as required by statute, a loser failing to take the benefit of the protection must
bear his own loss. Elcox v. Hill, 395.
2. Where the loss is occasioned by the personal negligence of the guest, the
innkeeper is not liable. Id.
INSANITY.
1. In an action for false imprisonment, brought by a patient in an insane
asylum against the superintendent, the broadest latitude should be allowed in
showing the jury the acts, words and appearance of the patient. Van Dusen
v. Newcomer, 395.
2. One cannot lawfully be placed or detained in an insane asylum against
his will, unless actually insane. Id.
3. The confinement of a person dangerously insane is always justifiable. Id.
4. Whether the superintendent of an asylum is liable for detaining a sane
person whom in good faith he believes to be insane, qucere. Id.
INSOLVENCY. See 1BANK, 1 ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 9, 17; RECEIvER, 3,
4; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 5.
New Jersey does not possess the crown's common-law prerogative to have
its debts paid in preference to other debts. Board of Freeholders v. State Bank,
268.
INSURANCE. See CORPORATION, 7; EQUITY, 1.
I. Generally.
1. A policy-holder is not entitled to a present action for the sum insured,
because the company wrongfully declare the policy void and refuse to receive
the premiums. Day v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Co., 47.
2. In such case the holder may either 1. Sue for the present value of the
policy; 2. Continue to tender premiums, and after death of the life insured.
sue for the amount of the policy; or 3. Go into equity to have the policy
decreed in force. Id.
3. Hochster v. De Ia Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, and Frost v. Knight, Law Rep.
7 Exch. I11, reviewed and distinguished. id.
4. When a forfeiture is alleged on merely technical grounds, the contract
will be upheld, if it can be without violating any principle of law. Appleton
Iron Co. v. Assurance Co., 395.
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5. Both mortgagor and mortgagee of chattels have insurable interests
therein ; and a provision that any loss is payable to the mortgagee is valid.
Appleton Iron Co. v. Assurance Co., 395.
6. Where the interest of the mortgagees exceeded the insurance, the mort-
gagor could not by a transfer of the title work a forfeiture. Id.
7. An agent who issues a policy and takes a premium after the company's
authority to do business in the state has been revoked, is liable to return the
premium, notwithstanding that he was ignorant of the revocation, and that
the four weeks' notice thereof required by law, had not been given by the state
superintendent. McCutcheon v. Rivers, 587.
8. A policy payable to the "legal heirs" of the person insured, is payable
to his children to the exclusion of his widow. Gauch v. Irs. Co., 587.
9. SUBROGATION BY THE INSURER TO THE INTEREST OF THE MORTGAGEE,
737.
1I. Conditions, Representations, 4-c. See infra, 24.
10. Cotton while guarded by Federal soldiers was insured, the policy stipu-
lating for notice to the company of any change in the situation or circum-
stances affecting the risk or in the title to the property. Subsequently it was
seized without lawful authority by Federal officials, who retained exclusive
control until the loss. Held, that the owner was not bound to give notice of
the change of control. Snell v. Insurance Co., 79.
11. A policy stipulated for immediate notice of loss. The insured property
was burned Oct. 9th 1871, in the Chicago fire, and notice was given Nov. 13th
1871. Held, to be in time in view of the derangement of business caused by
that fire. Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 268.
12. Parol evidence admissible to show that the assured stated to the soli-
citor receiving the application, that there was an encumbrance upon the pro-
perty. Boetcher v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 268.
13. Notice to a soliciting agent, who is authorized to fill up applications for
the assured, to receive premiums and forward the same with the application
to the company, and whose agency thereupon ceases, is notice to the com-
pany. Id.
14. A policy contained a clause that the agent taking the application was
the agent of the assured, but the latter was not advised of this fact. Held,
that the insertion of the clause was a fraud upon the assured, of which the
company could not take advantage. Id.
15. A mortgagor insured chattels, the loss payable to the mortgagee, and the
policy providing that any change in title or possession without notice should
avoid the policy. The mortgagor was adjudged bankrupt, and an assignment
made by order of court to a trustee: Held, that the policy was not avoided.
Appleton Iron Co. v. ins. Co., 316.
16. Where an insurance company agrees to pay the loss to mortgagees, it
is estopped from saying that the mortgagor had no insurable interest. Id.
17. Whether a clause of forfeiture upon a transfer of the insured property
(either voluntary or byjudicial process), is not void as against public policy,
quere. Appleton Iron Co. v. Assurance Co., 395.
18. Such forfeiture may bewaived by laches of the insurer, and if the latter
intended to rely on a forfeiture by the mortgagor, good faith required them
to notify the mortgagee. Id.
19. A policy contained a clause of forfeiture for the omission to state any
material fact: field, that it was avoided by the statement of the insured that
his title to the property was absolute, when in fact it was held by him and his
wife. Etna Ins. Co. v. Resh, 396.
20. The existence of any substantial encumbrance upon property is a ma-
terial fact, whether the statements of the insured are made warranties or not.
Id.
21. A policy provided that after the payment of two annual premiums it
might be exchanged for a paid-up policy. It also provided for a forfeiture
of the policy and all previous payments upon the non-payment of any premi-
um on the day appointed: Held, that the right to exchange for a paid-up
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policy was limited to the time during which the policy was in force. Busstng
v. Ins. Co., 457.
22. Where a mutual insurance company imposes forfeiture, in case a loss
occurs while its assessments are still unpaid, but its local agent receives past
due assessments with knowledge of a loss, and forwards them to the company
without notifying them of it, and they receive them, and two or three weeks
afterwards order the loss to be paid when adjusted, they cannot afterward
refuse payment. Farmners' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bowen, 524.
23. In answer to a question whether a proposal had ever been made on the
applicant's life at any other offices, he answered that he was insured in two
offices at ordinary rates. The policy was issued, and afterwards the company
discovered that the life of the insured had been declined by several offices:-
Held, that there had been a material concealment which would avoid the
policy. London Assurance v. Mansel, 790.
III Marine.
24. The memorandum clause in an open policy on three barge loads of
wheat, described the risk as 39,085 bushels hulk wheat at $1.15 per bushel-
sum $449.45; rate 1 ; premium $449.45 ; to be conveyed from Lansing to
St. Lonis by steamer and barges. In an action upon the policy, it was held
that the wheat was insured in bulk, and not in packages, either of one bushel
or one barge each; that a clause in the policy, "Each package shall be sub-
ject to its own average," did not apply to such a risk; and that, in determin-
ing the percentage of partial loss, the proportion between the entire actual
loss and the value of the entire shipment must be ascertained. Haenschen v.
Franklin Ins. Co., 60.
25. When a steamboat is seaworthy at the time' she was insured, her sea-
worthiness is presumed to continue : but when she springs a dangerous leak,
without apparent cause, a new presumption arises-that of unseaworthiness;
yet, as this is not conclusive, the owners are not required to show the identi-
cal cause of her loss, but may show a probable cause. Insurance Co. v. Tobin,
523.
INTEREST. See MORTGAGE, 10, 14; NATIONAL BANK, 2, 4; TRUST AND
TRUSTEE, I ; USURY.
1. On a demand note, with interest at ten per cent., that rate is recover-
able to the date of verdict, when damages are assessed by a jury, and to the
date of judgment, when a default is entered. Paine v. Caswell, 60.
2. Bonds were executed and made payable in New York. Held (in Iowa),
that delinquent interest thereon drew interest at the rate of six per cent.
Following Preston v. Walker, 26 Iowa 205. Burrows v. Stryker, 268.
3. A decree will draw only the rate of interest of the debt, and if a part
of the debts drew one rate and a part another, the decree will draw different
rates. Id.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See ADMIRALTY, 2; EXTRADITION; NATURALIZA-
TION.
1. The division of an empire does not of itself destroy rights of property
held by the citizens of its different parts, though situated in a different
division from that in which they may reside. Airhart v. DeMessieu, 587.
2. A citizen of Mexico was not divested of his title to lands in Texas by
the revolution, nqr by the constitution or laws subsequently adopted. Id.
INTERPLEADER. See SHERIFF, 3.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 8, 23; CRIMINAL
LAW, 24, 40; EVIDENCE, 3.
In an action by a married woman for an injury to her means of support in
consequence of the intoxication of her husband, it is not error for the court
to refuse to charge that " if the jury award the plaintiff any amount by way
of exemplary damages, they should not consider the fact, if such they find it
to be, that certain of the illegal sales were made on Sunday." Szbila v.
Baaney, 457.
INDEX.
INTOXICATION. See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4.
Effect of evidence of intoxication in criminal prosecutions. Note to State v.
Tatro, 159.
JOINDER OF ACTIONS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 20.
JOINT-DEBTORS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 10; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF,
11.
1. An agreement by which a creditor accepts the individual note of one of
two partners or joint-debtors in payment of the joint-debt, is founded on a
valid consideration, and will discharge the debt. Bowyer v. M1artin, 729.
2. Such agreement would be equally binding if it were to take the indivi-
dual note of each partner for his portion of the debt. Id.
JOINT-TENANT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 39.
JUDGMENT. See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1; EQUITY, 26; FOREIGN JUDGMENT;
JURISDICTION, 2 ; SET-OFF, 1, 7.
1. The mere fact that a judgment by default in trespass is much greater
than it ought to have been, will not of itself justify a court of equity in set-
ting it aside. Walker v. Shreve, 131.
2. Will not affect a bona fide conveyance for value, nor a charge in equity
made before it is entered up. Dyson v. Simmons, 587.
3. The court cannot, as a condition to opening a confessed judgment,
require the defendant to pay the money into court, but may allow the judg-
ment to stand as security until the trial of the issues raised. Page v. Wallace,
268.
JUDICIAL SALE. See SHERIpF'S SALE.
JURISDICTION. See COURTS, 1; EQUITY, 5, 15, 22 ; FOREIGN JUDGMENT, 1;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 4; RAILROAD, 17; TAXATION, 15; UNITED STATES
COURTS, 2, 6-9.
1. A declaration set up in different counts separate demands, each below
the jurisdiction of the court. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction, although
the demands in the aggregate were of sufficient amount. Camp v. Stevens, 128.
2. After judgment in such suit, it is not too late to move to strike off the
case for want of jurisdiction. Id.
3. By statute, Ness county, Kansas, was attached to Pawnee county for
judicial purposes, until it should be organized. The law provided that the
county should be organized from and after the qualification of certain officers
to be appointed by the governor. On the trial of a party in Pawnee county
court, charged with committing an offence in Ness county, held, that in the
absence of any evidence of the organization of Ness county, the court had
jurisdiction. State v. Ruth, 578.
4. Illegality in the service of process, by which jurisdiction is obtained, is
not waived by the special appearance of defendant to move to set aside the
service, nor after such motion is denied, by his answering to the merits. Hark-
ness v. Hyde, 584.
5. Whenever rights or remedies are dependent on statutes, the jurisdiction as
between the law side and the equity side of the federal courts, must be deter-
mined by the essential character of the case. Van Norden v. Morton, 660.
JUROR AND JURY. See NEW TRIAL, 4; VERDICT, 3.
1. Where, in a capital case, a person not summoned as a juror personates
on.- who was returned on the venire, the verdict will be set aside. McGill v.
The State, 455.
2. The improper overruling of an objection to a juror, is cured if it appear
that he was not on the jury when the case was tried and that the party's right
of peremptory challenge was not abridged. Burt v. Panjaud, 660.
3. One offered as a juror is not compelled to disclose his guilt of a crime,
which would disqualify him. Id.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See SET-OFF, 7.
Receiving money in his official capacity and depositing it in his private
bank account, is liable in case of failure of the bank. Shaw v. Bauman, 400.
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LACHES. See AccoUrT, 1; FRAUD, 4; MANDAMUS, 2.
LAND.
THE LAND LAW Or GREAT BRITAIN, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO TER
RIGHTS OF ALIENS, 465.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See GUARANTY, 1; UNITED STATES, 1.
1. By taking a mortgage which, from a failure to record it, cannot be en-
forced, a landlord does not lose his landlord's lien upon the property of his
tenant. Pitkins v. Retcher, 61.
2. Leases must receive a reasonable construction from the language
employed, without the aid of extrinsic evidence beyond what may be neces-
sary to identify the premises and to disclose the circumstances surrounding
the transaction. Bradley v. The United States, 396.
3. The grant of an estate expectant on the determination of a lease for
years, passes to the grantee the rents reserved in the lease. King v. Rousa-
tonic Railroad Co., 458.
4. Notice of the grant to the tenant is sufficient to entitle the grantee to
recover the rents. Id.
5. Where the grant of the reversion is by way of mortgage, the mortgagee
may take the rents or not at his election. But the rents in arrear at the time
the mortgage was executed, belong to the mortgagor. fd.
6. A tenant who removes at expiration of term, without reservation of a
right to remove fixtures remaining on the premises, abandons all right in
them. Joslyn v. McCabe, 711.
7. Where the tenant asked permission to leave the fixtures on the premises,
to which the landlord replied that he was willing, as the fixtures might help
him to rent the store. Reld, that this did not imply a license to re-enter and
remove them. Id.
8. Right of tenant to remove fixtures discussed. Id. Note.
9. A notice to quit held not invalidated by the addition of the following
clause: "And I hereby further give you notice that should you retain posses-
sion of the premises after the day before mentioned, the annual rental of the
premises now held by you from me will be 1601., payable quarterly in
advance." Ahearn v. Bellman. 730.
LATERAL SUPPORT. See SUPPORT.,
LEASE. FRAUDS, STATUTE or, 4; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
LEGACY AND LEGATEE. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, I; WILL, 7.
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES.
The meaning of this term is a question of intention to be gathered from all
the circumstances. Bowman v. Long, 791.
LIBEL. See CRIMINAL LAW, VI.
1. In an action for libel, where defendant justifies a charge of crime, the
defence must be established to the entire satisfaction of the jury, but need not
De established with the certainty required to sustain an indictment. Baker v.
Kansas City Times Co., 101.
2. In such a case, where there are acts or statements of the defendant fairly
admitting of two meanings, the jury should apply the meaning leading to
innocence rather than guilt. .d.
3. But a party failing to establish his plea of justification, may show, in
mitigation of damages, that he acted without malice. Id.
4. Absence of actual malice is no bar to an action of libel where the pub-
licatioh is not privileged. Id.
5. Where a plean of justification is not sustained, it is the duty of the jury
to award damages to the plaintiff, but the amount thereof should be left to their
discretion. Id.
6. Duty of court to lay down rules to guide the jury in assessing damages.
id. Note.
7. Where the defendant gives notice of a general justification only, he must
prove the truth of the statements precisely as charged. Bailey v. Kalamazoo
Publishing Co., 396.
INDEX.
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8. Courts take judicial notice of tile meaning of current phrases. Bailey v.
Kalhmazoo Publiding G~o., 396.
9. General reputation is sufficient to justify the charge that a lawyer is a
pettifogging shyster. Id.
10. Evidence to justify statements published after the commencement of a
suit for libel not admissible. Id.
11. It is not error to allow the defendant to show on what ground he based
his information. Id.
12. Damages for a libel upon a candidate for public office are reduced to a
minimum if the libel results from an honest mistake in an honest effort to en-
lighten the public. Id.
13. Where there is only a technical variance between the charge and its
justification, proof of the belief of tile party should be received. Id.
LIEN. See JUDGtENT, 2; LANDLORD AND TENANT, I ; MEcHANIcs' LIEN;
MIORTGAGE, 5; UNITED STATES COURTS, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER,
10-12.
1. The delivery of a warehouse receipt for a given number of barrels of
pork, parcel of a larger lot, where there is nothing to indicate the specific
barrels embraced in the receipt, will not create a lien in favor of the holder.
Sawyer v. Taqgart, 222.
2. Lien of finder of lost chattel, for compensation for finding it, or expense
incurred in care of it. Note to Bowen v. Sullivan, 699.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. COEOPtATION, 7 ; MADAm Us, 1; MORT-
GAGE, 7.
1. Temporary interruption to actual residence on land caused by the
destruction of the dwelling-house, but without any abandonment of possession,
is not a bar to the running of the statute. Clark v. Potter, 62.
2. Not a bar to an action for an account between partners, unless account
closed for six years. Stout v. Ex'rs of Seabrook, 198.
3. The administrator of a sheriff sued upon a note given to the sheriff for
land sold. Afterwards, and more than ten years after the maturity of the note,
the sureties of the sheriff who had been compelled to pay the amount for
which the land had been sold, substituted themselves as plaintiffs in the
action. Held, that they were barred by the statute, although the suit as origi-
nally brought, was not barred. Sweet v. Jeffries, 269.
4. When it appears on the face of the bill that the complainant's right is
barred, advantage may be taken of the Statute of Limitations by demurrer.
Partridge v. Wells, 333.
5. The bar of the statute is as perfect an answer in equity as at law. Id.
6. The statute does not apply to such trusts as are not cognisable at law,
but only in equity. Id.
7. It is no answer to a plea of the statute, that the cause of action was
fraudulently concealed, and that the suit was brought within the time limited
after discovery. Andreae v. Redfield, 458.
8. Whenever the act or acts necessary to constitute a criminal withholding
by an agent of pension money have transpired, the statute begins to run
against the prosecution. United States v. Irvine, 458.
9. One joint maker of a note shall not lose the benefit of the statute by
payments made by another. Rogers v. Anderson, 458.
10. Unexplained endorsements and endorsements by the payee will not take
a case out of the statute. Id.
11. The admissions of one joint maker are not evidence against another.
Id.
12. The running of the statute is not interrupted by the death of the claim-
ant, and the descent of the right to minors. Harris v. McGovern, 458.
13. When the statute begins to run, it will not be impeded by any subse-
quent disability. Id.
14. A state statute cannot bar the United States. United States v. Thomp-
&on, 459.
15. Applies to actions of account between partners. Todd v. Rafferty's
Adm'r, 476.
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16. Where such accounts have been closed for six years, and there has bees
acquiescence for that period, without fraud, the statute constitutes a bar;
aliter where there have been dealings within the six years. Todd v. Ra.fferty's
Adm'r. 476
17. The statute does not run against each item from its date, but if part be
within the period it draws the others after it. Id.
18. In cases of fraud, the statute runs from the time of discovery. Id.
19. Defence under, is a vested right, that cannot be impaired by subse-
quent legislation. Ryder v. Wilson's Ex'rs, 588.
20. In the administration of a decedent's estate, the expiration of the time
for the creditors to present their claims, worked, under the old law, a bar.
Held, that the repeal of the law authorizing this procedure, did not revive the
right to enforce such claims. Id.
21. The rule and the fact that the claim sued on was not presented within
the time limited, may be pleaded as a bar. Id.
22. In debt on judgment of a court of another state, defendant gave notice
of reliance on the Statute of Limitations, and on the fact that during more
than eight years he had resided in this state and had known attachable pro-
perty therein. Held, that the allegation as to residence and the possession of
property was surplusage, and that the burden was on plaintiff to show that the
statute had not run. Capen v. Woodrow, 791.
LOST PROPERTY.
1. The finder of lost property has title as against any one, except the loser
or real owner, and the fact that it was found by an employee among property
purchased by his employer, makes no difference. Bowen v. Sullivan, 686.
2. Rights of finder of lost property, discussed. Id. Note.
LUNATIC. See INsSANITY.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. Plaintiff must show legal termination of the prosecution, and malice or
want of probable cause. Potter v. Casterline, 588.
2. The legal termination is sufficiently shown by the refusal of the grand
jury to find a bill. Id.
3. A rejection of the complaint by the grand jury is prima facie evidence
of want of probable cause. Id.
4. A nonsuit should be refused, if, from the evidence, the jury might infer
that the defendant had no belief or suspicion of plaintiff's guilt. Id.
5. Defendant cannot excuse himself by showing that he acted under the
advice of an unprofessional person. Id.
MANDAMUS. See MUNICIPAL BONDs, 4; PUELIO SCHOOLS, 3.
1. The limitations of the Ohio code of civil procedure, as to the time of
commencing civil actions, do not apply to proceedings in mandamus. Chlinn
v. Trustees, 203.
2. Where, however, the relator has for an unreasonable time slept upon his
rights, the court may refuse to issue the writ. Id.
3. In determining what constitutes such unreasonable delay, regard may be
had to the circumstances, to the character of the case, and whether any rights
have been prejudiced by the delay. d.
4. Payment of a judgment against a city may be enforced by mandamus
at the suit of ali assignee of the judgment. City v. Sansom, 333.
5. Cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error. Ex
parte Schwab, 397.
6. Where application is made for an injunction, the court must determine
whether that power can be exercised, and if they decide wrongly, the remedy
is by appeal and not by mandamus. Id.
7. To compel payment to a contractor from a special assessment, denied
where the assessment had been adjudged invalid in a suit brought by a tax-
payer. People v. East Saginaw, 451.
8. Will not lie to compel a court to proceed with a trial that has been
enjoined. People v. Circuit Judge, 459.
INDEX.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADMIRALTT, III.
MARRIAGE. See ACTION, 7; HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 13; LOST PROPERTY,
1 ; RAILROAD, 1.
1. Where a mining company let a contract for taking out ore, but employed
persons to watch for dangerous rocks, and in other ways retained control over
the mode of mining, and a servant of the contractors was killed by a falling
rock, the danger from which ought to have been detected. Hdd, that the
mining company was responsible. Lake Superior Iron Co. v. Erickson, 28.
2. It is not contributory negligence for a servant to go into a dangerous
place in deference to the opinion of others, who, by their positions are bound
to have better knowledge as to the danger. Id.
3. Liability of landowner for injuries to persons upon his premises, dis-
cussed. Id. Note.
4. If an employee under contract to serve for a fixed period leaves the
service before the expiration thereof, he is not entitled to recover what may
be due after deducting damages for the breach of contract. Powers v. Wilson,
264.
5. A servant, for reward, takes upon himself the natural risks and perils
incident to his employment. But where there are latent risks which are
known to the master it is his duty to notify the servant. If unknown to the
master through no negligence of his, the risk is with the servant. Steffen v.
The Railway Co., 435.
6. A switchman was injured in consequence of a worn rail left on a side-
track by his fellow employees. He had full means of knowing the condition
of the track, and the custom of using worn rails for side-tracks. Held, that
he could not recover. Michigan Central Railroad v. Austin, 524.
7. One voluntarily entering a dangerous service, knowing the danger,
assumes the risk of his employment. Kelly v. Silver Spring Mine Co., 732.
8. An employee continuing to work exposed to a known danger, without
complaint, without any promise that the danger shall be removed, and not
under stress of special exigency, consents to the risk. Id.
9. An employee is only entitled to have the best practical appliances used
having in view the business of the employer. Baldwin v. Railroad, 761.
10. It is not negligence for a railroad company to transport for connecting
roads cars differently constructed from its own, but in ordinary use on the
connecting roads. Id.
11. Liability of master for injuries to servant by instrumentality employed
in the business. Id. Note.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
An agreement to take second mortgages in payment is a waiver of the
right to file a mechanic's lien. Weaver v. Demuth, 131.
MERGER.
Where it is the right and for the interest of a creditor to preserve a
mortgage title intact, equity will not infer an intent to merge it. Del. 4. Hud.
Canal Co. v. .Bonnel, 419.
MINES AND MINING. See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1.
1. The ninth section of the Apt of Congress of July 26th 1866, "granting
the right of way to ditch and canal owners over the public lands," only con-
firms to such owners the rights which they held under the local customs, laws
and decisions, and confers no additional rights upon owners of ditches subse-
quently constructed. Jennison, Ex'r, v. Kirk, 660.
2. The origin and character of the customary law of miners explained. Id.
3. By that law the owner of a mining claim and the owner of a water-right
in California hold their respective properties from the dates of their appro-
priation, but where both rights can be enjoyed without interference, they are
both allowed. Id.
4. By that law a person cannot construct a ditch to convey water across
the mining claim of another, taken up and worked before the right of way
was acquired. Id.
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5. The local record of a mining community is not the best or only evi.
dence of priority or extent of possession. Campbell v. Rankin, 664.
6. The Act of'Congress of May 10th 1872, section 5, gives no greater ef-
fect to the record of such mining claims than is given to the registration laws
of the states. .d.
MISTAKE. See EQUITY, 1-5, 8, 9, 23, 36; EVIDENCE, 19; MORTGAGE, 11.
1. When a party, having full knowledge of the facts, comes to an errone-
ous conclusion as to their legal effect, this is a mistake of law, and not of fact.
Birkhauser v. Schmitt, 131.
2. Upon a sale of milk, if there is a mistake of the parties as to the amount
held by each can, and the vendor receives more than he is entitled to, he must
account even though the purchaser was negligent in discovering the mistake.
Devine v. Edwards, 269.
3. Where through mutual mistake a lot of land was conveyed instead of
an adjoining one, relief can only be granted by transferring to such adjoining
lot the encumbrances put on the former. Weston v. Wilson, 789.
MORTGAGE. See ATTORNEY, 4; COLLATERAL SECURITY, 1 ; DEBTOR AND
CrEDITOR, 1, 19; EjJECTHENT, 1 ; ESTOPPEL, 2; FORMER ADJUDICATION,
4 ; FRAUD, 3, 7 ; HOMESTEAD, I ; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11 ; INSURANCE, 5,
15 ; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1, 5; MERGER, I ; NATIONAL BANK, 1, 6 ;
POSSESSION, 3 ; RAILROAD, 13; RECEIVER, 9 ; TENDER, I ; UNITED STATES
COURTS, 1.
I. Of Chattels.
1. An unrecorded chattel-mortgage not valid as against a mortgage subse-
quently executed and recorded. Pitkin v. Fletcher, 60.
2. The mortgagee of chattels has the legal title even before the debt is due,
and may take immediate possession. Appleton Iron Co. v. Ins. Co., 316, and
Vote.
3. A mortgage upon logs in the drive is void for uncertainty against third
persons, if it does not furnish the data for separating the mortgaged logs from
the mass. Richardson v. Alpena Lumber Co., 389.
4. A chattel-mortgage in form for an absolute debt, but really to secure
against a contingent liability as surety, is not fraudulent as to creditors of the
mortgagor, and the mortgagee may hold it for debts which he has not yet paid
but which, as surety, he will have to pay. Goodheart v. Johnson, 519.
5. In Rhode Island a mortgage of personal property to be subsequently
acquired, creates in equity a valid lien on such property when acquired. Wil-
liams v. Winsor, 661.
II. Of Realty.
6. The right of redemption, after sale on foreclosure, in Illinois, as decided
in Brine v. Insurance Co., 6 Otto, re-affirmed. Orvis v. Powell, 60.
7. Where a mortgagee holds adverse possession for twenty-one years under
a decree of foreclosure, the equity of redemption is barred although the decree
be void. Clarke v. Potter, 62.
8. An agreement by a purchaser of lands, sold under a deed of trust, to
give the owner a right to redeem, cannot be enforced against an innocent
grantee of the purchaser, who has given negotiable notes for part of the pur-
chase-money. Aliter, if, at the time of trial, the notes remain in the hands
of the first purchaser. Digbyl v. Jones, 132.
9. A renewal* aortgage for the same debt takes precedence of one recorded
subsequent to the original mortgage and prior to the renewal. Shaner v. Wil-
lams, 132.
10. Extension of time of paying interest on mortgage made after the mort-
gagee had ratified several similar extensions made by his agent, is a waiver
of a provision that the principal should become due on default in the interest,
and a suit at law for the principal would be enjoined. Bell v. Romaine, 202.
11. A mortgagee cannot avail himself of an assumption of a mortgage
inserted in a deed by a mistake of the scrivener, without the knowledge of the
parties to the deed. &evens Institute v. Sheridan, 203.
INDEX.
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12. Where the grantee of a mortgagor conveys the mortgaged premises in
different parcels, and the grantees of such parcels again convey them in par-
cels-liehl, that the grantees of the latter parcels are liable to pay their share
of the mortgage-'lebt, in the inverse order of conveyance to them. 11iles v.
Cout, 203.
13. A mortgage for want of words of inheritance conveyed only an estate
for life, although intended to convey the fee. A second mortgagee had such
notice as induced the belief that the first mortgage was in fee. Held, that as
against him the first mortgage should be regarded as in fee. Gale v. Morris,
265.
14. May be foreclosed for interest overdue, although principal is not due.
Butler v. Blackman, 459.
15. A mortgage for a balance of purchase-money has priority of one given
by the vendee to a person who furnishes him the money to make the cashpay-
ments, notwithstanding the latter is recorded first. Turk v. Funk, 459.
16. A mortgagor cannot commit waste; and the removal of a house maybe
enjoined, or if it has been severed, the mortgagee may maintain replevin.
Dorr v. Dudderar, 588.
17. If a mortgage proves defective, by reason of some informality or omis-
si %n, it will be enforced by a court of equity, not only as against the mortgagor,
but as against subsequent judgment-creditors. Dyson v. Simmons, 588.
18. A conveyance made as security for a loan, whatever its form, will be
treated by equity as a mortgage, and parol evidence is admissible to show its
character. Butler v. Butler, 661.
19. A vendee, under a deed which recites that he assumes payment of cer-
tain mortgages made by his vendor, is liable in assumpsit to the mortgagees
for the amount of the mortgage-notes, and this contract being an implied one,
is not within the Statute of Frauds. Urquhart v. Brayton, 726.
20. A recital in an administrator's deed that thr purchaser had complied
with a decree requiring a mortgage to be given, is sufficient notice to the pur-
chaser's vendee of the existence of the mortgage, though the latter be unre-
corded. zEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Ford, 731.
21. A bill to foreclose a mortgage, should be brought in the name of the
equitable owner of the notes, but the objection that it is brought in the payee's
name should be made in the court below. Irish v. Sharp, 731.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 17, 20; TAXATION, 16.
1. Municipal bonds on their face referred to the ordinance authorizing their
issue and which was printed on the back. The ordinance recited that an
election required by law had been duly held. In an action by an innocent
holder. Held, that the court properly sustained a demurrer to pleas, which
merely tendered issue as to the authority to issue the bonds and as to the
validity of the election. City of 2,Vauvoo v. Ritter, 61.
2. One who takes county bonds issued under a statute which limits the rate
of taxation for their payment, is chargeable with knowledge of the limitation.
State v. Macon County Court, 459.
3. Indebtedness on bonds issued to pay a railroad subscription, is not one
of the "expenses of the county," within the meaning of Wag. Stat., sect.
166, 1193. Id.
4. Payment of such indebtedness not enforced by mandamus, where such
action would withdraw funds necessary to the support of the county. !id.
5. Where the county court has refused to draw a warrant therefor, it will
not be compelled by mandamus to change its decision. I. Because its action
is judicial; and, 2. Because an appeal lies to the Circuit Court. Id.
6. United States ex rel. v. Clark County Court, 96 U. S. Rep. 211, dis-
approved. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LA , 10, 33; DAM-
AGES, 6 ; HIGHWAY, 1-6 ; MANDAxtUS, 4 ; MUNICIPAL BONDS ; OFFICE AND
OFFICER, 3; STATUTE, 2, 15; T.XATION, 16.
1. An invalid organization of a county is validated by a subsequent legis-
VoL. XXVII.-105
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lhtive recognition of the existence of the county. State of Kansas v. Stevens,
43, and Note.
2. Municipal corporation not dissolved by non-user. Id.
S. The charter of a borough authorized the warden and burgesses to remove
oncroachments upon the highway. The warden, by direction of a vote of the
warden and burgesses, removed a fence supposed by them to be an encroach-
ment, but which in fact was not. In an action of trespass by the owner: leld,
1. That the grant of power, though to the warden and burgesses, was in real-
ity to the borough. 2. That it was exercised by the borough for its own ad-
vantage, and not as a governmental duty. 3. That the borough was liable
for the acts of the warden. Weed v. Borough of Greenwich, 204.
4. City authorities after notice allowed a sidewalk to remain dilapidated
and out of repair, whereby a person received an irreparable injury: Held, that
the right of recovery against the city was clear. City v. Herz, 383.
5. Courts will not interfere with a fair and honest exercise of discretion by
municipal lauthorities in levying a tax beyond the sum required for its debts
in order to meet expenses of collection and probable deficiencies. Village v.
Ingalls, 334.
6. Powers delegated to municipal corporations will always be strictly con-
strued with reference to the intention of the grant. Henderson v. City of
Covington, 385.
7. A city cannot appropriate its revenues except to the discharge of some
legal duty, or to accomplish some of the objects of its creation. Id.
8. A city cannot appropriate money to pay the expenses of persons to visit
the state capital and procure legislation. Id.
9. A city received money for legitimate purposes, and issued therefor bank
bills, a form of indebtedness prohibited by the state statutes, but afterwards
cancelled these bank bills and delivered in lieu thereof bonds: Held, that this
new form of obligation was valid. City of Little Rock v. Merchants' vational
Bank, 390.
10. A city may temporarily discontinue the use of a street as a highway
for the purpose of constructing a sewer, and the easement of a street railway
company is subject to such right. Kirby v. Citizens' Railway Co., 460.
11. Where the sewer could not be constructed without interfering with the
railway track, the injury resulting from such interfereuce was damnum absque
injuria. Id.
12. A city authorized to erect, repair and regulate public wharves, and fix
the rate of wharfage, cannot lease its wharf, or farm out its revenues, or em-
power any one else to fix the rates of wharfage. Afatthews v. City of Alex-
andria, 460.
13. The owner of a lot on an unimproved street in erecting buildings as-
sumes the risk of damage from the subsequent grading of the street. City of
Akron v. Chamberlain Co., 460.
14. The municipality is liable only where such buildings were erected with
reference to a grade actually established, or where the grade subsequently es-
tablished is unreasonable. Id.
15. Whether a grade be unreasonable -must be determined by the circum-
stances existing at the time the grade was established. Id.
16. The municipality is liable where a lot is improved with reference to a
reasonable future grade which is afterward established, and damage results
from a subsequent change in the grade. Id.
17. Power of a city to borrow money and issue securities depends upon
its charter and the legislation applicable to it. Gause v. City, 497.
18. Such power is not inherent or incidental to the usual grants of munici-
pal power. It may be inferred from powers requiring extraordinary expen-
ditures usually met by borrowing, and where this appears to have been the
legislative intent. Id.
19. These principles applied to the borrowing of money to repair wharves
and open streets, and to the borrowing of money to pay for stock in com-
panies under a special statute. Id.
20. Where bonds are issued without authority for money actually received,
the remedy is by action, not on the bonds, but to recover the money. Id.
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21. The legislature may, for police purposes, prescribe the limit. o" nmuni-
cipal bodies, and give them power to pass ordinances to prevent nuisances to
operate beyond their boundaries. Chicago Packing and Provision Co. v. Chi-
cago, 589.
22. The legislature can authorize benefits to be assessed upon property ad-
jacent to, as well as within a city. Brooks v. Mayor of Baltimore. 589.
23. Such assessment is not a tax for the support of the municipat govern-
ment, but a contribution from persons whose property has been increased in
value by the improvement to an amount equal to the assessment. Id.
24. A municipal corporation will not be allowed to purchase realty in order
to compel a taxpayer to abandon litigation with the municipality. Place v.
City of Providence, 731.
25. A city ordinance is not conclusive, but may be shown to be unneces-
sary and oppressive. Carrigan v. Gage, 731.
26. A writ of fieri facias may issue in West Virginia, against a political
public municipal corporation. Brown v. Gates, 731.
27. But by implication the taxes and public revenues of such corporations
are exempt. Id.
28. Semble, that such corporation may own property strictly private, which
is subject to levy under a fierifacias. But property owned for public pur-
poses is not subject to such levy. Id.
29. The fee of the soil of the streets of Chicago is in either the state or
city, and the city may, under legislative authority, construct a tunnel therein
without being liable to lot-owners for damages. City of Chicago v. Rumsey,
135.
30. The right of a corporation to condemn property for the construction of
a horse or dummy railway in the streets of a city is derived solely from the
state law, and the consent of the city is not a condition precedent; such con-
sent can be obtained after condemnation, and if given, is a mere license,
revocable at any time before it is acted on. Metropolitan City Railway Co. v.
Chicago IV. D. Railway Co., 135.
31. A municipal corporation may appropriate an easement in land abutting
on a street for the purpose of affording lateral support to the street. Dodson
v. The City of Cincinnati, 391.
32. Such appropriation does not divest the owner of his dominion over the
servient property for all purposes not inconsistent with the support to the
street. Id.
33. Not liable for the acts of its officers unless such acts were authorized or
ratified. Donnelly v. Tripp, 661.
MAURDER. See CR MINAL LAw, VII.
NAME. See CRIMIN1AL L.ALW, 8 ; PARiTNEnsrip, 25 ; TtADEMARK, 4; WILL, l.,
A contract is binding when signed by the party making it, though he may
use an English translation of a French name, as Seam for Couture, in his
signature thereto. Augur v. Couture, 61.
NATIONAL BANK.
1. A national bank cannot loan money on real estate security, and a mort-
gage given -to one of its officers to secure re-payment of a loan by the bank
is void. Findley v. Bowen, 204.
2. Where a national -bank makes to one of its directors a loan, which in
amount and rate of interest is in contravention of the National Banking Act,
the borrower is not estopped to defend against a recovery of interest. Bank
of Cadiz v. Slemmons, 389.
3. If a payee when he receives the note surrender the maker's note of an
earlier date, the facts, and not what the payee called the transaction, will de-
termine whether it was a renewal or payment. Id.
4. In rendering judgment on a renewal-note given to a national bank,
which note included illegal interest on the original note, the whole interest on
both notes will be disallowed. Id.
5. Payments made generally on such note will be applied to the principal.
Id.
INDEX.
NATIONAL BANK.
6. Unless the title by mortgage or conveyance is taken to the bank directly,
for its use, the case is not within the prohibition of the statute. Union
National Bank et a/. v. Afatthews, 461.
7. Where a corporation is incompetent to take title to real estate, a con-
veyance to it is only voidable, and is valid until assailed in a direct proceed-
ing. .1d.
NATURALIZATION.
CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, 593, 665.
NAVIGABLE STREAM. See NEGLIGENCE, 7; RIPARtIAN RIGHTS, 1.
NEGLIGENCE. See ACTION, 4, 5 ; ADMIRALTY, 4 ; CHEcK, 2 ; EvIDENCE, 8,
26, 38; HIGHWAY, 1, 3, 5 ; INNKEEPER, 1 ; M ASTER AND SERVANT, 1-5, 6,
7, 9-11 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 4; RAILROAD, 2, 5, 19, 25.
1. The omission by a person in full possession of the faculties of seeing and
hearing, to use such faculties for the avoidance of danger in crossing a rail-
road, is negligence, and will defeat an action for an injury to which it con-
tributed. Pennsylvania Co., 6-c., v. Rathqeb, 61.
2. The question of negligence or of contributory negligence, general'y a
mixed question of law and fact, to be decided by the jury, under proper in-
structions. Id.
3. But if all the material facts be undisputed, or be found by the jury, and
admit of no rational inference but that of negligence, the question becomes
one of law merely. Id.
4. In an action for the loss of a cow killed by a train, plaintiff was held as
maiter of law guilty of contributory negligence in turning his cow loose upon
premises nearly surrounded by railroads, one of which she was accustomed to
cross in going to water. McCandless v. Railroad Co., 133.
5. The facts that the track was unfenced, and that the train was running
somewhat faster than usual at that place, and was not slackened, nor any
alarm given, would not have sustained a verdict that the defendant was guilty
of any wilful or malicious act. Id.
6. There was no error in rejecting evidenee offered by plaintiff, that other
cattle were in the habit of running at large in that vicinity. Id.
7. Where a bridge over a navigable stream is authorized by Act of Con-
greas, the builders may cause such obstruction of the stream as is reasonable
and necessary to the construction of the work, and the rights of navigation
are limited by these rights. Railroad Co. v. Transportation Co., 204.
8. Leaving a barge unguarded in a navigable part of the river is not neg-
ligence if justified by the necessities or convenience of the bridge builders.
Id.
9. And if such vessel is moored out of the usual path of vessels, and in a
place where work is going on from day to day, the absence of a light is not
necessarily negligence. Id.
10. Damages cannot be recovered unless the alleged negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. Id.
11. A pilot leaving the usual channel of navigation must exercise an in-
creased amount of care. .d.
12. An absence of a lookout on a steamer approaching at night a place of
danger is such negligence as will prevent recovery, unless it clearly appears
that such lookout would not have prevented disaster. Id.
13. Although the proximity of the cause to the injury is generally for the
jury to determine, yet where it is obvious from undisputed facts that there was
an intervening agency the court should take the case from the jury. Hoag v.
Railroad Co., 214.
14. By reason of a landslide an oil train was wrecked. The oil took
fire, floated down an adjacent stream and destroyed plaintiff's buildings.
Held, that even if the engineer were negligent the loss was not such natural
consequence as ought to have been foreseen by him. Held further, that
the facts being undisputed, the evidence was properly not submitted to the
jury. .d.
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15. Penna. Railroad v. Hope, 80 Penn. St. 373, distinguished; Penna.
Railroad v. Kerr, 62 Id. 353, followed. Hoag v. Railroad Co., 214.
16. Doctrine of proximate or remote cause in reference to liability for dam-
ages, discussed. Id., Note.
17. Plaintiff carelessly walked upon the track of a railroad only a few
steps south of an approaching train, without looking north, paid so little heed
as not to hear the bell or whistle, or notice the calls of persons, and was run
over by the engine, not moving at high speed. There was no proof of wan-
ton or wilful injury: Held, that the plaintiff's negligence was so gross as to
preclude a recovery. Railroad Co. v. Hart, 335.
18. Where an intent, either actual or constructive, to commit an injury ex-
ists, such injury ceases to be a merely negligent act, and becomes one of vio-
lence. Penna. Railroad v. Sinclair, 378.
19. Contributory negligence is a complete defence to an action for a merely
negligent injury. Id.
20. One who brings an action for an injury by defendant's negligence, has
the burden of proving such negligence. Steffen v. Railroad Co., 397.
21. In such action, where, upon plaintiff's evidence, the accident appeared
unaccountable, and defendant's evidence, so far as it accounted therefor,
showed that it arose from an occult risk incident to the employnent, or that, if
there was negligence, it was that of the plaintiff, it was error to submit the
question of negligence to the jury. Id.
22. The nature of the injury may in some cases raise a presumption of
negligence. Steffen v. Railroad Co., 435.
23. The owner of animals not naturally inclined to commit mischief, is not
liable for an injury committed by them unless it be shown that lie had notice
of the animal's mischievous propensity, or that there was some neglect on his
part. Marean v. Vanatta, 517.
24. Animalsferm naturw are known to be mischievous ; and whoever keeps
such an animal in places of public resort is liable for injuries committed by
it. Congress Spring Co. v. Edqar, 613.
25. Whoever keeps a dangerous animal, with knowledge of its dangerous
propensities, is liable to one injured thereby, without proof of negligence in
the securing or taking care of the animal. Id.
26. Plaintiff was injured by a buck while in a. park owned by defendants
and open to the public. The back was at large; there was no evidence that
it had attacked others, but defendants had posted a notice, "Beware of the
buck." There was expert evidence that bucks were dangerous at the season
the injury was received: Held, that defendants were liable. Id.
27. Liability of owner for injury inflicted by wild animals, discussed. Id.
Note.
28. Plaintiff's goods were injured while in possession of defendant as a
bailee for hire, and defendant, when applied to, gave no satisfactory account
of the injury: Held, that the jury might infer negligence. Kirst v. Railroad
Co., 661.
29. A company supplying gas being in charge of a dangerous material,
must exercise due care to prevent careless interference with its pipes by others,
and whether they have done so is a question for the jury. Butcher v. Provi-
dence Gas Co., 732.
NEGOTIABLE SECURITIES. See BILLs AND NoTEs; MUNICIPAL BoNDs,
1, 2.
NEW TRIAL. See CRIMINAL LAw, 21, 41, 42; ERRORS AND APPEALS, 5, 8;
JUROR AND JURY, 1; VERDICT, 3.
1. Where a plaintiff brings a case on for trial in the absence of the defend-
:mt, in violatien of a written stipulation, a court of equity will grant a new
trial, and this though relief may be had at law. Foote v. Deqpain, 269.
2. After a new trial has been denied, a second motion upon the same grounds
cannot properly be granted. Rogers v. Hoenig, 397.
3. No one but a party to the suit can ask for a new trial. Id.
4. The mere fact that a juror in a civil case drank intoxicating liquor dtr-
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ing an adjournment while the trial was in progress, is not a sufficient reason
for granting a new trial. Pittsburgh, Cin. 4- St. Louis Railway Co. v. Porter,
527.
5. Where the liquor was fumished by the prevailing party, the new trial
will be granted, unless it clearly appears that this action was not intended to
influence, and did not influence, the juror. Id.
6. An attempt to corrupt a juror, though not successful, is good ground for a
new trial. Id.
7. Will be granted when it appears that the jury must have omitted to take
into consideration some of the elements of damage properly involved in the
plaintiff's claim. Phillips v. Railway Co., 7321
NONSUIT. See UNITED STATES COURTS, 15.
NOTICE. See GUARANTY, 8; INSURANCE, 13; MORTGAGE, 13, 20; PossEs-
SION, 3, 5.
NUISANCE. See CRIMINAL LAW, VIII. ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 21.
1. The purchaser of a property used for a particular purpose, is bound to
know at his peril that at some time such use may, by the residence of many
people in the vicinity, become a nuisance, and that it must yield to regulations
for the suppression of nuisances. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Village of
Hyde Park, 62.
2. In such case prescription, whatever the length of time, has no applica-
tion. Id.
3. Courts of equity may enjoin a business before the fact of its being a
nuisance is established at law, where there. is danger of immediate irreparable
loss or material injury. Minke v. Hopeman, 133.
4. That which the law authorizes cannot be a nuisance so as to give a com-
mon-law right of action. Northern Trans. Co. v. Chiicago, 589.
5. If a statute which authorizes acts harmful to individuals be such as the
legislature has power to pass, the acts are lawful and are not nuisances. Id
6. In such grants of power, a right to compensation for consequential
injuries may be given, but such right is a creature of the statute. Id.
7. In equity proceedings to obtain relief for the inundation of complain-
ant's land, and of his private road to a highway by the building of defend
ant's dam : Held, that under the circumstances of the case the dam was a
nuisance in law but not in fact. Held further, that relief should be granted
for the inundation of the land. Held further, that it appearing that the rais-
ing of the grade of the private road would give access to a new and more con-
venient highway, the interruption to this road was capable of pecuniary com-
pensation, and therefore remediable at law. Stone v. Peckham, 662.
8. The erection by a landowner of a building overtopping his neighbor's
chimneys and causing them to smoke, is not a nuisance which will give the
neighbor a right of action. Bryant v. Lefevre, 780.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See AGENT, I ; BILLS AND NOTES, 1 ; CHECK, 1,
2 ; EVIDENCE, 2; EXECUTION, 1, 5; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 33 ; RE-
WARD, 3; SLANDER, 1 ; SURETY, 1, 2 ; UNITED STATES, 1.
I. The legislature may repeal a statute under which an officer has been
appointed, and the office expires with the repeal. State ex rel. Birdsey v.
Baldwin, 205.
2. A person is not entitled to the salary of a public office, unless he both
obtains and exercises the office. Farrell v. City, 334.
3. A policeman of a city is a public officer, holding his office as a trust and
not as a matter of contract. Id.
4. Officers having quasi judicial powers, not liable for injuries resulting
from acts done understandingly and in good faith within the limits of their
authority. Van Dusen v. Newcomer, 395.
5. A legally-elected officer, duly qualified, is entitled to the salary, even
though debarred from his duties by an intruder. Comstockc v. City of Grand
Rapids, 398.
6. The law presumes that persons acting in a public office have been duly
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appointed, and are acting with authority, until the contrary is shown. Keely
v. Sanders, 525.
7. An officer defacto is not a mere usurper, nor yet within the sanction of
law, but one who, colore officii, claims and assumes to exercise official autho-
rity, is reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces accordingly. Hus-
sey v. Smith, 525.
8. The acts of such officers are held to be valid, because the public good
requires it. Id.
9. An officer sued for exceeding his authority is not to be presumed to have
been justified by extraordinary circumstances. Stilson v. Gibbs, 589.
10. Where an officer, by abuse of his authority, renders himself technically
liable as a trespasser ab initio, the jury may nevertheless limit the damages to
the plaintiff's actual injury. Id.
11. A pledge by a candidate for a public office that he will perform his
duties for one-half the legal fees, is contrary to public policy, and the title ta
an office obtained thereby is invalid. State v. Collier, 768.
ORDINANCE. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 25; STATUTE, 2, 15.
PARDON. See CRIMINAL LAW, 27.
PARENT AND CHILD. See AGENr, 2 ; SPsciric PEntORmANCE, 13, 14;
TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 13.
A father who has supplied, or is ready to supply, his minor son, with neces-.
saries, cannot be bound by a contract of the son for necessaries. Johnson v.
Smallwood, 525.
PARTIES. See ACCOUNT, 3; EQUITY, 13, 28; MORTGAGE, 21; PROHIBITION, I-
PARTITION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 9.
PARTNERSHIP. See BANKRUPTCY, 15 ; EQUITY, 5, 7; JOINT DEBTORS, I;
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2, 15.
1. The occupancy and cultivation by one of the farm of another, under an
agreement that the crops raised shall be divided between them in a certain
proportion, does not constitute them co-partners. Donnell v. Harshe, 62.
2. In a case free from fraud, a conveyance of firm assets by one partner in
payment of his individual debt, if made with the consent of his co-partuers, is
valid as against firm creditors. Sciniidlapp v. Currie, 108.
3. Acceptance by creditor of the note of one partner, after dissolution of
firm, in lieu of a matured firm note, not an extinguishment of the firm debt.
Leabo v. Goode, 133.
4. In such case, a surety on the note of the individual partner may recover
from the other partners money which he has paid in discharge of the note. Id.
5. If property seized by the tort of one partner is appropriated to the use
of the firm, the other partners are liable. Durant v. Rogers, 134.
6. Statement of account between partners conclusive, except in cases of
mistake, accident, fraud or undue advantage. Gage v. Parmelee, 134.
7. A dormant partner need not give notice of his retirement from the firm
to strangers having no knowledge of his connection with it. Nussbaumer v.
Becker, 205.
8. Where a partner borrows money on his individual note, such borrowing
does not create a partnership debt, though the money be applied to partner-
ship purposes ; and the principal of a surety on such note is the individual
partner, and not the partners generally. Peterson v. Roach, 205.
9. If a bank pays out firm money to one partner upon his check, in fraud
of the rights of the other partners, an action at law cannot be maintained in
the firm name, but a resort must be had to equity. Church v. First Nat. Bank,
269.
10. An assignment by two partners of all their property for the payment
of their debts conveys their separate property, although their names in the
assignment are immediately followed by the word "partners." Williams Y.
lkadley, 334.
11. Property purchased by one co-partner with the funds of the firm, the
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title being taken in the name of his wife, is partnership assets. Partridge v.
Wells, 334.
12. As against the creditor, a partnership debt is not extinguished by the
fact that one partner, after dissolution gave, without authority, a note in the
firm name foi the debt, the creditor believing the note to be binding. Gardner
v. Conn, 398.
13. As between the partners themselves, such transaction will not discharge
the non-consenting partner from liability to make contribution. Id.
14. Partner not bound by accommodation endorsement made in the name
of his firm without his assent. leftfon v. 'Fanaford, 461.
15. A partner's declarations cannot bind his associates in concerns foreign
to the partnership, nor can his admissions bring such matters within the scope
of the business. Id.
16. A note was given by a debtor to an execution-creditor to obtain a
release from a levy, and was endorsed in the name of a firm by one of the
partners. Held, that it must be presumed that it was an accommodation
endorsement, and that the creditor was privy to the facts. Id.
17. Profits made secretly by one partner in the business of the firm, are
partnership property. Todd v. Rafferty's Adm'r, 476.
18. A firm is dissolved by the death of a partner. Jenness v. Carleton, 590.
19. A surviving partner cannot bind co-survivors by signing the firm name
without their authority. Id.
20. As long as firm debts are outstanding, it is irregular to distribute any
assets among the partners. Hall, Adtn'r v. Clagett, 590.
21. It is the duty of each partner to aid in the settlement of the firm
business even after final dissolution. Id.
22. The powers of partners are co-ordinate whether the partnership be in
active operation or subsisting only for the purpose of winding up its affairs,
and each partner ,hould keep for inspection precise accounts of his transac-
tions for the firm. Id.
23. A total failure to do this, without excuse, affords a good reason for a
court of equity to refuse to supply such accounts. Id.
24. A court of equity will not adjust the relative rights of partners when
the proof is utterly deficient and inconclusive. Id.
25. If the firm name be merely the name of one partner, the firm is not
liable on a bill of exchange signed with such name without proof that it was
made with the authority of, and for the purposes of the firm. Yorkshire
Banking Co. v. .Beatson, 733.
2ASSENGER. See CommoN CARRIER, 2; RAILROAD, 5, 25.
PATENT. See TRADEMARK, I ; UNITED STATES COURTS, 14.
1. A re-issued patent must be for the same invention as the original, or for
a part thereof, when divisional re-issues are granted. Giant Powder Co. v.
California Powder W17orks, 269.
2. An original patent for a process will not support a re-issued patent for
a composition, unless the invention of the one involves the invention of the
other. Id.
3. A patent for processes of exploding nitro-glycerine will not support a
re-issue for a composition of nitro-glycerine and gunpowder, even though the
original application claimed the invention of both process and compound. Id.
PAYMENT. See ACTIO N, 8; AGENT, 4; ASSUMPSIT, 2; MISTAKE, 2.
1. A debtor delivered a horse to his creditor to sell and apply the proceeds
to the debt. The creditor exchanged the horse for other property, and the
amount to be applied was disputed. Held, that the transaction amounted to a
payment, instead of a mere basis of set-off. Strong v. Kennedy, 398.
2. When voluntary cannot be recovered back, though the demand'was ille-
gal and a written protest filed. Union Pacific Railroad Co., v. County Com.,
tc., 525.
3. When a party is called upon to pay an illegal tax, and can save himself
and his property in no other way than by paying it, he may protest and
recover it back. d.
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4. Where, however, before any steps are taken to enforce the tax, he pays
in the usual course of business at the tax office everything that is charged
against him, accompanying the payment with a general protest, such pay-
ment is not compulsory. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. County Coin., 4-c., 525.
PENSION. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE or, 8.
PLEADING. See AccoUNT, 5; CRIMINAL LAW, 15, 16, 26, 31,34; ERRORS
AND APPEALS, 3; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 22.
1. A plea which answers only part of a count, is good if that part is severa-
ble from the rest as a basis of recovery. Eemming v. Mayor of Hoboken, 134.
2. A plaintiff declaring specially upon an express contract between third
persons, must aver his title, and then make out by evidence the contract and
his title as alleged. Rose v. Jackson, 590.
3. The right to sue as assignee of a contract must be positively averred.
An averment of the assignment in the common counts will not support a re-
covery upon the special count in which it is not averred. Nor will a mere
allusion to it in the special count be sufficient. .d.
POSSESSION. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 1, 5, 22; FRAUDULENT COX-
'VEYANCES, 1; HUSBAND AND WIPE, 37 ; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, I;
IINES AND MINING, 5 ; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 17 ; VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER, 5, 9.
1. One who enters upon land under color of title, intending to take posses-
sion of the entire tract, no part of which is held adversely at the time of his
entry, is deemed to be in possession to the extent of his claim. Clark v.
Potter, 62.
2.- The principle that possession of land is notice of title, is intended to pro-
tect equitable rights, and not to cover the possessor's fraud. Groton &wing
Bank v. Batty, 205.
3. As against an innocent mortgagee, notice from possession cannot be set
up by an occupant who being insolvent put the title in the name of the mort-
gagor and who becoming aware of the mortgage, remained silent, and per-
mitted the mortgagor to obtain a second loan on mortgage from the same
mortgagee. Id.
4. A person in actual possession of real estate under an unrecorded deed, is,
as against all persons having notice of the deed, the legal, and as against all
other persons the equitable owner. Tucker v. Vandermark, 334.
5. Persons are bound to take notice of the equitable interest of a person in
actual possession. Id.
6. If one takes possession of the land of another, believing and claiming it
to be his own, his possession is adverse. Walbrunn v. Ballen, 591.
7. A proposal from one in possession to buy out the holder of the true
title, does not necessarily amount to an acknowledgment that the possession is
not adverse. Id.
8. In ejectment or trespass, actual possession or receipt of rent is prima
facie evidence of title, as against a naked trespasser. Burt v. Panjaud, 662;
Campbell v. Rankin, 664.
9. Title draws after it possession of property not in adverse possession of
another. Moore v. Douglass. 662.
10. Actual possession of a part under a bonafide claim to the whole, is
possession of the whole, or so much thereof as is not in the adverse posses-
sion of others. Id.
I1. In such case, the party in possession of such part, may maintain an
action of unlawful entry and detainer against one who enters on the residue
without any right of entry, but the owner of such residue may enter on and
hold the same without force. Id.
12. TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION, 209.
PRACTICE. See EQUITY, 41, 43, 46.
PRESCRIPTION. See NUISANCE, 2.
Prescriptive enjoyment of light and air. Note to Bryant v. Lefevre, 787.
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PRESUMPTION. See CoMMON CARRIER, 3, 4; EASEMENT, 2; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 7; INsus.ANcE, 25; NEGLIGENCE, 28; OFFICE AND OFFICER, 6;
WILL, 8.
1. A person not heard of for seven years is presumed to be dead. But that
presumption is not conclusive. Davie et al. T. Briggs, 266.
2. If it appears that the absent person, within the seven years, encountered
some specific peril, which might reasonably be expected to destroy life, the
court or jury may infer that life ceased before the expiration of the seven
years. Id.
3. Where a person is not heard of for seven years, there is no presumption
as to the time of death, but only that he is then dead. Id.
PROBATE COURTS.
1. The county court has jurisdiction only in the administration of the estates
of dead persons. Mdia v. Simmons, 134.
2. Administration of the estate of a person who, though represented to
have deceased, is still alive, is absolutely void, and an occupation for ten years
under claim founded upon such administration would not bar an action for the
land. 1d.
PROHIBITION.
Writ does not lie to arrest a proceeding at law for defect of parties. Bow-
man's Case, 270.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See BILLS AND NOTES.
PUBLIC POLICY. See EQUITY, 39; EXECUTION, 1; INSURANCE, 17; Or-
FICER, 11 ; REWARD, 1.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS. See TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
1. The teacher, unless restrained by some affirmative action of the board
of education, has authority to enforce obedience to his lawful commands, and
may, in a proper case, suspend a pupil from the privileges of the school.
State ex rel. Burpee v. Burton, 233.
2. The decisions of the department of public instruction are entitled to
great weight, and should never be overruled unless clearly contrary to law. Id.
3. Whether a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the teacher to reinstate
a suspended pupil, quoere. Id.
4. Extent of teacher's authority discussed. Id. Note.
RAILROAD. See ACTION, 9; COMMON CARRIER, 4; CONSTITUTIONrAL LAW,
9, 20; EQUITY, 31 ; EVIDENCE, 8; MASTER AND SERVANT, 6, 9 ; NEGLI-
GENCE, 1, 4, 13. 17; SALE, I ; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 1 ; TAX, 8.
1. Railroad company not liable for drugs furnished on order of division
superintendent to a person injured on the road without proof of the authority
of the superintendent to give the order. Brown v. Railway Co., 63.
2. Where a railroad is authorized to use steam locomotives, no inference
of negligence arises from the causing of an injury by sparks from such loco-
motives. Ruffner v. Railroad Co., 134.
3. When a drunken, unruly, boisterous passenger endangers by his acts the
lives of people, it is the duty of a conductor to remove such a passenger from
the train. Railway Co. v. Valleley, 206.
4. But he must not inflict wanton or unnecessary injury upon the offending
passenger, nor needlessly place him in peril. Id.
5. If having exercised reasonable prudence, the conductor expels such pas-
senger, who is afterward run over and killed, the expulsion itself is not such
proximate cause of the death as will make the company liable. Id.
6. Purchase of a ticket does not give passenger a right to stop over at inter-
vening station without the consent of the company. Stone v. Railroad, 270.
7. A passenger who refuses to pay his fare becomes a trespasser, and may
be ejected from the train. id.
8. By refusal to pay his fare the passenger deprives himself of the right to
insist upon courteous treatment. Id.
9. Testimony to the effect that the plaintiff had been permitted at other
times to stop over at intervening stations, held inadmissible. Id.
10. Where a passenger has been ejected for non-payment of fare, he must
INDEX. 843
RAILROADS.
pay the fare from the station where he first entered before he can insist upon
being carried forward upon the same train. Stone v. Railroad, 270.
11. That the passenger attempted to re-enter the train with good intent, and
without a purpose to defraud the company, would not aid him. Id.
12. A law of New York authorized railroads having continuous lines to con-
solidate, and a law of Connecticut provided that whenever a railroad, lying
within both states, should consolidate with another road, under the laws of
New York the new company should possess all the rights of the old. A rail-
road lying within both states was consolidated with another road, but the lines
of the two roads were not continuous. Held, 1. That a subsequent Act of
New York recognising the new corporation validated the consolidation. 2.
That this ratification satisfied the requirements of the Connecticut act. Mead
v. Railroad Co., 453.
13. The new corporation succeeded to the power of the old one to issue
bonds for completing the road and to mortgage its property. Id.
14. And this power included the power to issue bonds in exchange for
bonds previously issued by the old company. Id.
15. A bill in equity alleged that the new corporation duly issued its bonds
and disposed of them to bona fide holders: Beld, a sufficient averment that
the bonds were lawfully issued. Id.
16. After the bonds were issued, but before the mortgage was recorded, a
creditor with knowledge of these facts, levied an execution upon the mort-
gaged property: Held, that he obtained no priority. Id.
17. A court of chancery has jurisdiction for the foreclosure of such a mort-
gage, although embracing property out of the state. .d.
18. A court of chancery may make a decree respecting property situated
out of the jurisdiction. id.
19. Negligence by a railroad does not relieve a person attempting to cross
its track from exercising ordinary care and prudence. Blaker's Ex'r, v. Re-
ceivers, 4"c., 562.
20. If it appears that the negligence of the person killed materially contri-
buted to the disaster, his next or kin cannot recover. Id.
21. If one approaching a railroad fails to look and listen, or if seeing an
approaching train he tries to cross and fails, the company is not liable. Id.
22. The duty of a person approaching a railroad to stop, look and listen,
discussed. Id. Note.
23. Where a railroad enters upon land and lays its track before making
compensation to the owner, the latter is not entitled to have the damages es-
timated by the value of the land, including the road-bed, ties, &c. Greve v.
St. Paul 4- Pacific Railroad Co., 702.
24. The above decision criticised, and the authorities reviewed, Id. Note.
25. Liable for injuries to passenger by its train, even though his ticket had
not been issued by them, but by another railroad over which it had running
powers. Foulkes v. Met. Dist. Railway, 733.
RAPE. See CRIMINAL LAW, IX.
REBELLION. See CONFEDERtATE STATES; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 13.
RECEIVER. See EQUITY, 31.
1. Property vested in a receiver by the law of the state where it is situated
will not be divested by.the law of another state, into which he takes it in the
performance of his duty. Pond v. Cooke, 134.
2. And where such property is attached in the state to which it is taken a
party giving a receipt to the officer serving the attachment is not liable, even
in nominal damages in a suit on the receipt for refusal to deliver. l.
3. A receiver appointed by a court in such a case stands in the same posi-
tion as an assignee or trustee in insolvency. Id.
4. On the appointment of a receiver of an insolvent corporation, its title
to its property is divested by law. Board of Freeholders v. State Bank, 270.
5. The title of a receiver to property attaches from the date of his appoint-
ment, and is not deferred until he gives bond. Mlagnard v. Bond, 270.
6. A receiver cannot be sued or garnished without leave of the court.
People ex rel. v. Brook% 398.
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7. A foreign receiver with power to take property, wherever situate may
sue for such property in the courts of New Jersey. Wlurd v. Elizabeth, 591.
8. This is the rule whenever the creditors of the person represented by the
receiver do not intervene. Id.
9. A court of chancery may, under certain circumstances, appoint a receiver
of the rents of mortgaged premises pending foreclosure proceedings. Haas
v. Chicago Building Society, 733.
RECORD. See Coun, 1 ; EVIDENCE, 5, 30.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
1. A petition for the removal of a suit in equity to the United States Cir-
cuit Court, with accompanying bond, was filed in a state court during a term
in which the bill was filed, hut subsequently to the filing of the answer and
the appointment of a receiver: Held, that the petition was filed in time under
the Act of Congress of 3d March 1875. Taylor v. Rockefeller, 298.
2. No order or allowance of the state court for a removal of the cause is
necessary under that act. Id.
3. The jurisdiction of the state court is not ousted, unless the petition and
record show a case of which the United States court has jurisdiction ; but the
judgment of the state court to that effect is not binding upon the United States
court. Id.
4. Any cause which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, may
be removed from a state court. Id.
5. Semble, that the federal courts have jurisdiction where some of the indis-
pensable parties on either side are citizens of the same state as that of some
of the indispensable parties on the other side. Id.
6. Senble, that, prior to the Act of 1875, no removal could be had, unless
each of the plaintiffs could have sued each of the defendants in the federal
court. % Id.
7. But under that act the power of removal may he enjoyed where in a suit
there are several controversies of which one is wholly between citizens of dif-
ferent states, and can be fully determined as between them. Id.
8. Upon the question of citizenship, the court looks to the citizenship of the
trustee, not of the cestui que trust. Id.
9. Semble, that the "controversy" mentioned in the Act of 1875, between
the petitioners and the opposite party, need not be the main controversy in
the case. Id.
10. A controversy wholly between citizens of different states, fully deter-
minable as between them, entitles either of such parties to removal, though
not fully determinable as between the remaining parties. Id.
11. The Circuit Court, upon such removal, obtains jurisdiction over the
whole cause. Id.
12. Removal of causes under Act of 3d March 1875, discussed. Id. Note.
13. A cause can be removed after a new trial has been granted in the state
court. Railway Co. v. McKinley, 462.
REPLEVIN. See CONFLICT Or LAWS, 2; MORTGAGE, 16.
A receiptor of goods attached, who by his receipt has bound himself to
return them, has a special property in them, and can maintain replevin. Pe-
ters v. Stewart, 331.
RESCISSION. See CONTRACT, 10; FRAUD, 8; VENDOR AND PuacssasE, 9, 14.
REWARD.
1. Where a reward is offered for information leading to the apprehension
of a felon, a police constable, to whom the felon has voluntarily offered to
surrender himself, is not entitled to the reward. Bent v. The Bank, 291.
2. England v. Davidson, 11 A. & E. 856, commented upon. Id.
3. Right of officers to take reward when acting solely under their official
authority. Id. Note.
RIPARIAN RIGHTS. See WATERS AND WATERCOURSES, 1, 8, 9.
Where a navigable river was meandered in making the public surveys and
the United States has granted the land bounded by the meander line, the
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grantee takes to the river. Accretions to such land belong to him and can-
not be selected by others as swamp and overflowed land. Minto v. Delaney,
733.
RIVER. See RIPARIAN RIGHTS.
SALE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; CONTRACT, 2; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR,
13; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, I; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 48; STOPPAGE
IN TRANSITU, I; TAX AND TAXATION, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. Plaintiff being interested as a bondholder in the completion of a rail-
road bought timber on his private account in order to have it ready when
wanted by the railroad. Subsequently, contractors for the building of the
road and the furnishing of the material applied to him for the timber, which
he delivered to them. No terms were agreed upon, nor was it stipulated that
the timber was to be used for the railroad, but both parties so understood.
While the contractors were transporting the timber it was attached by
creditors of the railroad. Held, that the transaction was a sale to the
contractors, and that plaintiff could not maintain replevin. Colegrove v.
Snow, 135.
2. Upon a sale of a specified quantity of goods from a mass, identical in
kind and uniform in value, a separation of the quantity sold is not neces.ary
to pass the title ; otherwise, -where the articles composing the mass are of
different qualities and values. HurfVr. Hires, 161, and Note.
3. A purchaser of a number of articles not obliged to accept any unless all
be delivered. Hausman v. Nye, 194.
4. Whether a delivery of goods to a common carrier not designated by the
purchaser is sufficient to transfer the title, qucEre. Id.
5. If a vendee of corn under an agreement, that if it does not prove to be
of grade No. 2, the title is not to pass, sells the same after it is rejected as
No. 2, he will be liable for the price received by him. Burns v. Mays, 591.
6. Plaintiffs contracted to sell "twenty-five tons (more or less) Penang
pepper * * name of vessel or vessels * * to be declared within sixty
days." Within that time plaintiffs declared twenty-five tons by a vessel, but
only twenty tons complied with the terms of the contract, and made no fuither
declaration. Held, that it was an entire contract, and the vendees were not
bound to accept the twenty tons. Reuter v. Sala, 734.
7. In the absence of fraud on the part of an executor to induce the pur-
chase of land of his testator, the rule of caveat emptor applies in all its strict-
ness. Bond v. Ramse.y, 791.
SALVAGE. See ADMIRALTY, IV.
SAVINGS BANK. See CORPORATION, 2.
SCHOOL. See PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
SERVANT. See MASTER AND SERVANT.
SET-OFF. See FORMER ADJUDICATION, 5; PAYMENT, 1.
1. The assignee of a judgment with notice that the judgment-debtor had
an unsettled demand against the plaintiff, but without notice of an equitable
right to have it set-off, will be protected. Ulman v. Kline, 206.
2. Joint-debts cannot be set-off against separate debts, unless there be
some special equity. Bank v. Hemingray, 462.
3. If there is such equity, the bankruptcy of the party against whom they
exist, is sufficient ground for the allowance of the set-off. Id.
4. In an action on a note which the plaintiff holds as collateral security for
a loan to the insolvent payee, against whom the maker is entitled to an equit-
able set-off, the plaintiff can only r cover the amount of the debt, and not the
amount of his attorney's fees. Id.
5. A plaintiff cannot fix the amount of a contested bill by giving credit for
what he claims it should be. McEwen v. Bi~qdow, 526.
6. A defendant can withhold his claim of set-off to be litigated in another
suit. Id.
7. A judgment recovered before one justice can be ascertained and applied
by another in satisfaction of a counter claim recovered before him. Id.
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SHERIFF AND SHERIFF'S SALE. See EXECUTION. 1, 5, 6, 8.
1. A sheriff's deed good upon its face cannot be collaterally assailed after
the lapse of half a century because the sale was made on a day different from
that advertised, there being no evidence of fraud or to connect the purchaser
with the mistake. Homk v. Cross, 135.
2. A sheriff agreed that his private debt should be set-off against a note
given for the purchase-money of land sold by him as sheriff. The parties
entitled to the proceeds of the land treated the note as paid, and compelled
the sheriff's sureties to pay them the money. Held, that the sureties could
not recover against the maker of the note. Sweet v. Jeffries, 272.
3. Where moneys belonging to execution-creditors are deposited in bank by
him as sheriff, and are attached by his individual creditors, he may interplead
to protect the fund as trustee for those entitled to the money. Meadowcroft
v. Agnew, 734.
4. Where the proceedings on an execution are in substantial compliance
with the law, the sale, though somewhat informal, is good, and will protect
the purchaser without a change of possession. Fitzpatrick v. Peabody, 791.
SHIPPING. See ADMIRALTY.
1. A shipowner who charters his vessel, is impliedly bound to see that she is
seaworthy, and to keep her in proper repair. Work v. Leathers, 63.
2. But a breach of this contract will not relieve the hirer from paying for
the use he makes of the vessel. Id.
3. The contract of a shipmaster to carry to a certain port, means that he is
to bring his vessel to some wharf or convenient place of discharge. Hodgdon
v. Railroad Co., 327.
4. The master of a vessel arrived in port, but could not reach any wharf
for some days, on account of ice: Held, that he was not entitled to demurrage.
Id.
5. The fact that the consignees broke a passage for other vessels did not
entitle'this master to demand the same help. .d.
SLANDER. See TRIAL, 2.
1. Words falsely and maliciously charging a public officer with ignorance
and incapacity to perform the duties of an office of profit, and directly tend-
ing to injure him therein, are actionable per se. Spiering v. Andrae, 186.
2. When charge of incapacity in office amounts to slander. Id. Note.
3. It is sufficient if the gravamen of the charge be proven. Dufresne v.
Weise, 398.
4. Where, the proof was that defendant used words of similar import to
those charged, though not quite the exact words, the variance was imma-
terial. id.
5. Words falsely charging an act criminal by the law of the place of the
act are slanderous per se, although the act be not criminal by the law of the
place of speaking. Id.
6. Where words are actionable per se, pecuniary loss is presumed. Where
they are not it is necessary to prove special damage. Shafer v. Ahalt, 462.
7. Words charging an offence are not actionable per se unless the offence
subjects the party to corporal punishment. Id.
8. Special damage is that which is the natural consequence of the slander,
and not such as is occasional and accidental, such as sickness. id.
SMUGGLING. See STATUTE, 6.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See EVWEwCE, 19 ; TRUST AwD TRUSTEE, 13.
1. Specific performance refused of a contract to build a railroad, although
the estimates, &c., were to be made by the railroad, and the payments were to
be made in its stocks and bonds, the railroad having refused to carry out the
contract solely, as it alleged, because of its inability to comply with a supple-
ment to the act of incorporation, the penalty for non-compliance being a for-
feiture of its charter. Daa!forth v. Railroad Co., 206.
2. The court refused to consider the constitutionality of the supplement, or
to direct the railroad to make estimates for the work already done. Id.
3. Where a vendor of real estate agrees that if a certain street be not
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opened in two ycar , he will, upon a reconveyance, refund the money, a
court of equity will specilically enforce this agreement. Kerfbot v. Breck.
enrieqe, 206.
4. Where the wife has not joined in the contract, it is errcneous to decree
specific performance by her. Mtthldson v. 171son, 335.
5. The insolency of a purchaser who was to give a mortgage for part of
the purchase-money, hut who offered to pay the whole in cash if desired, is no
defence against specific performance. Hq,/hes v. Young, 788.
6. Where the person through whom plaintiff claims, could not claim specific
performance, the plaintiff cannot do so without showing that he is a bona fide
purcna'er. B,-rry v. Vhitne,, 463.
7. Stipulations not actually made, and to which the parties might not have
assented, cannot he imported into a contract. Nins v. Vaugh, 591.
8. Where a demand has once been made and refused, it is not necessary to
repeat it before suit. Id.
9. Will not be refused as inequitable because of the fluctuation of values,
where the court ha, no means of knowing what bearing the contract had on
the negotiations of the parties. Id.
10. Generally, when a contract respecting real property is unobjectionable,
equity will decree specific performance. But the court may, under certain cir-
cumustances, refuse its aid, or it may rescind the contract. W. Va., 0. 4 0.
L. Co. v. Vinal, 662.
11. When general rules and principles will not furnish any exact measure
of justice, the court will withhold or grant relief according to the circum-
stances of each case. Md.
12. In the case of parol contracts for land, partly executed, it is the duty
of the court to exert proper means to ascertain the terms of the contract. d.
13. Shonld he decreed of a contract between fAther and son, that if the son
would enter upon and improve certain land, the father would make him a deed
for it, in pursuance of which the son enters on the land. Lorentz vw Lorentz,
663.
14. Such contracts must be established by clear, definite and certain proof.
Id.
15. Not extended to contracts relating to other matters than conveyance of
land. Brittain v. Rossiter, 716.
16. A parol contract for sale of land will not be enforced unless explicit,
nor unless the boundaries of the land are already defined. Brown v. Lord,
734.
17. If possession is relied on to enforce parol agreement, it must have been
visible, notorious and exclusive, and taken under the agreement. Id.
STATUTE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 30; CRIMINAL LAw, 39; TAx AND
TAXATIoN, 2.
1. Even if two statutes on same subject be not in terms repugnant, if the
later statute is clearly intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern
the case provided for, it will repeal the earlier act. State v. The Ma.yor, 4c.,
20, and Note.
2. This rule applied to municipal ordinances. Id.
3. A legislative grant of a privilege to one person not repealed by an act
giving all others the same right under certain conditions. State v. Cleland,
63.
4. An act was passed in 1872. A revision in 1875 repealed all public laws
not contained therein, except acts which, though public in form, were of a
private nature. This act was not contained in the revision. By an estab-
lished custom the acts of each year were published by the secretary of state
in two pamphlets, one called "Public Acts" and the other "Private Acts and
Resolutions." This act was published among the private acts for the year
1872. Held, that it was to he presumed that the legislature acted with refer-
ence to this usage and classification, and intended to preserve the act in ques-
tion. State v. Srgent, 243.
:. Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be so construed as not
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to infringe upon the principles of the common law to any greater extent than
is plainly expressed. State v. Clinton, 271.
6. An action of debt cannot be maintained by the United States for penal-
ties prescribed by the Act of Congress to prevent smuggling, approved July
18th 1866. That act contemplated only a criminal proceeding. United States
v. Claflin, 271.
7. Nor does section 3082 of the Revised Statutes authorize a civil action.
Id.
8. A recital in a statute that a former statute had been repealed, is not con.
elusive. fid.
9. When a new statute covers the whole subject-matter of an old one, the
latter operates by way of substitution, and the former is impliedly repealed.
It is, however, necessary that the objects of the two statutes are the same. If
not, both statutes will stand, though they refer to the same subject. Id.
10. Where a statute creates a new offence and provides a remedy by a par-
ticular method of proceeding, that method must be preserved. Conumissioners,
6-c., v. Bank of Findley, 526.
11. An Ohio statute provided that any one aiding in the loan of public
moneys should be guilty of embezzlement and subject to imprisonment and a
fine of double the amount embezzled, such fine to be a judgment in favor of
the party injured, and to be collected as other judgments. Held, that this act
created a new offence, and that the remedy therein given was exclusive of a
civil action for the same offence. Id.
12. A statute exempting property from levy and sale, is not to be construed
strictly. Washburn v. Goodheart, 591.
13. In construing a statute, aid may be derived from attention to the state
of things as it appeared to the legislature when the statute was enacted. Pratt
v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 663.
14. In considering what cases fall within a statute, the intention of the
makers governs. Brown v. Gates, 734.
15. The repeal of an ordinance pending a prosecution under it releases the
defendant. City of Kansas v. White, 735.
16. When an act is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered
as to future transactions as if it had never existed. Curran v. Owens, 735.
17. A right of action depending solely upon statute, falls with the repeal
of the statute, unless it has been carried into judgment. Id.
18. Whether the repealing act was intended to affect pending suits, must be
gathered from the repealing act itself. Id.
19. If the section in the old act which gave the right of action is substan-
tially re-enacted in the repealing statute, suits brought thereon are saved. rd.
STOPrAGE IN TRANSITU.
1. Delivery of goods by the vendor to a carrier, even though the carrier be
hired by the purchaser, is only constructive delivery to the purchaser. Ex
parte Rosevear Clay Co., 791.
2. Till the goods are in the actual possession of the purchaser the transit is
not at an end, and it makes no difference that their ultimate destination has
not been communicated by the purchaser to the vendor. Id.
STREAM. See EQUITY, 22; RIPARIAN RIGHTS; WATERS AND WATER-
COURSES.
STREET. See MUNICOIPAL CowpoATIox, 4, 10, 13, 19, 29, 30, 31, 32.
SUBROGATION. See IsUnANoE, 9.
I. A first mortgagee, who pays taxes upon the faith of a promise by a
second mortgagee to repay him, cannot, as against the second mortgagee, be
subrogated to the original lien of the township for the taxes. Manning v.
Tuthill, 207.
2. A mere volunteer, who pays another's debt, is not entitled to be subro
gated to the creditor's rights, but if the person paying the debt does so for tho
protection of his own rights, the substitution should be made. Young v. Mot-
gan, 792.
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SUNDAY. See CRIMINAL LAW, 45; INTOXICATING LIQUORS, 1.
Whenever an act must be done in a given period, Sundays which fall withn
the period make a part of it ; but if the period closes on Sunday, the act may
be done on the following day. Barnes v. Eddy, 664.
SUPPO RT.
1. The right of lateral support extends only to the soil in its natural condi-
tion, and does not protect whatever is placed on the soil, increasing its down-
-ward and lateral pressure. Northern Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 587.
2. SUPPORT, LATERAL AND SUIIJACENT, 529.
SURETY. See B ANKRUPTCY, 16; GUARANTY; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 49;
LItMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3 ; PARTNERSIIP, 4, 8.
1. Surety on bond of officer not responsible for performance of duties not
belonging to the office when the bond was signed, and not discharged by the
addition of such duties. Gaussen, E.r'r, 4.c., v. United States, 64.
2. Where an officer is required to perform a special duty, for which he gives
a special bond, no liability therefor attaches to his general bondsmen. Su-
pervsors of .11waukee v. Elders, 136.
3. Where a principal takes sureties for his agent without disclosing to them
his di-covery of a previous default by the agent, he cannot recover from them.
Dinsmnore v. S*idball, 463.
4. Abandonment by creditor of a mortgage sufficient to secure his debt, will
discharge a surety, and he may make this defence in a court of law. Renegar
v. Thomapson, 644.
5. Where facts, which, if known, might have deterred the surety, are, with
the knowledge of the creditor, misrepresented to him, although not with a
fraudulent purpose, he is not bound. Warren v. Branch, 735.
6. The creditor is not bound to disclose facts not connected with the sure-
tyship unless the surety makes inquiry. Id.
7. If the creditor fraudulently conceals such facts, or has reason to believe
that the principal must have used fraud, the surety is not bound. Id.
8. Distinction between guaranty and suretyship. Note to Birdsall v. Hea-
cock, 757.
T AX AND TAXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2, 14, 22; EVIDENCE,
12; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5, 27 ; PAYTENT, 3; SUBROGATION, 1.
1. A state tax on the amount of an auctioneer's sales is a tax on the goods
sold. Cook v. Pennsylvania, 57.
2. A provision in a constitution exempting from taxation property ";neces-
sary for school purposes," is more extensive than "for the use of schools."
Northwestern Unirersity v. The People, 366.
3. The former includes property which is not itself in actual use by the
school, but which, by being rented, produces an income for the support of the
school. Id.
4. Exemption of corporations from taxation. Id. Note.
5. A surrender of the right of taxation is never to be presumed, but must be
the result of express terms or necessary inference. County Commissioners v.
Sisters of Charity, 399.
6. Exemption being a surrender of the power of taxation, is subject to the
same principle. Id.
7. No general principle of law exempts charitable corporations from taxa-
tion. Id.
8. The charter of a railroad company provided, "that the said road or
roads, with all their works, improvements and profits, and all the machinery
of transportation used on said road, are hereby vested in the said company,
incorporated by this act, and their successors for ever ; and the shares of the
capital stock of the said company shall be deemed and considered personal
estate, and shall be exempt from the imposition of any tax or burden :" Held,
1. That the exemption from taxation was a contract between the state and
the corporators, within the protection of the Constitution of the United States ;
2. That the property and franchises of the company, and the gross receipts
derived from the exercise of such franchises, were exempt from taxation.
State v. B. 4- 0. Railroad Co., 464.
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TAX AND TAXATION.
9. The receipts from the road and from lateral roads, and from all neces-
sary buildings and works, were exempt from taxation, whether constructed
with money derived from the subscription to the capital stock, or from sales
of the stock, or from money borrowed, or from the undistributed profits.
State v. B. 4- 0. Railroad Co., 464.
10. Necessary buildings and works were such as were reasonably conve-
nient and appropriate to the operation of the road. Id.
11. The elevators, wharves, piers and docks owned by the defendant were
necessary for its business as a common carrier; but, as such common carrier,
it had no right to use them for the storage of freight, after the consignee had
had a reasonable time to remove the same. Id.
12. Hotels and buildings for the accommodation of passengers were neces-
sary to the business of the road, and therefore within its charter, although not
expressly authorized. Id.
13. Whoever claims a surrender of the power to tax, must show it in lan-
guage that will admit of no other reasonable construction. Hoge v. Railroad
Co., 526.
14. The distinction between taxes and special assessments for benefits, has
been so generally recognised that it must be considered as settled. Brooks v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 589.
15. Chancery has jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a tax. Kimball v.
Merchants' Say. 4- L. Co., 736.
16. TAxATION or BONDS OR STOCK OP FOREIGN STATES, MUNICIPALI-
TIES AND CORPORATIONS, 1.
TELEGRAPH.
1. Under the Wisconsin statute, empowering the court to compel parties to
allow inspection of papers, the court may order a telegraph company defend-
ant to deposit in court for inspection originals of messages transmitted by
them, duly verified. Phelps v. Telegraph Co., 399.
2. INVIoLABit"TY OF TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE, 65.
TENANT IN COMMON. See HUSBAND AND WIF, 39.
TENDER.
1. Tender after default does not discharge the lien of a mortgage. Crain v
McGoon, 178.
2. Such tender should be kept good. Id.
3. Distinction between mortgages and debts as to tender after default. Id.,
Note.
4. Objection to the mode of tender must be made at the time of tender.
.Brotning v. Crouse, 399.
5. A tender does not remain in force, if the payment is refused and received
back. Id.
6. One who relies on a tender must pay the money into court. Gilkeson v.
Smith, 736.
TIME.
A probate court appointed commissioners on an insolvent estate of decedent,
and allowed six months for creditors to prove their claims : Beld, that the
commissioners must sit on the last day of the six months, and if that came on
Sunday, they must sit the following day. Barnes v. Eddy, 664.
TITLE. See EXECUoOR AND ADmiNISTRATOR, 3.
TORT. See PARTNERSHIP, 5.
TRADE-MARK.
1. So much of Title 60 of the Revised Statutes as relates to trade-marks is
unconstitutibnal, a trade-mark not being a writing or discovery, nor its maker
an author or inventor within the meaning of the constitution. Leidersdorf v.
Flint, 37, and Note. r_
2. The word "Worcesters h ire, " as applied to sauce, has become generic in
meaning, and the fact that persons manufacturing a sauce by that name reside
in Worcestershire, England, does not give them the sole right to such name.
Lea v. Deakin, 322.
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TRADE-MARK.
3. Plaintiffs having known for many years that there was a sauce manufac-
tured by other persons, to which this term was applied, and having taken no
steps to prevent it, there may be said to have been something in the nature
of an acquiescence. Lea v. Deakin, 322.
4. Application of name as a trademark. I'd., Note.
TRESPASS. See ACTION, 9; OFFICER, 10; POSSESSION, 8 ; RAILROAD, 23.
1. In trespass for an assault the provocation, though offered in evidence to
justify the assault, may, if insufficient for that purpose, be considered by the
jury in mitigation of damages. Burke v. Melvin, 335.
2. And it makes no difference that the plea is the general issue, with notice
only that the facts would be proved as a justification. Id.
TRIAL. See EVIDENCE, 9; JURY, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 21 ; UNITED STATES
COUNTS, 15.
1. An admission in writing or of record made at first trial binding at an-
odher trial. Holly v. Young, 64.
2. In slander defendant offered evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation.
The court limited him to ten witnesses: Held, to be a ground for granting a
new trial. lWard v. Dick, 464.
3. The party holding the affirmative of an issue ought to open and close,
and if plaintiff hold the affirmative of any one of a number of issues, he ought
to begin. A liberal discretion, however, is allowed to the court on this ques-
tion, and this will not be reviewed except upon plain error. Montgomery v.
,Stcindler. 526.
4. Where there is only a scintilla of evidence, the case should be taken from
the jury. Conely v. McDonald, 592.
5. Where the evidence has a legal tendency to make out a proper case, its
weight and sufficiency, however slight, is a question for the jury. Id.
TROVER.
1. A judgment in trover,' without satisfaction, does not pass the title of the
property to the defendant. Atwater v. Tupper, 271.
2. Plaintiff brought two actions of trover against A. and B., who had sev-
erally and successively converted the property. He obtained judgment against
A.: Held, to be no bar to the maintenance of the suit against B. Id.
3. And held, that the judgment was to be for the full value of the property.
Id.
4. The value of the property had been found upon a hearing on the general
issue before the filing of the plea in bar of the further maintenance of the ac-
tion. Plaintiff demurred to that plea, and the court sustained the demurrer.
The defendant then claimed the right to be heard upon the question of dam-
ages: Held, that he'was not entitled to a further hearing. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; COLLATERAL SECU-
RITY, 1 ; CORPORATION, 10 ; EQUITY, 41 ; JusTIcE OF THE PEACE, 1;
LISITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 6.
1. Grantee of land retaining the purchase-money as indemnity until encuiu-
brance is removed, is a trustee of the money for the vendor, and chargeable
with interest for its use. AlcCrea v. Martien, 64.
2. All the power, influence and skill of one occupying a relation of trust
is to be used for the advantage of the beneficiary, and all profits and increase
belong to the latter. Berkmeyer v. Kellerman, 202.
3. Although a trustee has no right to settle a debt due him as trustee by
cancelling one due from himself to the debtor, yet if the cestui que trust adopts
the settlement, and compels the sureties of the trustee to make good the
amount to him, they cannot afterward recover it of the original debtor. Sweet
v. Jffries, 272.
4. A purchaser of land died without completing his payments, and the
vendor without manifesting any intention of enforcing a right of forfeiture
resold one-half of the land to a third person, and one-half to the widow of the
purchaser for the balance due, which was less than the value of the land.
Held, that the widow took the title in trust for her husband's heirs. Mushan
V. Musham, 336.
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5. A trustee has no power to sell trust property for his own use, and a
purchaser with notice acquires no title. Third National Bank v. Lainge, 382.
6. Implied trust may be proved by parol. Nwton v. Taylor, 527.
7. An implied or constructive trust may be established from the acts of a
party who has obtained money upon the faith of his agreement to buy lands
in the name of his wife, and, having bought them, takes the title to himself.
Id.
8. A husband, so receiving money, is an agent for the wife, and by taking
the deed to himself becomes a trustee ex naaleficio. Id.
9. Where one accepts notes of another in trust to pay such person's debt,
and agrees with the creditor to either turn over the note to him, or when col-
lected to pay him the money, he makes himself a trustee for the creditor, even
though he receives no compensation. Walden v. Karr, 527.
10. Where a conveyance is obtained for fraudulent ends, the party deriving
title may be converted into a trustee. Huxley v. Rice, 592.
11. K. sold to H. a parcel out of a lot which he had mortgaged, and then
allowed the mortgage to be foreclosed, and by a collusive arrangement with
R., caused the lot to be bid in by R. Held, that R. should be considered as
trustee for H.'s benefit. Id.
12. Where a party makes another trustee of notes, not only for her own
benefit, but also for the benefit of the makers of the notes, the trustee being
one, she cannot revoke the same, nor will a court of equity revoke it where
there is no abuse of the trust. Light v. Scott, 592.
13. Upon a purchase by a father with his funds in the name of the son,
there is no resulting trust in the father, and the son may compel specific per-
formance. Lorentz v. Lorentz, 736.
14. A trustee is at liberty to apply for his release from the trust, on the
sole ground of unwillingness to act. Green v. Blackwell, 792.
15. The fact that he is one of two trustees, and that the deed of trust pro-
vides that, in case of the death of one, the survivor shall appoint* a new
trustee, will not induce the court to refuse the release. Id.
16. That a very large and unexpected addition to the trust estate has been
made, is in itself, a good reason for releasing an unwilling trustee. Id.
TUG. See ADMIRAL Y, 5.
ULTRA VIRES. See CosPORATION, 2.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. See DEED, 1 ; EQUITY, 14; WILL, 4, 9.
UNITED STATES. See ASSIGNMENT, 1 ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, I; EQUITY,
25; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 14.
1. Where the United States has leased property, public officers can only
agree to pay the rental, provided the money is appropriated by Congress.
Bradley v. United States, 396.
2. Where the lessor has been notified that he would not be paid any greater
rent than the sum appropriated, he can only recover such sum. Id.
3. Is not estopped by a judgment in ejectment against its tenants or agents.
Carr v. United States, 528.
4. Without an Act of Congress, no direct proceedings will lie at the suit
of an individual against the United States or its property; and no officer of
the government can waive this privilege. Id.
5. When it becomes apparent by the pleadings or the proofs that the posses-
sion assailed is the possession of the government by its agents, the jurisdic-
tion of the court ought to cease. Id.
6. The cases in which the property of the government may be subjected to
claims agaidst it are those in which the property is in juridical possession by
the act of the government itself, or has become so without violating its pos-
session, and it seeks the aid of the court to establish or reclaim its rights, in
such cases the prior rights of others to the same property should be adjudicated
and allowed. The cases of The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and The Davis, 10 Id.
15, cited and approved. Id.
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UNITED STATES COURTS. See BANKRUPTCY, 1, 2, 3; ERRORS AND Ap-
PEALS;, 2. JIMRSDICTION, 5.
1. The rule established by statute or decision in any state as to the order in
which mortgaged property, sold at different times to different purchasers, shall
be subjected to the mortgage will be followed by the federal courts sitting in
such state. Orcis v. Powell, 60.
2. Where jurisdiction depends upon the citizenship of the parties, the facts
to support that jurisdiction need not be averred in the pleadings, but must be
shown by the record. Robertson v. Cease, 207.
3. The record includes onlypapers properly inserted in the transcript. Id.
4. Citizenship and residence are not synonymous terms. Id.
5. Neither the language nor policy of the 14th amendment supports the
position that the bare averment of residence is sufficient to show jurisdiction.
Id.
6. A citizen of Tennessee filed a bill in the Circuit Court against a citizen
of Ohio to compel a re-transfer of shares in the Memphis Gaslight Co., which
complainant alleged had been fraudulently transferred by respondent from
complainant's name to his own upon the corporation books. ield, that the
Circuit Court had no jurisdiction, because the gaslight company was an indis-
pensable party. Kendig v. Dean, 265.
7. Where the decision of an inferior court of a state, was solely on a point
which would give jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court, it will not
be presumed that the State Supreme Court decided the case on another ground
not found in the record. Kith v. Clark, 336.
8. While the prayer for judgmefnt usually fixes the amount in dispute, yet
if the actual amount otherwise appears in the record, reference may be had to
that for the purpose of determining jurisdiction. Gray v. Blanchard, 400.
9. Where the decision is upon principles of general law, and it nowhere
appears in the record that the plaintiff claims any right, under the constitu-
tion or authbrity of the United States, the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction.
Bank of Old Dominion v. Mc Veigh, 400.
10. It is not enough for a record to show that a federal question was argued.
It must appear that it was decided, or that the judgment could not have been
given without deciding it. The State ex rel. v. Board of Liquidation, 400.
11. Where the court decided that as between vendor and vendee there could
be a sale and delivery of cotton, so as to pass title to the vendee before the
payment of the government tax. Held, that no federal question was in-
volved. Carson v. Ober, 400.
12. The judgment of the highest court in a state that a statute is in accord-
ance with the state constitution, is conclusive upon the U. S. Supreme Court.
Railroad v. Georgia, 452.
13. The courts of the United States take judicial notice of the laws which
formerly prevailed in countries acquired by the United States. Such laws are
not deemed foreign laws, but the laws of an antecedent government. United
States v. Askew, 586.
14. A suit between citizens of the same state cannot be sustained in a Cir-
cuit Court of the United States where there is no denial of the plaintiff's
patent, where its use is admitted, and where a subsisting contract governs the
rights of the parties. Hartell v. Tilghman, 592.
15. Circuit Courts cannot order a nonsuit, but may, at the close of plain-
tiff's case, direct a verdict for defendant if they are of opinion that, in view
of the evidence and of all inferences therefrom, the jury would not be war-
ranted in finding a verdict for plaintiff. Congress Spring Co. v. Edgar, 613.
USAGE. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 35 ; CUSTOM, 1 ; EVIDENCE, 33 ; MINES, 2.
USURY. See NATIONAL BANKS, 2, 4.
1. The extension of time of payment of a loan is a loan of money within
the meaning of a statute, and where the sureties upon a note executed a new
note for the consideration of the extension of time upon the original under-
taking, the transaction was held to be usurious. Kendiq v. Linn, 64.
2. Although by the terms upon which a defendant is let in to answer he can-
not set up usury, yet if usury be proved the complainant can only recover the
amount equitably due. Powers v. Chaplain, 207.
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3. One of two executors loaned moneys of the estate, reserving usury
thereon for his own use. Held, that such usury could be set up as a defence
in a suit by the executors. O'Neil v. Cleveland, 272.
4. An agent procuring a loan received from the borrower five per cent. and
$100 for expenses, the lender having no knowledge of and deriving no bene-
fit from this payment. Held, that it was not usury. Ballinger v. Bowland,
336.
5. The right to recover back usurious payments is a personal one, and can-
not be enforced by a purchaser of property subject to a debt drawing usurious
interest. ,Spaulding v. Davis, 792.
VARIANCE. See CRIxiNAL LAW, 8; LIBEL, 7.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See AssumpsiT, 1, 2; EsTOPPEL, I ; FRAUD,
1, 3 ; MORTGAGE, 15, 19 ; SALE; TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 1.
1. A vendor of land received the vendee's check for a cash payment, but
did not present it for four weeks. Two weeks after the sale the vendee with-
drew his funds from the bank: Held, that the vendee retained an equitable
lien on the land for the amount of the check. Madden v. Barnes, 136.
2. A vendor gave bond to give a deed on a certain day if the purchase-
money was then paid- Held, that the making of the deed and the payment
of the money were concurrent acts, and if the vendor could not make title at
the appointed time, and the vendee was ready to pay, the latter can recover
back the money already paid. Clark v. Weis, 208.
3. Upon a bill to enforce a lien for purchase-money where there has been
no fraud and no eviction, the vendee cannot controvert the title of the vendor,
and no one claiming an adverse title can be permitted to bring it forward and
have it settled in that suit. Peters v. Bowman, 272.
4. In such cases, the vendee must rely upon the covenants of title in the
deed of the vendor. Id.
5. Where at the time of the conveyance with warranty, there is adverse
possession under a paramount title, such possession is regarded as eviction,
and involves a breach of this covenant. Whdre the paramount title is in the
warrantor, and the adverse possession is tortious, there is no eviction. Id.
6. The covenant of good right to convey is synonymous with the covenant
of seisiu. The actual seisin of the grantor will support both. Id.
7. These covenants, if broken at all, are broken when they are made. They
are personal, and do not run with the land. Id.
8. A transfer of his bid by a bidder at public sale is valid, if there be no
fraud and no loss to the mortgagor. Even if objectionable, it cannot be set
up in an action of ejectment against remote purchasers without notice. John-
son v. Watson, 335.
9. A vendee of land, who has paid the price and taken possession, cannot
maintain an action to recover back the purchase-money, without giving up
possession. Long v. Saunders, 528.
10. The taking of bond and personal security for purchase-money is not a
waiver of vendor's lien, unless it is shown that the security alone was relied
on. Warren v. Branch, 664.
11. Before the passage of the West Virginia statute, requiring an express
reservation of this lien in the deed, the execution of the deed and the taking
of personal security would amount to a waiver. Id.
12. A vendor who has taken the sole mortgage of his vendee, a married
woman, in part payment of the purchase-money, is in equity, as against her,
entitled to a lien for such purchase-money. Kent v. Gerhard, 736.
13. A buyer is tinder no obligation to disclose the fact that he is purchasing
for anqther. Hughes v. Young, 788.
14. To resist payment of the purchase-money for fraud, the pukchaser must
elect to rescind the contract, and it is doubtful whether this can be done by his
grantees after his death. Bond v. Ramsey, 792.
15. Assumsnox OF ENCUmBRANCES BY THE PURCHASER or LAND, 337,
401.
INDEX.
VERDICT. See CRIMINAL LAw, 43; JUROR AND JURY, 1.
1. Where, in a civil action for assault and battery, issue is joined as to the
guilt of defendant, and whether the injury was occasioned by the plaintiff's
own fault, a verdict that the jury "do find and say that the plaintiff is enti-
tled to -$990 damages in the above case," is substantially a finding of the
issue in favor of the plaintiff. Slaul v. N~orman, 136.
2. In such action it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove the assault
and battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
3. A juror will not be allowed to impeach his verdict by his affidavit that
he would not have found the defendant guilty, if he had known that the pun-
ishment was death. The State v. Shock, 736.
VESSEL. See ADMIRALTY, 1, 2 ; NEGLIGENCE, 8, 9; SHIPPING, 1.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE. See DE3TOR AND CREDITOR, 2.
WAGER. See CONTRACT, 2, 8, 11.
WAIVER. See BILLS AND NOTES, 7; CRIMINAL LAW, 26 ;EsCAPE, 3; IN-
SURANCE, 22; JURISDICTION, 4; MECHANICS' LIEN, 1; MORTGAGE, 10;
VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 10.
A waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. The exist-
ence of such an intent is a matter of fact. First Nat. Bank; v. Hartford Ins.
Co., 136.
WARRANTY. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 5.
WASTE. See MORTGAGE, 16.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See EQUITY, 22; HIGHWAY, 5; MINES,
1; NEGLIGENCE, 7; RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1.
I. The owners of land bounded on a harbor, own only to high-water mark.
They have,a right to construct wharves below that line, if they conform to
the state regulations, and do not obstruct navigation. State v. Sargeant, 243.
2. The duty of protecting the right of navigation rests upon the legislature.
Id.
3. They may vest in commissioners authority to restrain riparian proprie.
tors from obstructing navigable waters. Ad.
4. The enactment of such a law is not an exercise of the right of eminent
domain. Id.
5. The Act of 1872, establishing a board of commissioners for New Haven
harbor, gives the board power to prevent encroachments upon the harbor ;
authorizes them to prescribe harbor lines, make any structure in the harbor
not approved by the commissioners a public nuisance, and authorizes the com-
missioners to bring suits to stop such erection. Held, 1. That the act was
constitutional and valid. 2. That it was not necessary for the commissioners
to establish a general harbor line. before forbidding or removing particular
encroachments. Id.
6. The owner of land on which there is a watercourse, may receive the
water in its natural channel, and use it, but must return it to its channel when
it leaves his land. Taylor v. Fickas, 249.
7. The owner of land is the absolute owner of all water lying on the sur-
face from rain-fall or the overflow of streams. And, he may fill up his land
so as to prevent its being so overflowed. Id.
8. An owner of land on the Ohio river planted trees between his land
and that adjoining, so as to arrest the drift-wood, and in times of overflow, to
back up the water on the adjoining land. reld, that the adjoining owner had
no cause of action. Id.
9. Where a stream was useful, both for domestic purposes and for watering
stock, and defendAnt kept hogs on land bordering thereon, which fouled the
stream and deprived a lower proprietor of its use for domestic purposes.
Held, that it was for the jury to determine whether defendant's use was rea-
sonable and proper. Hazeltine, Adm'r, v. Case, 663.
WAY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 41 ; INJUNCTION, 5.
856 INDEX.
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.
The true Mexican vara is slightly less than 33 American inches, but by use
in California, it is estimated at 33 inches, and in Texas at 331 inches. United
States v. Askew, 586.
WHARF. See MNIUiCPAL CORPORATION, 12; WATERS AND WATERCOUREB,
1.
WILL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 37.
1. Where there is a corporation whose legal title answers the description
in a bequest, parol evidence is inadmissible to show declarations of testator
that he meant a different corporation. Dunham v. Averhill, 132.
2. Where a testator by a codicil revokes a devise on the assumption of a
fact which proves not to exist, the revocation does not take effect. Dunham v.
Averhill, 208.
3. But such revocation will not be set aside unless testator's belief of the
existence of such fact appear by the will itself. Id.
4. A testator, by a will made five days before his death, bequeathed the
bulk of his estate to a church. It appeared that the will was drawn by a
vestryman of the church who was the only person who conversed with the
testator about the will, and who was made sole executor. This vestryman,
together with his brother-in-law and another vestryman were the witnesses.
Relatives living near by were not apprised of testator's illness, and other
relatives were misdescribed in the will. Hdd, that the circumstances created
a suspicion of undue influence which required explanation. Drake's Appeal,
208.
5. Qumre: Whether the vestrymen were competent witnesses to the will.
Id.
6. A direction to invest "in productive funds upon good securities," means
only those designated by law; and a disregard of such requirement renders
the executor personally liable. Ward v. Kitchen, 332.
7. T. gave to the children of D. a part of his estate, to be equally divided
between them as they should respectively attain their majority. At the time
of making the will and of T.'s death, D. had two children, but before the
elder came of age, another child was born: Held, That each of the three chil-
dren was entitled to an equal share, notwithstanding the use of the word
"between." rard v. Tompkins, 336.
8. When duly executed is presumed to contain testator's unconstrained
wishes, but this may be rebutted by proof of fraud and undue influence.
Greenwood v. Cline, 736.
9. What constitutes undue influence depends upon the circumstances of
each case. Id.
WITNESS. See CmmixA.LA LAW, 4, 10, 12, 13, 18, 25, 27, 41, 42 ; EviDExcz,
9, 10, 15-1&
END OF VOL. XXVIL
